Preservation of memory for generalities in amnesia by Haslam, Catherine
Preservation of memory for generalities in amnesia
Catherine Haslam
B.Sc. (Psychol.), UNSW, M. Clin. Psy., Macq.
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Psychology Division, The Australian National University
July 1998
This thesis describes original research carried out by the author in the Division of 
Psychology of the Australian National University. Aside from the usual advice 
given by supervisors in the course of such study, the work reported in this thesis 
was performed solely by the author. This thesis has not been submitted for a 
higher degree at any other university or institution.
Catherine Haslam
N.B. The above statement notwithstanding, some of the material contained in 
this thesis is reported in the following articles:
Haslam, C., Coltheart, M., & Cook, M. (1997). Preserved category learning in 
amnesia. Neurocase. 3, 337-347.
Haslam, C., Cook, M , & McKone, E. (in press). Memory for generalities: 
Access to higher-level categorical relationships in amnesia. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology.
iii
Acknowledgments
My reason for undertaking doctoral research was primarily to gain an 
education and I am indebted to a number of people who have supported me in 
this endeavour. I owe most to Dr Michael Cook who played an essential role in 
my intellectual development both as sparring partner and as counsellor. I am 
only sorry for future students who will not have the benefit of his vigorous 
approach to supervision as he nears retirement. I also wish to thank Professor 
Max Coltheart for his contribution to the empirical program and helpful 
comments throughout this research. Other academic advisors, including Dr 
Elinor McKone and Professor Marie Carroll, also provided valuable support at 
various stages in this research.
In conducting research there are always technical and practical problems 
to overcome. In this regard I would like to thank the technical staff in the 
Psychology Division at the ANU, in particular Shane Pozzi, for helping in 
development of materials used in some experiments, and the Department of 
Psychology at the Canberra Hospital for access to their test library.
I am extremely grateful to the patients and families who took part in this 
research and to a number of colleagues — Philippa Hedges, Gail Robinson, 
Amanda Stevenson and Ursula Johns — for their assistance in referring 
prospective participants. There are also several other people that I would like to 
thank for providing me with emotional support during some of the most trying 
times. I could not imagine having completed this thesis without the patience, 
endurance and intellectual support of my husband Alex Haslam. Kate Reynolds 
and Felicity Benn were particularly helpful in both showing the way and 
providing me with a sounding board whenever required. Finally, I would like to 
thank my family for their support in my choice of career and for being there 
despite their own trials.
iv
—
üsilaB
Contents m Ä I. . ■ ; ;
Acknowledgments 
Contents 
List of Figures 
List of Tables 
Abstract
Page
iii
iv 
xi 
xiv 
xv
Chapter 1 Memory for generalities in amnesia:
An introduction 1
1.1 The present program of research 7
Chapter 2 The amnesic syndrome: Description and theory 10
2.1 Describing amnesia 10
2.1.1 Retrograde amnesia 10
2.1.2 Anterograde amnesia 12
2.1.3 Summary 14
2.2 Theories of amnesia 15
2.2.1 Theories of retrograde amnesia 15
2.2.2 Theories of anterograde amnesia 19
Modular/systemic accounts of amnesia 19
The semantic-episodic distinction 19
The procedural-declarative distinction 22
Modular/systemic accounts: Concluding 
comments 25
P ro c e ss  th eo rie s  o f  a m n e s ia  25
C o n te x tu a l m e m o ry  d e f ic it  h y p o th e s is  26
C o n c e p tu a lly -d r iv e n  a n d  d a ta  d r iv e n  
p ro c e sse s  29
P ro c e ss  ac co u n ts : C o n c lu d in g  c o m m e n ts  32
S tag e  th e o r ie s  o f  a m n e s ia  32
E n c o d in g /re tr ie v a l 33
S to ra g e /c o n so lid a tio n  36
S tag e  th eo rie s : C o n c lu d in g  c o m m e n ts  39
2.3 Overview 39
C h a p ter  3 P reserv a tio n  o f  m em ory  fo r  g en era lities: A  
rev iew  o f  f in d in gs from  d em en tia  an d  a m n esia  41
3.1 Preservation of memory for generalities in dem entia 43
3 .1 .1  E v id e n c e  43
3 .1 .2  T h e o ry  4 9
T h e  h ie ra rc h ic a l n e tw o rk  m o d e l 4 9
T h e  fa m ilia r ity /fre q u e n c y  a c c o u n t 52
T h e  fra g m e n ta ry  k n o w le d g e  a c c o u n t 5 4
S u m m a ry  55
3.2 Preservation of memory for generalities in amnesia 56
3 .2 .1  R e se a rc h  p r im a rily  c o n c e rn e d  w ith  o th e r
th e o re tic a l issu e s  56
In d ire c t e v id e n c e  56
D ire c t e v id e n c e  61
R e tro g ra d e  a m n e s ia  62
A n te ro g ra d e  a m n e s ia  63
S u m m a ry  o f  d ire c t a n d  in d ire c t e v id e n c e  68
VI
3.2.2 Research primarily concerned with the generalities
phenomenon 68
Preserved category learning in amnesia:
The case of MK 68
3.3 Overview 74
Chapter 4 Overview of empirical chapters 76
Chapter 5 Investigating memory for generalities in amnesia:
Case histories 80
5.1 Case IP 82
5.2 Case GS 86
5.3 Case TG 89
5.4 Patient summary 92
Chapter 6 Accessing knowledge of higher-level categorical
relationships in amnesia 93
6.1 Experiment 1: Preservation of memory for
generalities in anterograde amnesia 94
Method 96
Participants 96
Materials 96
Procedure 97
Results and Discussion 98
6.2 Experiment 2: The role of study context 102
Method 104
Participants 104
Materials 104
Procedure 105
Results and Discussion 105
vii
6.3 Experiment 3: Direct examination of higher-level
knowledge 110
Method 111
Participants 111
Materials 111
Procedure 111
(i) Knowledge of educator/tradesperson 111
(ii) Knowledge of teacher/lecturer 112
Results and Discussion 112
(i) Knowledge of educator/tradesperson 112
(ii) Knowledge of teacher/lecturer 114
6.4 Conclusions from Experiments 1 to 3 115
Chapter 7 Amnesic memory for generalities: Can
knowledge of higher-level associations be 
accessed directly? 119
7.1 Experiment 4: Accessing higher-level knowledge
directly 119
Method 121
Design 121
Participants 122
Materials 123
Procedure 124
Results and Discussion 127
7.2 Experiment 5: Accessing higher-level knowledge
directly from names 132
Method 133
Design 133
Participants 133
Materials 133
Procedure 133
Results and Discussion 134
viii
7.3 Conclusions from Experiments 4 and 5 137
The evidence for direct access to higher-level knowledge 138 
Differences between patients in access to knowledge 139
Comparison of results from Experiments 3, 4 and 5 140
Chapter 8 Preservation of memory for generalities in
retrograde amnesia 142
8.1 Investigation of autobiographical memory for
generalities 144
8.1.1 Experiment 6: Direct examination of
autobiographical knowledge 144
Method 145
Design 145
Participants 146
Materials 146
Procedure 147
Results and Discussion 149
8.1.2 Experiment 7: Indirect examination of
autobiographical knowledge 152
Method 153
Participants 153
Materials 153
Procedure 153
Results and Discussion 153
8.2 Investigation of memory for generalities in the
public domain 156
8.2.1 Experiment 8: Direct examination of memory 
for famous people 156
Method 157
Design 157
Participants 158
Materials 159
Procedure 160
Results and Discussion 162
Faces 162
Names 164
8.3 Conclusions from Experiment 6 to 8 166
ix
Chapter 9 Memory for generalities in a non-impaired
sample 169
9.1 Experiment 9: Investigation of the generalities
phenomenon in a non-clinical sample 171
Method 172
Design 172
Participants 173
Materials 173
Procedure 174
Results and Discussion 176
(i) Coarse occupational discrimination 178
(ii) Fine occupational discrimination 179
Chapter 10 Preserved memory for generalities in amnesia: 
Conclusions 182
10.1 Overview 182
10.2 General theoretical implications of findings 186
10.2.1 Which knowledge domain? 186
10.2.2 Explaining preservation of memory for generalities 
in amnesia 187
Familiarity/frequency 187
Fragmentary knowledge 190
10.2.3 Specific issues arising from the results 191
Preservation of old and new memory for generalities 191
Performance on direct and indirect tests of higher- 
level knowledge 194
Preservation of memory for generalities and the
role of context 197
Superior memory for generalities in the non-impaired 199
Modality differences in access to information
about people 200
A functional model of the stages involved 
in person recognition 201
Explaining modality differences in access 
to knowledge 203
10.3 Final comment 205
References 207
Appendices 224
Appendix 1: Appendices to Experiments 
reported in Chapter 6 225
Appendix 2: Appendices to Experiments 
reported in Chapter 7 229
Appendix 3: Appendices to Experiments 
reported in Chapter 8 235
XI
Figure Number Page
3.1 Illustration of a hierarchical semantic network structure
of the type proposed by Collins and Quillian (1969). 50
3.2 Illustration of the structure of degraded concepts according to a
fragmentary knowledge account. 55
6.1 The hierarchy of occupations used in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. 96
6.2 Indirect measures of higher-level knowledge in two amnesic 
patients (a) results of Experiment 1 (educator/tradesperson)
and (b) results of Experiment 2 (teacher/lecturer). 99
6.3 Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2: Direct and indirect measures 
of knowledge at the level of teacher/lecturer in two amnesic
patients. 107
6.4 Results of Experiment 3: Direct measures of knowledge at the
higher-level of (a) educator/tradesperson and (b) teacher/lecturer
in two amnesic patients. 113
7.1 The hierarchy of knowledge levels used in Experiment 4. 121
7.2 Design of Experiment 4. 122
7.3 The two types of name cards used to test knowledge for face-name
associations (a) single name card and (b) name pair card. 125
7.4 Accuracy (as a proportion of hits - false alarms) of yes/no 
recognition for novel faces as a function of level in (a) amnesic 
patients and (b) matched controls. 128
7.5 Accuracy (as a proportion of hits - false alarms) of yes/no
recognition for novel names as a function of level in (a) amnesic 
patients and (b) matched controls. 135
8.1 The hierarchy of knowledge levels used in Experiment 6. 144
8.2 Design of Experiment 6. 145
8.3 Accuracy (as a proportion of hits - false alarms) of TG's
autobiographical memory in response to face and name cues. 150
8.4 Knowledge levels used in Experiment 7. 152
8.5 Results of indirect testing of higher-level autobiographical
knowledge in TG. 155
8.6 The hierarchy of knowledge levels used in Experiment 8. 157
8.7 Design of Experiment 8. 158
8.8 The two types of name cards used to test knowledge for face-name
associations (a) single name card and (b) name pair card. 160
8.9 Accuracy (as a proportion of hits - false alarms) of yes/no
recognition for famous faces as a function of level in (a) amnesic 
patients and (b) matched controls. 163
8.10 Accuracy (as a proportion of hits - false alarms) of yes/no
recognition for famous names as a function of level in (a) amnesic 
patients and (b) matched controls. 165
9.1 Design of Experiment 9. 173
9.2 Indirect measures of higher-level knowledge in a non-clinical group. 177
9.3 Comparison of direct and indirect measures of higher-level
knowledge in a non-clinical group. 177
10.1 A hypothetical fragmentary representation of Mel Gibson
xii
191
xiii
10.2 The central features of the functional model of person recognition 
adapted from Valentine et al. (1991) and illustrated in Green and 
Hodges(1996) 202
xiv
Table Number Page
3.1 Recall and matching-to-sample test results (No. correct 
identifications/14) during the initial study phase (from
Haslam et al., 1997). 70
5.1 IP's neuropsychological test profile. 84
5.2 GS's neuropsychological test profile. 87
5.3 TG's neuropsychological test profile. 90
6.1 Proportion of correct to incorrect category responses across
consecutively paired study/test trials in amnesic patients. 109
10.1 Summary of the main findings from empirical chapters. 183
10.2 Evaluation of theories directly relevant to the investigation of 
preserved memory for generalities. 188
Abstract
The pattern of preserved and impaired abilities observed in amnesic 
patients has been used to draw conclusions about the structure and function of 
normal memory. Yet our understanding of the memory disturbance in this 
condition is limited. This thesis presents a novel perspective on the preserved 
and impaired capacities of amnesic patients based on a differentiation between 
item-specific and higher-level categorical knowledge. The dissociation of 
categorical knowledge from exemplar knowledge — referred to here as 
preservation of memory for generalities — has previously been demonstrated in 
particular forms of dementia. However, there are some indications that it might 
also occur in amnesia (e.g., Haslam, Coltheart & Cook, 1997). The aim of this 
thesis is to provide an exploration of the memory for generalities phenomenon in 
amnesia.
The phenomenon of preserved memory for generalities was investigated 
in three amnesic patients. Two of these patients suffered from anterograde 
amnesia and one suffered from both anterograde and retrograde amnesia. In all 
studies, knowledge about people was investigated (i.e., face-occupation or face- 
name-occupation associations). The first five experiments provide evidence of 
preserved memory for generalities in anterograde amnesia. In Experiment 1 
preservation of memory for generalities was shown for novel face-occupation 
associations. Patients remembered higher-level semantic attributes of 
occupations (e.g., educator, tradesperson) but not the more specific studied 
associations (e.g., teacher, lecturer, electrician, plumber). The influence of study 
context was investigated in the second study and it was found that one patient 
could discriminate between people at a level of categorization that had not been 
accessible in the earlier experiment (i.e., teacher/lecturer). These experiments 
examined memory indirectly. Here, higher-level knowledge was revealed in the 
pattern of response confusions that were made when patients were asked to
XVI
discriminate between people on the basis of their studied occupations. However, 
patients could not access the same information when higher-level knowledge was 
examined directly (Experiment 3). Although this finding suggests that the 
generalities phenomenon might simply be a product of testing procedure, results 
of Experiments 4 and 5 showed that higher-level knowledge could be accessed 
directly provided the information was sufficiently general. It was concluded that 
the phenomenon was not based on the mode of response employed at test, 
although it was also clear that indirect methods of testing facilitated memory 
performance in the amnesic patients.
Evidence of preserved remote memory for generalities was also found in 
the one patient with retrograde amnesia. This patient retained sufficient 
knowledge to support higher-level, but not lower-level, distinctions on direct 
tests in autobiographical (Experiment 6) and public (Experiment 8) domains. In 
both knowledge domains a difference was found in the amount of information 
that could be accessed in the two modalities (i.e., faces and names).
Furthermore, in the autobiographical domain, it was shown that indirect tests 
facilitated access to knowledge that was not available on direct tests (Experiment 
7). A final experiment investigated the preservation of memory for generalities 
phenomenon in a non-impaired sample. While these participants also displayed 
superior memory for generalities under conditions of partial learning, no 
difference was found in their performance on direct and indirect tests. The latter 
result provides additional support for the notion that the preservation of memory 
for generalities phenomenon is not simply a consequence of testing procedure.
The preservation of memory for generalities phenomenon cannot be 
accommodated by current theories of amnesia. Furthermore, of the two main 
approaches proposed to explain the phenomenon in dementia, only one theory 
(referred to as a "fragmentary knowledge" account) explains the majority of our 
findings. The implications of modality-based differences in access to person- 
related knowledge for models of face recognition are also considered. Overall,
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the present series of experiments show that preservation of memory for 
generalities is not restricted to dementia or amnesia. Its occurrence in a non- 
clinical sample suggests that it can occur under any conditions of poor memory 
and thus should inform our understanding of memory processes and organisation 
in general.
1Memory for generalities in amnesia: An introduction
Our understanding of normal memory function has been advanced 
considerably in the course of studying the pattern of preserved and impaired 
abilities in patients with organic memory dysfunction. Not only do these patterns 
help to clarify the nature of the particular memory disorder in question but, at a 
more fundamental level, they play an important role in the development and 
revision of theories of memory structure. The purest form of memory 
disturbance occurs in the amnesic syndrome, which results from a variety of 
neurological conditions including cerebrovascular accidents, anoxia, Wernicke- 
Korsakoff syndrome and heipes simplex encephalitis (see O'Connor, Verfaellie 
& Cermak, 1995, for a discussion). Although there is some disagreement about 
how exactly to define amnesia (e.g., see Knight & Longmore, 1991; Mayes & 
Downes, 1997; O'Connor et al., 1995), most researchers agree that this condition 
is characterised behaviourally by a profound disturbance to memory, which can 
affect both remote and newly acquired knowledge, and a general preservation of 
remaining cognitive functions.
There have been various attempts to explain the memory loss in amnesia 
and some of this work has focused on memory dissociations. Various 
dissociations have been proposed in an effort to identify what these patients can 
and cannot remember. Essentially, this process of characterizing the memory 
disturbance in amnesia entails contrasting two alternative classes of material — 
one which is processed normally by patients and the other which is processed 
abnormally. While it has been argued that dissociating a complex function such 
as memory into two systems or processes is simplistic (e.g., Baddeley, 1982a), it 
must also be noted that the study of memory dissociations has advanced our
2understanding of the amnesic condition. Perhaps the most prominent 
dissociation is that between short-term memory (STM) and long-term memory 
(LTM). Amnesic patients provide one of the primary sources of evidence for this 
particular memory dissociation given that, on superficial analysis, their memory 
disturbance seems to be characterized by preservation of STM (together with 
premorbid LTM) and an inability to store new information in LTM. Preservation 
of STM has been demonstrated most convincingly on tests of immediate memory 
span (e.g., Baddeley & Warrington, 1970; Butters & Cermak, 1980), and this 
particular capacity represents one of the core features of amnesia that is not 
bound by specific pathological presentations of the condition.
With increasing evidence of preserved priming (e.g., Graf, Squire & 
Mandler, 1984; Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982; Moscovitch, 1982; Warrington & 
Weiskrantz, 1970, 1974) and skill-learning (e.g., Brooks & Baddeley, 1976; 
Cermak, Lewis, Butters & Goodglass, 1973; Corkin, 1968) in amnesia, it became 
apparent that at least some information was also retained in long term memory.
A number of other memory dissociations were proposed to account for the 
selective preservation of information in long-term memory. One account 
explains the pattern of preserved and impaired abilities in amnesic patients in 
terms of a dissociation between semantic and episodic memory. According to 
this proposal, semantic memory, which comprises our factual and general 
knowledge about the world, is preserved in amnesia while knowledge of the 
particular circumstances in which information is acquired — or episodic memory 
— is selectively impaired (Kinsbourne & Wood, 1975; Parkin, 1982; Tulving, 
1983). However, disillusionment with this suggestion, largely arising from 
limited support for new semantic learning in these patients, led to alternative 
proposals of memory dissociations in amnesia. Cohen and Squire (1980) argued 
that both semantic and episodic memory were impaired in amnesia. They 
suggested that both types of memory required conscious recollection of facts and 
episodes — a function they attributed to the declarative memory system.
3Preservation of function was supported by procedural memory, a system believed 
to be responsible for the expression of memory through behaviour or 
performance (e.g., skill learning, conditioning and priming). Again though, there 
is disagreement about whether this distinction adequately characterises the 
pattern of memory impairment and preservation in amnesia. Not only has the 
concept of procedural memory been criticised because it is too general, but even 
despite its generality, it fails to encompass all aspects of preserved ability in 
amnesia (e.g., preservation of short-term memory and various forms of priming, 
Baddeley, 1990; Eysenck & Keane, 1990).
Both the semantic/episodic and procedural/declarative accounts attribute 
the pattern of preserved and impaired ability to different underlying memory 
systems. There are other explanations that attribute the memory disturbance to a 
deficiency in processing particular information. The implicit-explicit 
dissociation is one example of this. As in the case of procedural/declarative 
memory, consciousness play a key role in this dissociation — memory is 
expressed implicitly when performance is enhanced without conscious awareness 
and memory is expressed explicitly when conscious recollection is invoked (Graf 
& Schacter, 1985; Schacter, 1985). For the purpose of explaining the amnesic 
syndrome, it has been suggested that implicit memory is preserved and explicit 
memory is impaired in these patients (Graf & Schacter, 1985; Schacter, 1985). 
However, as an explanation of amnesia, the implicit/explicit account also has 
limitations. Like other memory dissociations it is descriptive and hence, on its 
own, it cannot explain the nature of the deficit(s) in amnesia (Schacter, 1987). 
There are also aspects of amnesic memory performance that cannot be explained 
by the implicit/explicit dissociation. For instance, this theory cannot account for 
preservation of immediate or short-term memory in these patients. Because 
performance on these tests requires conscious recall, the proposal that amnesics 
are impaired on all explicit memory tests is obviously false. Furthermore, there 
is some debate about the degree of explicit memory impairment in amnesia and
4in particular, whether it is disproportionately impaired for certain kinds of 
materials (see Mayes & Downes, 1997, for a discussion).
There is considerable disagreement over how to describe the nature of the 
deficit in the amnesic syndrome. The various proposed dissociations have been 
debated in the amnesia literature for some time and as yet no resolution has been 
reached. Given the lack of agreement about the nature of the memory 
disturbance, it is probably not surprising that there is also little agreement about 
the stage of information processing implicated in these dissociations (i.e., 
encoding, storage/consolidation and retrieval). Clearly, the above dissociations 
have failed to characterise the pattern of impaired and preserved ability in 
amnesia adequately and thus there is still much to be learned if we are to advance 
thinking about this condition and memory function in general.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine a novel feature of the deficit in 
amnesia involving a differentiation in performance on tests of exemplar and 
higher-level categorical knowledge. It is shown that the memory disturbance 
observed in amnesic patients is characterised in part by impairment of item- 
specific (i.e., exemplar) knowledge and preservation of more general (i.e., 
higher-level) categorical knowledge. This pattern of disturbance will be 
described as preservation of memory for generalities. Although this 
phenomenon has previously been reported in patients suffering from particular 
dementing conditions, there is evidence to suggest that it may occur in amnesia.
The dissociation of higher-level category knowledge from exemplar 
knowledge was first identified by Warrington (1975). She found that patients 
with selective impairment of semantic memory could describe items in terms of 
their broad class or superordinate category, but could not identify them precisely. 
Since Warrington's paper there have been many reports of this phenomenon in 
particular forms of dementia (e.g., semantic dementia, Alzheimer's disease) and 
this has been illustrated in a range of tasks. Preservation of higher-level 
categorical knowledge has been demonstrated in object naming, definition,
5sorting, fluency, probe questions (both category and attribute) and word-picture 
matching (Chertkow, Bub & Caplan, 1992; Funnell, 1995; Hodges, Graham & 
Patterson, 1995; Hodges, Patterson & Tyler, 1994; Martin, 1987).
The evidence in support of preserved memory for generalities comes 
mainly from patients suffering particular forms of dementia, and it may be that 
the phenomenon is restricted to these conditions. A recent study challenges this 
view. Haslam, Coltheart and Cook (1997) found evidence of preserved 
categorical knowledge and impaired item-specific knowledge in an amnesic 
patient, MK. This patient was asked to learn a series of picture-name 
associations from two well-known categories — animals and fruits/vegetables. 
When knowledge for these associations was tested it was found that MK could 
only discriminate items on a categorical basis (i.e., whether they belonged to the 
animal or fruit/vegetable category). He could not make more detailed 
discriminations such as those involved in distinguishing two items from the same 
category. Thus, not only had MK provided evidence of new learning in amnesia, 
but his results suggested an alternative analysis of the deficit in amnesia.
Because the knowledge he acquired could only support discrimination at a 
superordinate level, it was considered possible that MK had either acquired 
partial knowledge or could only retrieve partial knowledge that was semantically- 
related to the studied items.
Some other studies report results which could be interpreted as evidence 
of partial knowledge in amnesia, even though preservation of memory for 
generalities was not the primary issue under investigation. Knowlton, Squire and 
colleagues (Knowlton, Mangels & Squire, 1996; Knowlton, Ramus & Squire, 
1992; Knowlton & Squire, 1993, 1994, 1996; Squire & Knowlton, 1995) found 
that amnesic patients acquired sufficient knowledge of artificial grammar to 
differentiate grammatical from non-grammatical letter strings. Although patients 
were successful in performing this categorical task they had no memory for the 
specific materials used in training. In another study, Verfaellie, Croce and
6Milberg (1995) found that an amnesic patient acquired enough knowledge about 
novel compound words to identify their correct usage in sentences that 
maintained the general meaning of the target word. However, they were no 
better than chance in differentiating sentences that violated the specific meaning 
of target words. Additional evidence of partial knowledge has been found in 
amnesic patients when exploring their susceptibility to memory illusions. In 
these studies, knowledge was indicated in the pattern of errors or semantic 
confusions that patients made when attempting to recall or recognise items 
encountered at study (Cermak, Butters & Gerrein, 1973; Schacter, Verfaellie & 
Pradere, 1996).
A common finding in these studies is the demonstration of partial 
knowledge in amnesia. The tasks used to examine memory in each case allowed 
patients to demonstrate partial knowledge when detailed knowledge was not 
available. Not only does this highlight the importance of examining higher-level 
categorical relationships when searching for evidence of new learning, but more 
importantly, it indicates that the patients must have formed some memorial 
representation of materials they encountered at study. Unfortunately, we know 
little about the structure of these memory representations. While it is possible 
that amnesic patients acquire a degraded version of the original study materials 
(as suggested by Schacter et al., 1996), it is also possible that patients have 
partial access to a reasonably intact memory representation. Clearly, there is 
more to be learned about the nature of the memory representation that supports 
performance on tests of higher-level categorical knowledge and hinders 
performance on tests of item-specific knowledge. It is this pattern of memory 
disturbance — the preservation of memory for generalities — which is the focus 
of the present thesis.
71.1 The present program of research
This thesis presents results of an investigation into preservation of 
memory for generalities in amnesia. Three amnesic patients took part — IP and 
GS, who suffered from the anterograde form of the disturbance only, and TG 
who suffered from both anterograde and retrograde amnesia. Case histories for 
these patients are presented in Chapter 5.
Two general aspects of memory function were addressed. First, the 
influence of test type (i.e., direct and indirect) was examined. Previous research, 
particularly in the area of priming, suggests that amnesic patients perform best 
when memory is tested indirectly (e.g., Graf & Schacter, 1985; Graf, et al., 1984; 
Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982; Schacter, 1985; Shimamura & Squire, 1984; 
Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1974, 1978). Perhaps this is also true of memory for 
generalities — that is, amnesic memory may be best when higher-level 
knowledge is tapped indirectly. To address this issue higher-level knowledge 
was tested both directly and indirectly. In Experiments 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 higher- 
level knowledge was examined directly. Up to five levels of detail were 
examined in these studies, ranging from the very general to the very specific. 
Indirect examination of higher-level knowledge involved analysis of semantic 
confusions or errors, and the influence of this form of testing was explored in 
Experiments 1, 2 and 7.
A second aspect of memory for generalities explored in this thesis 
concerns the relevance of this phenomenon to both remote and newly acquired 
knowledge. The relationship between retrograde and anterograde amnesia, if 
indeed one exists, is by no means clear. To some degree, this reflects our level of 
understanding of retrograde amnesia which is relatively poor compared to that of 
anterograde amnesia. One way to improve this situation is to evaluate the 
different theoretical positions in terms of their capacity to explain both retrograde 
and anterograde memory. To address this issue, preservation of remote and 
newly acquired memory for generalities was investigated in one patient who
8suffered from both forms of the disturbance. Two domains of remote memory 
were investigated — public knowledge and autobiographical knowledge.
The plan to investigate preserved memory for generalities in retrograde 
and anterograde amnesia, had implications for our choice of stimulus materials.
In particular, it was important to ensure that materials used to examine past and 
newly acquired knowledge were of equal complexity. For this reason, 
investigation of the generalities phenomenon focused on knowledge about 
people. In the case of remote memory knowledge about famous people was 
examined. In addition, knowledge about family and friends was explored in the 
one patient who participated in the autobiographical component of this research 
program. To examine new learning, details about people unknown to patients 
were studied prior to testing. The type of knowledge examined ranged from 
general information about a person (e.g., familiarity, fame) to increasingly more 
specific detail, including occupational status and a person's name.
In a final study memory for generalities was investigated in non-clinical 
participants to determine the relevance of this phenomenon to our understanding 
of memory function in general. It is certainly possible that preservation of 
memory for generalities is a phenomenon peculiar to individuals suffering some 
form of brain impairment. However, it is also possible that memory for 
generalities is better under any conditions of degraded memory and this can even 
occur in people who do not suffer from memory impairment. If the latter is true, 
then the difference between clinical and non-clinical populations is merely 
quantitative — we all show better memory for generalities, but the phenomenon 
is more pronounced in amnesic patients given their condition is characterised by 
a profound and ever-present memory disturbance.
In summary, this thesis provides a different perspective on the deficiency 
in amnesia based on a phenomenon that has been previously explored in 
dementia. This phenomenon, preservation of memory for generalities, was 
explored in both amnesic patients as well as in participants without memory
9impairment. The results suggested that the generalities phenomenon occurs 
outside the narrow confines of the dementing conditions in which it was first 
observed. Evidence of superior memory for generalities was found in both 
amnesic patients and non-impaired controls. However, there were important 
differences between these groups. In patients, memory for generalities was best 
when knowledge was examined indirectly. However, the non-impaired group 
performed equally on direct and indirect tests of higher-level knowledge. 
Furthermore, the non-impaired sample could access specific details despite being 
subjected to suboptimal learning conditions — though, as noted, their memory 
for more general-level knowledge was considerably better. In contrast, patients 
could not provide any specific details and thus, the differentiation observed in 
their performance was driven solely by preservation of more general-level 
knowledge. Thus, while the conclusion reached is the same in both groups, 
superior performance on tests of generalities in the amnesic patients may be 
supported by different mechanisms.
The following chapters present a review of the relevant literature on 
amnesia and the generalities phenomenon. Evidence in support of the 
generalities phenomenon is discussed in three parts. First, the dissociation 
between exemplar and categorical knowledge with respect to dementia is 
discussed and this is followed by a discussion of the evidence from patients 
suffering amnesia. Finally, a preliminary study (Haslam et al., 1997) which 
explored the generalities phenomenon directly in amnesic patients is discussed in 
greater depth as this served as the catalyst for the current program of research. 
After a number of empirical chapters which explore memory for generalities in 
the manner outlined above, we then return to consider the broader implications 
and utility of this phenomenon for the study of memory as a whole.
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The amnesic syndrome: Description and theory
2.1 Describing amnesia
Amnesia is characterized by a pattern of preserved and impaired ability. 
The primary characteristic is a profound disturbance to memory which presents 
in the context of preserved intellectual function. Amnesia can affect memories 
which existed prior to the onset of the condition or it can affect newly acquired 
memories. These forms of the amnesic memory disturbance are referred to as 
retrograde amnesia (RA) and anterograde amnesia (AA) respectively. It is 
possible for RA and AA to be present in isolation or together. Mild AA may 
occur in the context of severe RA or vice versa, and in these cases the condition 
is usually characterized by the type of memory impairment that predominates. In 
the case of RA, there are differences between patients in the duration of memory 
disturbance. Some patients have a relatively short RA, covering a period of 
several months or years, and others show a more extensive memory loss, 
involving decades. This is not the case in AA where the deficit to new learning 
affects all information encountered after the onset of the condition. Irrespective 
of the form that amnesia takes, it is clear that the memory loss is not complete. 
Neither remote or newly acquired knowledge is totally impaired. However, as 
will be outlined below, the pattern of residual abilities observed in these two 
forms of amnesia differs.
2.1.1 Retrograde Amnesia
Several residual remote memory abilities are commonly reported in 
patients with RA. One capacity common to all patients is preservation of 
language. All patients retain their use of an extensive vocabulary as is obvious 
from their ability to engage in normal conversation. The remaining residual
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abilities, which include the presence of temporal gradients in memory recall and 
the sparing of domain-specific knowledge (e.g., preservation of autobiographical 
knowledge relative to public knowledge), tend to vary among individual patients.
In some patients the memory loss may be temporally graded, with recent 
remote memories more vulnerable than distant remote memories. This is most 
common in patients who develop amnesia secondary to the alcoholic Korsakoff 
syndrome (e.g., Albert, Butters & Levin, 1979; Butters & Cermak, 1986; 
Kopelman, 1989; Squire, Haist & Shimamura, 1989). There are also patients in 
whom there is no evidence of such a gradient and this has been reported in cases 
of herpes simplex encephalitis (e.g., Cermak & O'Connor, 1983; Warrington & 
McCarthy, 1988) and head injury (Kapur, Ellison, Smith, McLellan & Burrows, 
1992).
The memory loss may affect certain types of information more than 
others. In particular, there are reports of differential performance on tests of 
autobiographical and public knowledge (i.e., knowledge about famous people 
and events). Evidence of greater impairment on tests of autobiographical than on 
tests of public knowledge has been found in one patient (e.g., Markowitsch, 
Calabrese, Liess, Haupts, Durwen & Gehlen, 1993), while the reverse pattern has 
been found in other patients (e.g., De Renzi, Liotti & Nichelli, 1987; Kapur, 
Heath, Meudell & Kennedy, 1986). To complicate matters, there are also 
patients in whom the deficiency in autobiographical and public knowledge is 
equally severe (e.g., Cermak & O'Connor, 1983; Warrington & McCarthy, 1988).
These residual capacities are problematic when considered in the context 
of a clinical description. There is no basis at this stage for predicting whether a 
person with remote memory disturbance will present with either a temporal 
gradient or with domain-specific deficits. However, there are various pathologies 
which may result in RA and this might explain the variation in its presentation. 
For instance, the pattern of remote residual memory features present in patients 
with the alcoholic Korsakoff syndrome may differ from those present in patients
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with herpes simplex encephalitis. The implication of this is that RA should not 
be considered as a unitary condition, but rather as one with a number of different 
forms.
2.1.2 Anterograde Amnesia
The pattern of residual learning abilities observed in patients with AA 
tends to be more consistent than the pattern of residual abilities observed in 
patients with RA. There are core characteristics which are common to most 
patients, but characteristics of RA (at least in terms of residual abilities) tend to 
be more idiosyncratic. There are three areas in which patients with A A have 
demonstrated their capacity for new learning. They comprise retention of 
information in immediate or short-term memory, novel skill acquisition and 
demonstration of knowledge outside of conscious awareness.
One of the most striking features of AA is an apparent dissociation 
between short-term and long-term memory. In fact, amnesic patients have 
provided the primary source of evidence for the existence of these memory 
systems. Patients suffering from AA appear capable of processing novel 
information normally in short-term memory. This is evident in everyday 
behaviour and is seen, for example, in their capacity to engage in normal 
conversation. Preservation of short-term memory has also been reported in 
laboratory-based tasks involving memory for digits and recency effects in recall 
of word lists (e.g., Baddeley & Warrington, 1970). However, after interference 
or a brief delay, when information becomes the province of long-term memory, 
patients appear to remember no information at all. Although it has been argued 
that some amnesic patients do not perform normally on traditional tests of short­
term memory (e.g., Brown-Peterson paradigm, see Cermak, 1982 for a 
discussion), there is general consensus about preservation of performance on 
tests of immediate short-term memory (e.g., digit span).
Another residual ability observed in patients with AA is skill acquisition. 
Amnesic patients are capable of acquiring skill-based, or procedural, knowledge
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normally. The tasks that fall in this domain range from practical skills, such as 
dressmaking and model building (see Ellis and Young, 1996), to laboratory- 
based tasks which include the ability to track a moving target (Brooks & 
Baddeley, 1976; Cermak, et al., 1973; Corkin, 1968) and to complete puzzles 
(e.g., Brooks & Baddeley, 1976). Although patients show improvement on these 
skill-based tasks, they cannot recall having performed them.
Patients also seem capable of manifesting their newly acquired 
knowledge implicitly, or outside of conscious awareness, even though they 
cannot access the same knowledge explicitly (i.e., consciously). Acquisition of 
skill might be seen as an example of implicit memory, since performance on 
these tasks does not require conscious recollection of previous study episodes. 
Priming is another implicit memory phenomenon which appears to be preserved 
in amnesia. Priming refers to the facilitation in memory performance that occurs 
as a consequence of practice or previous exposure. Preservation of priming in 
amnesia has been demonstrated in numerous tasks. For example, in word-stem 
or fragment completion tasks patients are first shown some words and are
subsequently presented with a stem (e.g., mir__for mirror) or fragment (e.g.,
_ss_ss__for assassin). They are asked to complete these items with the first
word that comes to mind. Priming is evidenced in the tendency to complete 
these items with words seen earlier (e.g., Graf, et al., 1984; Warrington & 
Weiskrantz, 1970, 1974). In lexical decision, subjects are asked to identify 
whether a particular letter string is a word. Priming is indicated by a decrease in 
the decision time on the second and subsequent presentation of these strings (e.g., 
Barry, 1988; Smith & Oscar-Berman, 1990). Another commonly used task is 
perceptual identification. Here, a stimulus is shown briefly and participants are 
asked to identify it. Evidence of priming is found when the accuracy of 
identifying previously seen items is better than that for new items (e.g., Cermak, 
Talbot, Chandler & Wolbarst, 1985). The common feature in all these tasks is 
that no direct reference is made to previous study episodes. When conscious
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reference to previous study episodes is required, such as in recall and recognition 
tests, memory performance declines dramatically.
These residual abilities are often included in descriptions of AA as they 
are fairly typical of the condition. Accordingly, AA can be summarised as 
follows:
• a profound and permanent deficit to new learning most 
prominent under conditions of conscious recollection, which 
presents in the context of,
• normal intellectual function,
• normal immediate memory span and
• normal skill acquisition.
However, this characterization of preserved and impaired ability in AA is 
complicated by inconsistency and overlap between the features. Two features, 
involving conscious recollection and immediate memory, contradict one another. 
Information in the short-term is recalled explicitly and yet this capacity for 
conscious recollection is believed to be impaired in amnesic patients. It could 
also be argued that there is some overlap between other features. For example, 
skill-based knowledge is usually demonstrated outside of conscious awareness. 
Accordingly, should skills be included in a knowledge base that supports 
performance on tests that tap memory indirectly? Together, these complications 
suggest that descriptions of AA, like RA, may also suffer from a lack of 
precision.
2.1.3 Summary
Although there is some imprecision in descriptions of RA and AA, the 
diagnosis in many cases is not in doubt. The residual features may be present in 
some patients and not in others, and this is particularly problematic in the case of 
RA. Nonetheless, we are remarkably accurate in diagnosing these forms of 
amnesia. This is because the diagnosis is based primarily on the severity of the
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memory disturbance observed. If an individual recalls nothing at all of 
information presented recently or appears to have a large gap in their past 
knowledge, then the possibility that they are amnesic must be considered. Thus, 
the one characteristic feature that can be used to describe all patients with 
amnesia is the severity of their memory disturbance.
It is unclear at this stage whether RA and AA should be considered as 
separate conditions or different manifestations of the same condition. The fact 
that AA commonly presents with RA (e.g., in Korsakoff s syndrome and herpes 
simplex encephalitis) suggests that the two forms of memory disturbance may be 
caused by the same underlying deficit. However, reports of AA and RA in 
isolation suggest that they may be different conditions. Without a better 
understanding of the two forms, particularly the retrograde form, this issue will 
remain unresolved.
2.2 Theories of amnesia
Evidence of residual memory in amnesia indicates that some knowledge, 
irrespective of whether it is remote or newly acquired, influences the behaviour 
of these patients. The question is how do we explain the patterns of memory loss 
and preservation? Explanations vary according to whether they address the 
memory deficit to past or newly acquired knowledge. As will become clear, 
explanations of the memory loss in AA are far more comprehensive than those 
used to account for RA.
2.2.1 Theories of retrograde amnesia
In contrast to AA, the empirical work that has been conducted with 
patients suffering from RA is limited, and hence little can be said about this form 
of amnesia. Despite this, several attempts have been made to explain the pattern 
of preserved and impaired abilities in these patients. However, these accounts 
are largely ad hoc, being designed to explain isolated remote memory 
phenomena observed in particular patients.
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Squire (1992) offers an explanation for the presence of temporal gradients 
in remote memory. He argues that the formation of permanent memory traces 
takes place gradually and requires the co-ordination of activity between several 
neurological sites. Initial registration of memory representations takes place in 
the hippocampal and diencephalic regions. In the process of strengthening these 
traces, through consolidation and re-organisation, the role of these structures is 
diminished and is eventually taken over by the association neocortex which is 
believed to be the place of permanent memory storage. In the end then, retrieval 
of information from permanent storage can take place independently of 
diencephalic-hippocampal structures which are believed to be damaged in 
patients with AA. Thus, Squire suggests that the structures involved in learning 
differ from those involved in permanent storage and this would explain the 
temporal gradients observed in patients with RA. Distant memories have 
received adequate consolidation by the time amnesia develops and they can be 
retrieved because they are located in a different site to that responsible for new 
learning. In addition to temporal gradients, this theory can account for isolated 
RA and the combined presentation of AA and RA — patients who present with 
the latter have additional damage to the structures involved in the initial 
registration of memories, which is not the case in the former group of patients. 
However, there are also patients who present with an extensive remote memory 
impairment where the information loss in all time periods is equally severe (see 
Kapur, 1993, for a review of cases). It is implausible to explain such extensive 
periods of retrograde amnesia as the product of deficient consolidation as it is 
very unlikely that these processes would take many years to complete.
Hodges and McCarthy (1993) provide an alternative theory of memory 
loss designed primarily to explain the presence of extensive autobiographical 
amnesia in a single case. The researchers claimed that this accounted for the 
patient's inability to recall experiences after his period in the Navy and his 
constant reference to this particular time frame (it being the last one available to
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him) in guiding his everyday behaviour. Hodges and McCarthy suggest that the 
process of retrieval is mediated by a hierarchical memory structure. It is 
proposed that "thematic retrieval frameworks" (e.g., childhood, marriage, etc.) 
are contained at the highest level and that these are used to guide the search for 
autobiographical records which are represented at lower levels of the hierarchy.
In such a structure, damage to particular retrieval frameworks would disrupt 
recall of the specific experiences associated with these, while leaving other 
frameworks and associated experiences intact.
Another theory of memory storage and retrieval has been proposed by 
Damasio (1989) and this has been used by several researchers to account for 
findings in particular cases of RA. Damasio argued that different aspects of 
events are represented in different regions of the brain and that widespread 
activation encompassing multiple sites is required for information to be retrieved. 
One critical component of a memory representation is feature-based information, 
which is originally registered and stored in the sensory and motor cortices. The 
other component comprises the spatial and temporal details unique to the event 
concerned and these are represented in "binding codes". Damasio suggested that 
binding codes are generated in convergence zones which he proposed were 
located in the association areas of the brain. He proposed that conscious retrieval 
of an event requires simultaneous and "time-locked" activation of representations 
in all these areas.
Damasio's theory suggests that combined activation of the sensory 
attributes of an event and the temporal context registered at the time of encoding 
is necessary for the experience to be reconstructed. It has been used to explain 
the existence of mild AA together with severe impairment to autobiographical 
memory and visual processing in two patients (O'Connor, Butters, Miliotis, 
Eslinger & Cermak, 1992; Ogden, 1993). In both cases it was argued that 
deficits in visual processing (e.g., due to visual agnosia) could reduce 
retrievability of autobiographical memories as this information is supported to a
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large extent by visual images. Even though information may be available from 
other modalities (e.g., auditory modality), an inability to generate or manipulate 
visual images would reduce the richness of the memory. Damasio's model 
explains the combined presentation of visual and autobiographical memory 
impairment. Such patients have an inability to access old visual memories (e.g., 
involving faces, objects and places). This could be explained by supposing that 
one of the multiple sensory representations required for recollection, in this case 
visual attributes, was damaged.
Researchers have also attempted to locate the deficiency in RA at a 
particular stage of information processing. In some conditions, such as transient 
global amnesia, the remote memory disturbance can recover (see Kapur, 1993).
In these cases it could be argued that the deficiency lies in retrieval mechanisms. 
Storage deficits have also been proposed to explain RA. If patients consistently 
fail to retrieve certain information then the deficit is arguably one of storage 
(Shallice, 1988, Warrington & Shallice, 1979). However, the evidence is 
inconsistent on this point. Some patients fail to retrieve the same information on 
repeat testing (e.g., Squire et al., 1989), but others show no consistency in 
retrieval (Cermak & O'Connor, 1983). This suggests that even if some cases are 
explicable in terms of storage deficits, this is by no means always the case and 
the stage of processing responsible for the deficit may vary between patients.
In summary, the pattern of presentation in RA varies between patients 
and none of these theories accounts for all cases. Each of the theories may be 
correct in some cases. There is a need to gain a better understanding of the 
characteristics of the various presentations of RA if we are to develop theories of 
this condition and determine its relationship with AA. Given the complexity of 
RA, it seems sensible at this stage to follow Kapur's (1997) advice and examine 
the various features of remote memory impairment more fully before trying to 
develop a comprehensive account of all its sequelae.
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2.2.2 Theories of anterograde amnesia
We can consider explanations of memory loss in AA from two 
perspectives. First, the memory loss can be explained in terms of a failure to 
remember particular types of information. This may result from damage to 
certain memory systems or from a selective vulnerability in the processing of 
particular information. In the former case, it could be argued that there are 
structures in the memory system specialised for different types of information, 
and that damage to one of these is responsible for the memory disturbance. The 
alternative position, is that some information is more difficult to retrieve or 
encode and thus is more sensitive to damage. The former position is based on a 
modular/systems account of amnesia and the latter on a processing view of 
amnesia.
Irrespective of whether the deficit reflects information loss or selective 
vulnerability, we can also locate the memory disturbance at particular stages in 
remembering. Accordingly, the memory loss can be considered in terms of 
deficient encoding, storage/consolidation and retrieval mechanisms.
Modular/svstemic accounts of amnesia
Systems theories provide a structural account of memory in which 
independent systems have been proposed, each containing different information. 
The deficit in amnesia is explained by damage to one of these systems. There are 
several ways of conceptualizing these memory structures. One approach has 
been to attribute preserved abilities to the semantic memory system and impaired 
abilities to the episodic memory system. Alternatively, the memory disturbance 
in amnesia can be considered in terms of a dissociation between procedural and 
declarative memory.
The semantic-episodic distinction
The distinction between semantic and episodic memory was originally 
introduced by Tulving (1972). Semantic memory was seen as the system
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responsible for language, and as containing a copious amount of information 
including knowledge about word meanings, concepts, rules, formulae and 
symbols. In contrast, episodic memory refers to knowledge of our experiences 
comprising information about episodes and events in the temporal context in 
which they occurred. Over time, these definitions have been modified and 
extended to clarify the role of context (i.e., semantic memory as context free and 
episodic memory as context-dependent), the knowledge contained within 
semantic memory (which now includes general knowledge about the world) and 
the relationship between the two systems (Tulving, 1983, 1984).
Amnesic patients provide the main source of support for the 
independence of semantic and episodic memory. It is clear that patients with AA 
retain their premorbidly acquired knowledge of facts and language. Preservation 
of semantic memory has been demonstrated on a number of tasks including 
category fluency (Baddeley & Warrington, 1970), semantic verification 
(Baddeley, 1982b) and rule learning (Kinsbourne & Wood, 1975). Evidence of 
impairment to episodic memory is reported in the same studies on tests of recall 
and recognition. Additional evidence supporting the dissociation of semantic 
from episodic memory comes from a study on source amnesia. Schacter,
Harbluk and McLachlan (1984) found that patients with severe memory 
impairment could recall some trivial facts they had been taught about famous 
people but could recall neither the source of the information nor its presentation 
during the experiment. Thus, knowledge of facts was available to patients but 
episodic knowledge, relating to the acquisition of these facts, was not available.
The main criticism of the semantic-episodic theory is that, on its own, it 
does not explain why amnesic patients fail to acquire novel semantic 
information. For example, the well-known patient HM could not acquire the 
meanings of words that were introduced after the onset of his amnesia (Gabrieli, 
Cohen & Corkin, 1983). However, this can be accommodated by concluding that 
only semantic knowledge acquired prior to the onset of amnesia is preserved. It
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is also possible that amnesic patients can acquire novel semantic information, but 
that this knowledge is only accessible under certain conditions. An example of 
this is provided by Verfaellie, Croce and Milberg's (1995) patient, SS, who 
acquired partial knowledge about the meaning of novel words. Evidence of new 
learning was only found when indirect testing procedures were used (i.e., by 
examining ability to verify the correct usage of a word in a sentence rather than 
asking about word meaning directly) and support from pre-existing knowledge 
was provided (i.e., learning was only found in the case of compound words — 
items consisting of two meaningful pre-existing words). There are other 
examples of patients who have shown a capacity to acquire novel semantic 
information under these conditions (e.g., Hirst, Phelps, Johnson & Volpe, 1988; 
Tulving, Hayman & MacDonald, 1991). Together, these findings suggest that 
amnesic patients can learn novel semantic information. While there is the 
additional issue of how this knowledge can be accessed, this need not be central 
to the semantic-episodic theory.
Even if we accept that amnesic patients can acquire novel semantic 
information under certain conditions, there is another problem that must be 
addressed concerning the relationship between the two systems. Some 
researchers have argued that semantic memories emerge from episodic memories 
(e.g., Kinsbourne & Wood, 1982). This is consistent with the observation that 
most information is first encountered in the context of a particular episode. 
However, in this case, one must either acknowledge that semantic memory is not 
preserved in amnesia or that episodic memory is not impaired — both of which 
are inconsistent with the semantic-episodic theory. According to this view, novel 
semantic memories cannot be created from a damaged episodic system. These 
memories must be supported by an episodic trace.
The opposing view concerning the relationship between these two 
systems is that episodic information is represented as a subsystem within 
semantic memory (Tulving, 1985, 1987). In such a structure semantic memories
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can be accessed independently of episodic memories but episodic memories must 
be recalled in the context of semantic memories. This view is consistent with the 
semantic-episodic theory insofar as it can account for the preservation of 
semantic memory in the context of impaired episodic memory. However, in this 
revised position where semantic and episodic memory do not function 
independently, there is no basis for claiming that one memory system is 
dissociated from the other in amnesia. While debate continues about the relative 
merits of each view, there is some consensus about the importance of resolving 
this issue as one means of clarifying the status of this memory systems account.
The procedural-declarative distinction
The distinction between procedural and declarative memory was 
introduced to explain the differentiation commonly observed in amnesic patients 
between performance of skills and conscious knowledge of having performed or 
acquired these skills. These different abilities have been attributed to different 
memory systems. The procedural memory system is believed to contain 
knowledge relevant to skilled behaviour and the declarative memory system is 
believed to be responsible for conscious, or explicit, recollection of information. 
The former ability is preserved in amnesia and the latter is impaired (Cohen & 
Squire, 1980).
It is generally agreed that patients acquire sufficient knowledge to support 
performance on skill-based tasks. Nonetheless, the distinction between 
procedural and declarative memory is insufficient to account for all the preserved 
abilities identified in these patients. Some residual abilities extend beyond the 
realm of perceptual and motor-skills. Repetition priming, which refers to the 
facilitation in performance as a consequence of previous encounter (see Cofer, 
1967), is a good case in point. Most tests of priming provide evidence of 
knowledge and not of skills. The fact that amnesic patients complete word 
fragments with items just encountered at study (e.g., Warrington & Weiskrantz, 
1974), for example, indicates that they can acquire novel information in addition
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to skills. Such tasks, like skill-based tasks, are performed outside of conscious 
awareness. Thus, it could be argued that what is preserved in amnesia is not 
skill-based knowledge alone, but all knowledge that can be demonstrated outside 
of conscious awareness. The concepts of implicit and explicit memory have been 
proposed to address the role of consciousness in memory performance. Tests 
that examine knowledge without making reference to past episodes are classified 
as implicit, whereas those that require conscious recollection are defined as 
explicit (Graf & Schacter, 1985).
In an attempt to characterize the entire range of residual abilities in 
amnesic patients this concept of procedural memory has been replaced with 
"nondeclarative" memory (Musen, Shimamura & Squire, 1990; Squire & Zola- 
Morgan, 1988). The declarative-nondeclarative distinction provides a systemic 
explanation of implicit and explicit memory phenomena. Performance on 
implicit (i.e., nonconscious) tasks is supported by the nondeclarative memory 
system and performance on explicit (i.e., conscious) tasks is supported by the 
declarative memory system. However, this does not fundamentally change this 
approach to amnesia. A dual systems explanation of the condition remains 
central to the revised theory. Preserved abilities are assumed to be supported by 
the nondeclarative memory system and impaired abilities to the declarative 
memory system.
There are problems in attributing all preserved abilities to one memory 
system. It could be argued that the various forms of unconscious memory 
classified as nondeclarative are quite different. For instance, it is unlikely that a 
single system is responsible for supporting performance on tests of skill 
acquisition and priming. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that priming 
and skill learning can be dissociated (Butters, Heindel & Salmon, 1990), 
suggesting that the cognitive and neural operations supporting performance on 
these tasks may differ. If these operations are genuinely distinct then it is 
unlikely that understanding of the amnesic condition will be advanced by
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nominating a catch-all concept of a "nondeclarative" system in which 
qualitatively different forms of memory are seen as equivalent.
Perhaps the range of preserved abilities can be attributed to the integrity 
of a number of different systems. The knowledge base supporting skill 
acquisition may be different from that supporting performance on other tests of 
indirect or unconscious memory. This suggestion has been made by Tulving and 
Schacter (1990) who argued that another memory system — the perceptual 
representation system — was responsible for certain implicit memory 
phenomena (i.e., priming). They suggested that this system operated 
independently of other memory systems and that it supported performance on 
tests such as perceptual identification and fragment completion. Thus, 
preservation of knowledge in amnesia could be explained by the integrity of both 
the procedural and perceptual representation systems. However, the introduction 
of new systems creates another problem. If other preserved abilities are found 
are we to continue to invent new systems to accommodate them? There is no 
consensus at this stage concerning guidelines for the acceptance of new systems 
and without them an overabundance of memory systems may result (see Blaxton, 
1995, for a discussion).
While a dual systems approach is implied in the distinction between 
declarative and nondeclarative memory, this need not be the case. It is generally 
accepted that dual system explanations of the amnesic memory disturbance are 
too simplistic. Perhaps there is a single declarative memory system that is 
damaged in amnesia and this may be sufficient to characterize the condition. In 
addition though, there may be multiple systems responsible for the various 
preserved abilities observed in these patients. Given the diversity in these 
preserved abilities, it seems more likely that they are supported by a complex 
array of memory systems.
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Modular/systemic accounts: Concluding comments
On superficial analysis, it seems that the two theories discussed in this 
section present very different views about the particular systems that are involved 
in the process of remembering. Yet there is in fact some degree of overlap 
between the theories. By definition, episodic and declarative memory systems 
both support conscious remembering which is impaired in amnesic patients. 
However, information accessed from semantic memory can either be conscious 
or non-conscious. For example, in response to the question "What is the capital 
of Australia?", the answer "Canberra" can be produced either with or without 
conscious awareness of how this fact was acquired. As this overlap suggests, the 
distinction between these memory systems is far from clear. This is complicated 
further by attributing all preserved abilities to a single memory system.
However, apart from reasons of parsimony, there is no need to maintain a dual 
systems approach provided the existence of additional systems can be proven.
A final comment concerning modular theories relates to their focus on 
data from amnesic patients to support dissociations among memory systems. 
Much of the evidence in support of these distinctions is provided in the context 
of amnesia. This raises an interesting question. If a memory system that was 
created to explain preservation of ability in amnesia was subsequently found to 
be impaired in these patients, should this be taken as evidence against the 
existence of that system? Even if we do not reject a system completely on this 
basis then, at the very least, we might question whether it exists in the form 
proposed in these theories.
Process theories of amnesia
An alternative approach to theories based on damage to particular 
memory systems is based on the concept of differential vulnerability. This 
position is adopted by process theorists, who argue that the deficiency in amnesia 
is best explained in terms of the type of information being processed rather than 
the operation of different memory systems. There are two major accounts based
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on processing theory — one attributes the vulnerability to processing of 
contextual information, and the other attributing it to processing information 
conceptually.
Contextual memory deficit hypothesis
The role of context in normal remembering is well-established (e.g., 
Baddeley, 1982b; Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Thomson, Robertson & Vogt,
1982; Wiseman & Tulving, 1976) and it has been suggested that it may also be 
central to understanding the deficit in amnesia (Huppert & Piercy, 1976, 1978a; 
Mayes, 1988, 1992; Mayes, Meudell & Pickering, 1985). According to this 
theory, amnesic patients have difficulty processing the contextual aspects of 
information because this is more vulnerable to the effects of damage. If these 
patients cannot remember the contextual features unique to a particular event, 
then it is difficult to differentiate it from other similar events. The assumption 
made here, is that contextual and target information is processed differently.
There is considerable evidence to support the contextual memory deficit 
hypothesis. Huppert and Piercy (1976) investigated the influence of temporal 
context on memory by examining ability to differentiate pictures presented over 
two days. Half the pictures presented on the second day had been seen on the 
first day and participants were simply asked to identify the items presented on the 
second day. While controls had no difficulty making this discrimination, 
Korsakoff patients showed a tendency to identify repeated items (i.e., items 
presented on both days) as those seen most recently. Yet there was no difference 
between these groups in terms of their familiarity with target items (i.e., judging 
whether items had been seen before). This suggested that the patients had stored 
information about the materials but not the circumstances of learning.
In a subsequent study these researchers (Huppert & Piercy, 1978a) found 
that patients were influenced more by the strength of memory traces than they 
were by context — again, suggesting that contextual information is more 
vulnerable. This conclusion was based on the pattern of responses made by
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patients to recency and frequency judgements. Patients tended to confuse 
frequency of exposure with recency of presentation (i.e., items presented on three 
occasions, as compared with one, were believed to have been seen recently) and 
recency of presentation with frequency of exposure (i.e., items just seen were 
believed to have been shown on more occasions). It was suggested that amnesic 
patients based their judgements on the perceived strength of memory 
representations or familiarity rather than on specific contextual information 
associated with each item. While amnesic performance was influenced more by 
trace strength than contextual cues, controls were influenced by a combination of 
these factors.
A study by Schacter et al. (1984) has also been cited in support of the 
contextual account. Patients with severe memory impairment were asked to 
classify statements either based on fiction (e.g., that Bob Hope's father was a 
fireman) or well-known fact (e.g., that Al Capone was a gangster) as true or false. 
The statements had previously been read out by two experimenters, one male and 
the other female. While patients showed a tendency to remember the fictitious 
statements, they had difficulty recalling exactly how the facts were acquired.
They could not specify whether the information was acquired in the course of the 
experiment, nor could they identify the person who had provided the information.
The contextual hypothesis has also been investigated using the A-B, A-C 
interference paradigm. The general procedure is to present participants with two 
lists of paired associates to study. The word in each pair of items contained in 
the first list is also used to cue a new associate in the second list (e.g., the word 
battle may be paired with 'soldier' in the first list and 'army' in the second list). A 
number of researchers have found that amnesic patients tend to produce many 
intrusion errors in such tasks (Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1974, 1978; Winocur & 
Weiskrantz, 1976). That is, when knowledge for associates in the second list is 
examined, patients tend to produce words they encountered in the first list. This
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confusion can be interpreted as a failure to utilize the contextual features unique 
to each list.
While these and other studies (e.g., Hirst & Volpe, 1982; Winocur & 
Kinsbourne, 1978) have been interpreted in support of the hypothesis that 
patients are deficient in processing contextual information, there are some 
general issues that require clarification if this account is to maintain its relevance 
as an explanation of amnesia. A major difficulty, which has yet to be dealt with 
appropriately, is how to define context. In attributing the deficit in amnesia to 
contextual processing we need to specify whether the deficiency is generalised or 
targeted at certain aspects of context.
One answer to this question was offered by Baddeley (1982a) who 
suggested two ways in which context could influence memory. Interactive 
context (also referred to as intrinsic context) has a direct influence on how the 
information is stored and remembered. In this way, the process of pairing one 
word with another alters interpretation of these items as a consequence of their 
interaction. Extrinsic (or spatio-temporal) context refers to background 
information that has no impact on interpretation of target information. This 
includes features such as environmental factors (e.g., time and place) and a 
person's internal state (e.g., mood state). One could argue that extrinsic 
contextual knowledge is an aspect of episodic memory as the latter also contains 
information about temporal context. The only difference between these concepts 
is in their theoretical framework — one is based on a processing view of memory 
and the other is based on a modular view of memory.
The intrinsic-extrinsic breakdown has been of limited value in clarifying 
the role of context in amnesia. Mayes et al. (1985) suggest that an analysis of the 
amnesic condition in terms of intrinsic context is inappropriate. They argued 
that, by definition, intrinsic context should be processed as effortfully as target 
information. If this were the case, then it would be difficult to sustain an analysis 
that is based on differential processing of contextual and target information.
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Furthermore, although the notion of extrinsic context is accommodated better 
within an account based on differential processing, deficient processing of 
temporal information has also been reported in patients with lesions to frontal 
regions (e.g., Petrides & Milner, 1982). This is problematic for the contextual 
deficit theory, because much of the supportive evidence is based on results of 
studies conducted with Korsakoff patients who are known to have a combination 
of executive (i.e., frontal lobe) and memory deficits (see Kopelman, 1995). If the 
deficit is observed in both memory impaired and frontal patients, then deficient 
processing of background features may be a secondary consequence of the 
amnesic condition.
Another related problem with the contextual account concerns the 
differential processing of context and target information. It is not clear why 
contextual information would be more vulnerable to damage than target 
information. In response to this, it might be argued that the availability of 
processing resources is reduced in amnesic patients. As a consequence, some 
information, would be ignored as this lies in the periphery of attention and 
requires minimal effort (Mayes, 1988; Mayes et al., 1985). However, this 
analysis is difficult to maintain when contextual information is more salient than 
target information (e.g., when a fire alarm goes off in the middle of learning a 
word list). Perhaps some variant of the account offered by Mayes and his 
colleagues may ultimately provide an explanation of the selective vulnerability of 
contextual information, but this seems unlikely without further refinement of the 
concept of extrinsic or background context.
Conceptually-driven and data-driven processes
The distinction between conceptually-driven and data-driven processing 
has been offered as an alternative, process-based, interpretation of the implicit- 
explicit memory dissociation (a modular explanation was considered earlier in 
discussion of the declarative-nondeclarative distinction). Here it is argued that 
the dissociation observed on tests of implicit and explicit memory reflects
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differences in their dependence on depth of processing. Performance on implicit 
memory tests requires data-driven processes, which are believed to be preserved 
in amnesic patients, and performance on explicit memory tests requires 
conceptually-driven processes which are impaired (Blaxton, 1992).
The role of these two processes is clarified by Jacoby (1983). 
Conceptually-driven processes are believed to be engaged in tests which involve 
elaborate, or semantic, analysis of stimulus materials. Data-driven processes are 
engaged in tests which require analysis of the perceptual attributes or surface 
features of stimulus materials. Process theorists suggest that there is a confound 
in many tests of implicit and explicit memory (see Gabrieli, 1995). It is argued 
that most tests of implicit memory typically involve data-driven processes while 
most tests of explicit memory involve conceptually-driven processes. Thus, the 
implicit-explicit dissociation may be caused by an underlying deficit to 
conceptual processing. According to this view, amnesic patients should be 
impaired on any memory test that requires conceptual processing, irrespective of 
whether it is implicit or explicit in nature.
While much of the evidence used to support this theory is based on data 
from non-clinical populations, there is some limited evidence from memory- 
impaired patients. For example, Blaxton (1992) examined the impact of 
conceptual and data-driven processes on both implicit and explicit tests in a 
group of patients with temporal lobe epilepsy. She tested their memory for 
studied words using four tasks — an implicit perceptual test (i.e., word-fragment 
completion), an implicit conceptual test (i.e., answering general knowledge 
questions pertaining to words presented at study with no reference to the 
previous study episode), an explicit perceptual test (graphemic cued recall) and 
an explicit conceptual test (semantic cued recall). Her findings were consistent 
with predictions generated from the processing account of memory. These 
patients were impaired on both implicit and explicit tests that were conceptual in
nature.
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However, there is also evidence to the contrary. That is, there is evidence 
of preserved conceptual processing in amnesia on implicit but not explicit 
memory tests. Shimamura and Squire (1984) found that amnesic patients were 
just as likely as controls to produce words encountered at study when asked to 
generate the first semantic associate that came to mind in response to a cue. 
Clearly, this task requires more than a superficial analysis of stimulus features.
A similar pattern of results was reported by Graf, Shimamura and Squire (1985). 
These researchers presented amnesic patients with a random list of words and 
then asked them to produce the first eight items they could think of in response to 
a category label. Amnesic patients showed a tendency to generate words they 
had encountered at study at a level similar to that found in controls. These and 
other reports of preserved conceptual processing in amnesia (e.g., Keane, 
Gabrieli, Monti, Cantor & Noland, 1993) are not consistent with predictions 
generated from the processing account. Thus, it appears that in these cases the 
implicit-explicit framework provides a more convincing explanation of the 
pattern of preserved and impaired abilities in amnesia.
In summary, the processing view has been very successful in explaining 
the memory dissociations observed in normal individuals (e.g., Blaxton, 1989; 
Roediger & Blaxton, 1987; Roediger, Weldon & Challis, 1989; Srinivas & 
Roediger, 1990). However, the evidence from memory-impaired populations is 
far from convincing. While Blaxton (1992) provides some clinical evidence to 
support the processing account, there is in fact more evidence against it. It is 
apparent then, that the differentiation between conceptual and data-driven 
processes alone is not sufficient to account for the pattern of preserved and 
impaired abilities in amnesia. Reference to retrieval mechanisms — that is, 
whether information is retrieved with or without conscious awareness — is also 
required.
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Process accounts: Concluding comments
It is obvious that the type of processing engaged when performing a task 
has an impact on performance. Manipulating the processes engaged at encoding 
and retrieval, for example, has a considerable influence on how much 
information is remembered (Tulving, 1979; Wiseman & Tulving, 1976). 
Irrespective of whether the focus is on clinical or non-clinical populations, these 
processes have an essential role in memory function.
Having said this, it seems illogical to consider process and systems 
theories independently. If there is a special system responsible for storing our 
general knowledge then it is likely that different processes will impact on the 
information that can be retrieved. For example, in a case of amnesia, it has been 
shown that the processes engaged during recall and recognition are not sufficient 
to retrieve knowledge about the meaning of novel words. However, when that 
knowledge was tapped indirectly, by using other tasks (which presumably engage 
different processes or mechanisms), some information about word meaning was 
accessed (Verfaellie et al., 1995). Both theories can be used to explain this 
result. Novel information was acquired and, according to a systems account, this 
information would be stored in semantic memory. Furthermore, this information 
could only be retrieved when certain processes were engaged. This approach, in 
which the merits of both systems and process theories are considered, may be 
more progressive as each perspective has something to offer in understanding 
memory function.
Stage theories of amnesia
Regardless of whether we accept systems or process accounts of amnesia, 
we can ask whether the deficit is located at a particular stage of information 
processing. That is, if amnesia is a deficit in episodic memory does the problem 
arise at encoding or retrieval? The stages traditionally distinguished in analysis 
of remembering comprise encoding, storage/consolidation and retrieval. These 
stages coincide with the theoretical distinctions between immediate short-term
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memory and long-term memory which are supported both behaviourally and 
biologically (see Squire, 1987 for a discussion). Behaviourally, there is 
considerable evidence supporting the differentiation between short-term and 
long-term memory largely based on studies with amnesic patients (e.g., Baddeley 
& Warrington, 1970) and normals (e.g., Baddeley, 1966a, 1966b). Additionally, 
there is evidence of synaptic change in the transfer of information originally 
encoded in short-term memory to that consolidated in long-term memory (e.g., 
Kandel & Schwartz, 1982). Thus, these hypothetical stages involved in 
remembering have a direct empirical basis.
Encoding/retrieval
Encoding refers to the initial perception and formation of memory 
representations and retrieval refers to processes involved in accessing stored 
information. However, in practice they are difficult to differentiate. It is difficult 
to dissociate encoding from retrieval deficits on the basis of responses provided 
in most tests of memory. If patients complete word-stems with items 
encountered at study but cannot discriminate studied from non-studied items on 
tests of recognition, is this due to poor encoding of information at the time of 
study or inadequate retrieval of information from an intact knowledge base? 
These possibilities are difficult to tease apart as there is considerable interaction 
between these two stages of processing (Kinsbourne & Wood, 1982; Mayes & 
Downes, 1997). For this reason, theories that attribute the memory dysfunction 
in amnesia to deficient encoding and retrieval will be considered together 
(although there is some suggestion that these two processes can be differentiated 
under conditions of divided attention (Craik, Govoni & Mosche, 1996), this has 
not been applied to amnesia). There are two main encoding/retrieval deficit 
theories. One attributes the deficit in amnesia to processing of semantic 
information at the time of encoding and the other to interference during retrieval.
The view that amnesic patients cannot encode information appropriately 
has been proposed by numerous researchers and one common version of this
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theory is the proposal that encoding of semantic information is deficient (Butters 
& Cermak, 1975; Cermak, et al., 1973; Cermak & Moreines, 1976). It is 
suggested that the memory breakdown in amnesia results from an inability to 
encode information at a sufficiently deep level. This position is reminiscent of 
Craik and Lockhart's (1972) levels-of-processing account in which it is argued 
that deeper levels of analysis strengthen memory traces. If amnesic patients 
cannot process information at a sufficiently deep level then the memory traces 
that are formed will be relatively weak and thus unable to support performance 
on tests of recall and recognition.
Evidence of deficient semantic encoding is provided by Cermak and 
Moreines (1976), who found that Korsakoff patients were particularly impaired 
in detecting items in a word list from the same semantic category. In 
comparison, their ability to engage in shallow processing, such as detecting items 
on the basis of rhyme and repetition, was relatively unimpaired. Investigations 
of proactive interference (PI) have also been used to support the semantic 
processing hypothesis. Cermak, Butters & Moreines (1974) investigated release 
from PI using tasks requiring superficial analysis (i.e., shifting from letters to 
numbers or vice versa) and semantic analysis (i.e., shifting from animals to 
vegetables or vice versa). Korsakoff patients demonstrated a release from PI 
under conditions of superficial processing but there was no such release under 
conditions of semantic processing. Because controls showed release under both 
conditions, it was argued that the patients' failure to shift in the deep analysis 
condition indicated that they could not encode information semantically.
If the deficit in amnesia can be isolated to semantic analysis at the time of 
encoding, then improvement in memory performance should be observed by 
encouraging patients to process information semantically. Unfortunately, the 
evidence does not support this claim. Meudell, Mayes and Neary (1980) induced 
patients to process information at a number of levels ranging from shallow (i.e., 
spotting the difference between cartoons) to deep (i.e., describing cartoons).
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With this manipulation a levels-of-processing effect was found in amnesic 
patients. However, patient performance at all levels of processing was below that 
of controls. This suggests that amnesia is not due to deficient semantic analysis 
alone.
There is also a confound in investigations of PI. Most of these studies 
have been conducted with Korsakoff patients and it is possible that deficient 
semantic analysis results from impairment to functions other than memory.
There is evidence of a failure to release from PI in patients with frontal lesions 
(e.g., Moscovitch, 1982), and this region is known to be implicated in patients 
with the alcoholic Korsakoff syndrome (Kopelman, 1995). If the failure to 
release from PI is secondary to the amnesic condition in Korsakoff patients, then 
much of this evidence can be discounted. Having said this though, there is 
evidence of normal release from PI in Korsakoff patients under certain 
experimental conditions. It has been shown when advance warning of the shift in 
taxonomic category is provided (Winocur, Kinsbourne & Moscovitch, 1981), 
when a certain number of learning trials are used (Kopelman, 1991) and on the 
first occasion of a shift in category (Freedman & Cermak, 1986). These findings 
highlight the fact that the relationship between the presence of frontal 
dysfunction and the failure to release from PI is far from clear.
Retrieval theories state that the deficit in amnesia lies in accessing 
representations from memory. If such a theory is to explain AA, the deficit must 
be restricted to retrieval of newly acquired information. In addition, some types 
of information must be more vulnerable than others, because we know these 
patients can remember some information better than others. One suggestion is 
that at the time of retrieval amnesic patients are highly sensitive to competing 
memory traces and that the resulting interference reduces memory performance 
(Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970, 1974). This would account for differences in 
amnesic performance on tests of priming and free recall. The priming tests
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provide partial cues, reducing the impact of irrelevant memory trace, while free 
recall does not.
Again though, the evidence in support of this proposal is limited. For 
example, in a study conducted by Warrington and Weiskrantz (1978), patients 
were asked to learn words from two lists. All words presented in the first list had 
a competing item in the second list which consisted of the only other word that 
shared the same first three letters (e.g., if cyclone was presented in one list, cycle 
was presented in the other). These researchers found no difference in 
performance between amnesics and controls in recall of items from the initial list 
and the first trial of the second list. Furthermore, no difference was found 
between groups in a follow-up study in which participants were asked to produce 
items from both lists in response to cues. These results raise doubts about the 
appropriateness of the interference hypothesis as an explanation of the deficit in 
amnesia.
Although the particular versions of encoding/retrieval theories discussed 
here appear to have limited value, there may be no need to discard such theories 
altogether. The evidence suggests that it is unlikely the deficit is restricted to 
semantic analysis alone or interference from competing traces. However, it is 
possible that another type of information (for example, contextual information) is 
more vulnerable at these stages.
Storage/consolidation
It has also been suggested that amnesia may be caused by a deficiency in 
storage. This might result from poor consolidation or from rapid decay.
Consolidation refers to a process by which temporary memory 
representations gradually become relatively permanent or less resistant to 
disruption (Squire, 1987). During this process of transfer to more permanent 
storage information is modified or reorganized. In amnesia, it has been 
suggested that patients fail to consolidate information appropriately (e.g., Squire, 
Knowlton & Musen, 1993). It is argued that if patients cannot consolidate
37
information, then it is difficult for them to recall that information some time later. 
However, as consolidation is an ongoing process, it is difficult to locate the 
deficit in a particular stage (i.e., initial or later) of transfer to long-term memory.
The consolidation deficit in amnesia, although originally proposed to 
explain various features of RA, might take several forms. On the one hand, 
deficient consolidation might result in the formation of weak memory traces 
which are only sufficient to support performance on certain tests. For instance, 
most tests of implicit memory (e.g., fragment completion, perceptual 
identification) provide some cues about the information to be remembered. This 
information may be sufficient to support performance even if the memory trace is 
weak. In contrast, many tests of explicit memory involve free recall of target and 
contextual information and a weak trace alone may not be sufficient to support 
performance in this case. It is also possible that particular types of information, 
such as context, are not consolidated. As a result, a failure in memory may 
occur. If the stored information contains no uniquely defining features it may 
easily be confused with other memory traces. Either of these explanations could 
account for much of the behaviour of amnesic patients.
Another possible explanation for the storage deficiency in amnesia is that 
memory traces, which are acquired normally, decay rapidly. This type of 
explanation would be consistent with observations of amnesic behaviour in 
everyday situations. For example, while patients retain sufficient information in 
the short-term to enable normal conversation, traces of the circumstances and 
content of the conversation appear to degrade rapidly and the patient eventually 
fails to recall that any conversation had ever taken place. However, the evidence 
in support of the rapid decay theory is not conclusive. Some researchers have 
found evidence of faster forgetting in amnesic patients, but only under restricted 
conditions — that is, at particular delays, on some tests and with certain 
materials. For example, Kopelman and Stanhope (1997) found evidence of rapid 
forgetting over a 10 minute delay in a free recall test examining memory for
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pictures and objects. Yet no difference was found between amnesic patients and 
controls in recognition and cued recall. Similarly, Carlesimo, Sabbadini, Fadda 
and Caltagirone (1995) found normal rates of decay in yes/no recognition when 
memory for pictures was examined and accelerated forgetting over a 15 minute 
delay in free recall of words.
There is also evidence that opposes the rapid decay theory. Warrington 
and Weiskrantz (1970) compared retention of information after a brief delay (i.e., 
1 minute) in amnesic patients and controls. A fragment completion test was used 
in an attempt to equate initial memory performance in the two groups. They 
found no difference in forgetting rates, seemingly contradicting the rapid decay 
theory. However, interpretation of results was complicated by the fact that the 
initial learning performance of amnesic patients was still below that of controls. 
The problem of equating initial learning levels was addressed in a subsequent 
study conducted by Huppert and Piercy (1978b). To control for initial learning 
levels these researchers manipulated stimulus inspection times. Controls were 
shown the materials for a period of 1 second and this duration was increased to 4 
and 8 seconds for Korsakoff patients. These exposure durations had been shown 
in a previous study (Huppert & Piercy, 1977) to approximately equate amnesic 
and control performance. Under these conditions, Huppert and Piercy found no 
evidence to support differential rates of forgetting in patients over delays of 10 
minutes, 24 hours and 7 days on tests of yes/no recognition. However, all 
participants in these experiments happened to be Korsakoff patients, and while 
they show a normal rate of forgetting it is still possible that memory traces might 
decay rapidly in other amnesic pathologies. But, several studies comparing 
forgetting rates in medial temporal, diencephalic and normal participants report 
no differences between these groups on tests of recognition memory (Kopelman, 
1985; McKee & Squire, 1992).
It seems that rapid forgetting might only be detected on tests of free 
recall. If this is the case, then it could be argued that rapid forgetting is largely a
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phenomenon of testing and thus, on its own, does not constitute an adequate 
explanation of amnesia. However, deficient consolidation remains a possibility. 
The consolidation account may take several forms depending on the area of the 
vulnerability implicated. Both the trace strength (i.e., development of weak 
memory traces) and material specificity (e.g., a failure to consolidate context) 
perspectives are capable of accommodating many of the phenomena observed in 
amnesic patients. In fact, these two theories need not be considered as 
incompatible. Both factors together (i.e., reduced trace strength for contextual 
information) could be operating to generate the memory disturbance in amnesia.
Stage theories: Concluding comments
There is no evidence that completely rules out any of the stages involved 
in remembering. The deficit could occur at encoding, storage, retrieval, or a 
combination of these stages. But a comprehensive stage theory must identify the 
specific nature of the memory loss in addition to the stage at which this occurs.
In fact, the most plausible stage theories incorporate information loss (i.e., 
systems accounts) and vulnerability (i.e., process accounts) accounts. As this 
integrative approach suggests, theoretical accounts need not be considered in 
isolation.
2.3 Overview
The body of literature on amnesia is too vast to address within the 
confines of a single chapter. The above review presents only a selective 
treatment of the main contributions that researchers have made in the course of 
attempting to understand both this condition and memory function in general. 
There is some agreement about the characteristic features of the amnesic 
syndrome, most notably in the anterograde form of the disturbance. However, 
there is considerable dissatisfaction with theoretical explanations of the amnesic 
memory disturbance.
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The problem with amnesia is that all accounts, whether they address RA 
or AA, and whether they provide a process- or systems-based explanation, 
explain only some of the phenomena observed in patients who suffer from this 
condition. Consequently, no single account adequately explains amnesia. 
Nevertheless, some accounts survive scrutiny better than others. Investigations 
of amnesia have raised numerous questions. For instance, to what degree does 
the memory disturbance in amnesia differ as a function of pathology? Are 
several stages of information processing implicated in producing amnesia? Is 
there a problem in remembering contextual and target information, and if so, is 
this due to a deficit in processing either source of information (e.g., selective 
impairment in processing contextual information) or associating them? Is the 
deficit (or deficits) responsible for producing AA similar to that in RA? At this 
stage these and many other questions are unresolved.
The primary aim of all empirical work conducted with amnesic patients is 
to gain a better understanding of memory function. In addressing this general 
question there has been considerable variation between studies mainly reflecting 
the various theoretical perspectives of researchers. Much of this research has 
been limited by a tendency to focus on the amnesic syndrome in isolation. 
Amnesia is not the only condition which bears on the question of memory 
structure. Yet there seems to be little interaction between the theoretical 
accounts addressed in different pathologies. Amnesia should be considered in 
the context of other clinical conditions which produce memory impairments. In 
the following chapter a link is made between patients suffering from certain 
forms of dementia and amnesia. This is based on an apparent similarity in 
performance on tests of higher-level categorical knowledge.
41
Chapter 3
Preservation of memory for generalities: A review of findings 
from dementia and amnesia
The general question addressed in this thesis concerns preservation of 
memory for generalities and, in particular, its relevance to understanding 
amnesia. As alluded to in previous chapters, preservation of memory for 
generalities refers to a pattern of performance in which exemplar knowledge is 
impaired relative to higher-level categorical knowledge. This pattern of 
performance was reported initially by Warrington (1975) in three patients 
suffering from dementia, in whom the primary deficit was a selective impairment 
to semantic memory. All patients demonstrated a residual capacity to provide 
superordinate categorical information for items they could neither describe nor 
define in detail. Over time, evidence of this dissociative phenomenon in certain 
forms of dementia (i.e., semantic dementia and Alzheimer’s Disease) 
accumulated and this in turn has led researchers to seek an explanation for the 
phenomenon. Several theoretical accounts have been offered to explain memory 
for generalities in dementia — one based on the hierarchical structure of 
semantic memory (Collins & Quillian, 1969), another based on item familiarity 
and frequency (Funnell, 1995) and a final explanation based on random 
degradation of semantic knowledge (Hodges, et al., 1995).
Since investigations of the generalities phenomenon have focused 
exclusively on patients suffering particular forms of dementia, one might suppose 
that it is restricted to these patients alone. However, there are indications of an 
apparent differentiation between exemplar and higher-level knowledge in another 
group of patients — namely, global amnesics. In the case of retrograde amnesia, 
results from several patients suggest preservation of higher-level knowledge 
about famous people (Hodges & McCarthy, 1993; McCarthy & Warrington,
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1992; Warrington & McCarthy, 1988). A similar pattern of partial knowledge 
preservation is apparent in the performance of anterograde amnesics on tests of 
artificial grammar learning (Knowlton, Ramus & Squire, 1992; Knowlton & 
Squire, 1994, 1996), vocabulary acquisition (Verfaellie et al., 1995) and memory 
illusions (Cermak et ah, 1973; Schacter, et ah, 1996). Although results of these 
studies could be interpreted as evidence of preserved memory for generalities in 
amnesia, this phenomenon was not the primary issue investigated in these papers. 
A recent study conducted by Haslam et ah (1997) addressed this issue directly. 
These authors suggested that their findings indicated differential performance on 
tests of exemplar and categorical knowledge in global amnesia.
This chapter reviews evidence from both dementia and amnesia 
literatures relevant to the generalities phenomenon. The dementia literature is 
addressed first since this represents both the original source and the most 
thorough examination of the phenomenon to date. This is followed by a 
discussion of some relevant studies of anterograde and retrograde amnesics. The 
evidence is of two types — one in which higher-level knowledge has been 
examined directly (e.g., investigations of category learning in amnesia) and a 
second where evidence of higher-level knowledge has been an indirect outcome 
of the investigation. Reported evidence of residual learning in amnesics is 
considered from the alternative perspective of preserved memory for generalities 
in amnesia. Finally, the results of the study conducted by Haslam et al. (1997) 
are discussed in detail. This study examined higher-order knowledge relative to 
item-specific knowledge and was the first to apply an explanation based on 
preserved memory for generalities in the context of amnesia.
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3.1 Preservation of memory for generalities in dementia
3.1.1. Evidence
Much of the research relevant to the generalities phenomenon in dementia 
has addressed a fundamental question concerning our knowledge about concepts. 
Of particular interest to researchers has been the composition of concepts, 
including their characteristic features and representation. For instance, how is 
knowledge about dingoes organised so that we can distinguish them from dogs 
and cats, identify dogs as more closely associated with dingoes, and classify 
them all as mammals? The dissociation of higher-level category knowledge from 
exemplar knowledge observed in patients suffering from particular forms of 
dementia has been seen as providing a means to address such questions.
Warrington's (1975) report of partial knowledge loss in patients with 
selective impairment of semantic memory was the first in a series of papers 
noting differential performance on tests of exemplar and higher-level category 
knowledge. Warrington presented profiles for three patients, all of whom 
suffered from some form of dementia which was characterized by anomia as well 
as impaired word recognition and comprehension. Despite their inability to 
identify words and objects precisely, the patients retained sufficient knowledge 
about the items to make broad categorical distinctions. For example, on object 
recognition tests they could discriminate animals from plants and insects from 
non-insects reasonably well. However, when these patients were asked to make 
more refined judgements (e.g., to identify the dangerous animal), their 
performance declined. Similar results were obtained when knowledge about 
animal and object names was examined. Warrington concluded that knowledge 
of particular concepts was not completely lost in these patients. Rather, the 
pattern of loss was characterized by preservation of knowledge at the 
superordinate level and impairment of knowledge for specific attributes 
represented at the subordinate level.
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In two of the three cases reported by Warrington (1975), the underlying 
pathology responsible for producing the dissociation between exemplar and 
higher-level knowledge was unknown, but in more recent studies it has become 
apparent that the phenomenon occurs in various forms of dementia. The same 
dissociation has been reported in patients suffering from Alzheimer's disease 
(AD). Martin and Fedio (1983) found that these patients showed a greater 
tendency to produce within-category errors (e.g., calling a 'camel' a goat) or 
generalisations (e.g., calling a 'pelican' a bird) when the specific name for an item 
was unavailable. In each case patients demonstrated some residual knowledge of 
items. Martin (1987) reported further evidence of impaired exemplar knowledge 
in two patients on a test of fluency requiring naming of items which could be 
found in a supermarket. Patient G produced few specific items and tended to use 
category labels (i.e., fruits and vegetables). Patient W produced category labels 
only. This performance was quite unlike that of normal controls who provided 
many specific items within numerous categories. In another task Martin (1987) 
asked a group of patients with AD to sort pictures, name them and then answer a 
series of questions probing superordinate, category and attribute knowledge. 
Patients sorted pictures into categories as well as controls and responded 
accurately to questions examining superordinate and category knowledge. 
However, numerous errors were produced on tests of naming and attribute 
knowledge. There was a high correlation between performances on these tasks 
indicating that the same patients tended to make both types of error. In this way 
patients demonstrated they had sufficient knowledge about concepts to respond 
accurately to tasks probing higher-level information. A deterioration in 
performance was only noted on those tasks that tapped more specific subordinate 
detail.
Semantic dementia is another clinical condition in which a differentiation 
between exemplar and higher-level category knowledge has been identified. 
These patients suffer from a progressive aphasia characterized by selective
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impairment to semantic memory and general knowledge with relative 
preservation of other aspects of language output as well as other cognitive skills 
(Hodges, Patterson & Tyler, 1994). In addition though, there appears to be a 
pattern in the deterioration of semantic memory such that higher-level knowledge 
is preserved relative to item-specific knowledge. Hodges et al. (1994) reported 
the progressive deterioration in semantic knowledge observed in a patient with 
semantic dementia as a function of the level of specificity in sorting tasks. The 
patient, PP, was flawless in sorting pictures according to the living/non-living 
dimension, above chance (i.e., 72%) in sorting pictures on a categorical basis 
(e.g., land animals versus birds) and most impaired (i.e., 42%) in sorting pictures 
according to specific attributes (e.g., native versus foreign). A year later PP 
retained her ability to make the most general of these judgements, but her 
performance fell to chance in the second year of follow-up.
Hodges, Graham and Patterson (1995) provided a more extensive 
longitudinal investigation of another patient, JL, diagnosed with semantic 
dementia. JL was tested over a period of two years on a number of semantic 
memory tests. These tests examined category fluency (ranging from general to 
more specific categories in both living and non-living domains), picture naming, 
naming to verbal description, picture sorting (again ranging from superordinate 
to subordinate levels), word-picture matching, knowledge of semantic features 
and item description. JL's performance declined progressively over the two year 
period and a pattern of differential deterioration was noted on a number of tests 
which examined exemplar and higher-level knowledge. On initial examination 
of category fluency, the main difference in performance between controls and JL 
occurred for specific categories (e.g., musical instruments, sea creatures): the 
number of items produced by JL in the two most general categories was within 
the normal range but that in the two specific categories was outside of the normal 
range. In picture sorting, JL's ability to perform superordinate (i.e., living/non­
living) judgements was preserved throughout the assessment period. Category
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judgements (e.g., land animal/sea creature/bird) were more accurate than 
subordinate judgements (e.g., British/foreign) in the first year of follow-up, but 
performance on both fell dramatically in the final year of assessment. An 
examination of naming errors for items originally identified correctly revealed 
that early errors always reflected some preservation of knowledge. These initial 
naming errors consisted largely of within-category responses (or category co­
ordinates) or superordinate category labels. JL's responses on these tests indicate 
that he had retained some of his knowledge about concepts, at least initially, and 
that this was sufficient to support performance on tests of higher-level 
judgement.
Funnell's (1995) investigation of the memory disturbance in a case of 
semantic dementia is also worth noting. In a series of experiments, she examined 
the impact of item familiarity and frequency on exemplar and higher-level 
category knowledge. This approach reflects Funnell's belief that the dissociation 
between knowledge levels results from variations in word familiarity and 
frequency. Her patient was asked to define superordinate and basic-level names 
which ranged in familiarity and frequency and also to specify and verify object 
properties. She found that the patient could define concepts at all levels of 
knowledge (i.e., superordinate, basic-level and property-level) provided they 
were highly familiar and common. On this basis, Funnell concluded that the 
breakdown in semantic memory was not characterized by differences between 
levels of conceptual knowledge but, rather, reflected the differential strength of 
memory representations associated with differences in item familiarity and 
frequency.
Funnell's paper is not the only one which questions whether the 
generalities phenomenon primarily reflects a differentiation between exemplar 
and higher-level knowledge. Nebes and Brady (1988, 1990) raised the 
possibility that the differential performance may result from differing task 
demands. They suggested that tests of item-specific knowledge may be more
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demanding than tests of categorical knowledge. In the first of these papers 
(Nebes and Brady, 1988), they asked patients with AD to determine whether a 
target item (a line drawing of an object together with its name) and a set of 
stimulus words were associated. Decision time was used as an indirect measure 
of semantic knowledge. Ten stimulus words were presented after the target item 
was shown. Half of the words were related to the target and half were unrelated. 
Related words consisted of the object's superordinate category, an action or 
function of the object, a physical feature, a general associate and the name of the 
test object. For example, if the target item was "shirt", then the related words 
comprised clothing, wear, collar, tie and shirt. The authors found no differences 
in reaction time to category and attribute words suggesting, in contrast to the 
findings reported in earlier papers, equal knowledge at general and specific 
levels. Nebes and Brady concluded that attribute knowledge was not selectively 
damaged in patients with AD. Rather, they suggested that direct responses to 
questions about attributes requires conscious evaluation of concepts and that this 
is more demanding than an indirect association task. Accordingly, what appears 
to be a loss of specific semantic knowledge may be no more than a deficit in 
cognitive processing.
A similar argument that differential performance on tests of exemplar and 
categorical knowledge is due to task difficulty is presented by Bayles, Tomoeda 
and Trosset (1990) and Cox, Bayles and Trosset (1996). These authors referred 
to examples of tasks in Warrington's (1975) original paper to illustrate their 
point. They argued that the questions used to evaluate superordinate knowledge 
(e.g., "Is it a bird?") were simpler than those used to examine subordinate or 
attribute knowledge (e.g., Is it bigger than a cat?"). In these circumstances it 
would not be surprising to find patients experiencing greater difficulty with the 
latter tasks as they require knowledge of two concepts rather than just one. To 
evaluate the influence of task difficulty, Bayles et al. (1990) used the same 
concepts to examine item-specific (i.e., naming task) and higher-order knowledge
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(i.e., using category recall and category recognition) in patients with AD and 
normal controls. They found that the relative difficulty of category to naming 
performance increased with dementia severity and that when this was controlled, 
naming became progressively easier.
The Bayles et al. (1990) study can be criticised for basing measurement 
of attribute knowledge on a single and possibly inappropriate measure (i.e., a 
confrontation naming task). This problem was addressed in a subsequent study 
by Cox et al. (1996) who asked patients to identify attribute differences, sort 
items into categories, define concepts (both category and attribute) and to name 
items. The inclusion of all these tests ensured that category and attribute 
knowledge was sampled using a range of measures. Again the same items were 
used across tasks and effects of task difficulty were controlled. The results were 
somewhat inconsistent, but it is possible that limitations in the analysis of their 
data contributed to this. For instance, the decline in performance with increasing 
severity of dementia (measured by the Mini-mental State Exam) was greatest on 
the attribute differences task. This is consistent with patients having the greatest 
deficiency in attribute knowledge. Yet no differences in deterioration rates were 
found when performance on attribute and category definition were compared.
An analysis of item-consistency might have been useful here — that is, whether 
accuracy in category definition corresponded with accuracy in attribute 
definition. It is possible that there was a high degree of consistency in 
responding, implying that individuals could either access substantial knowledge 
relevant to a particular concept or none at all. If there was inconsistency it would 
have been useful to determine whether performance on category and attribute 
definitions differed, and if so, in which direction. Additionally, it is possible that 
these tasks measured different abilities. In this case comparison is meaningless. 
Given these limitations it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the 
nature of semantic memory deterioration either from this study or that of Bayles 
et al. (1990).
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The studies reviewed above are not the only investigations in which 
differences on tests of attribute and category knowledge have been reported in 
dementia (e.g., see Chertkow, et al., 1992; Chertkow, Bub & Seidenberg, 1989; 
Warrington & Shallice, 1979). In fact, there is considerable evidence in support 
of differential performance on tests of exemplar and categorical knowledge. 
Nevertheless, questions remain as to how the phenomenon should be 
characterized and explained. Is the phenomenon to be seen as a differentiation 
between item-specific and higher-level knowledge, or between low and high 
levels of concept familiarity/frequency? Is the pattern of semantic memory 
deterioration a function of selective vulnerability (either in attribute knowledge 
or in concepts low in familiarity/frequency) or random damage? Theoretical 
accounts addressing these questions are reviewed in the next section.
3.1.2. Theory
Three explanations have been used to account for the generalities 
phenomenon in dementia. These comprise the hierarchical network model, the 
familiarity/frequency account and the fragmentary knowledge account.
The hierarchical network model
The first explanation of the differential performance between category 
and exemplar knowledge is based on Collins and Quillian's (1969) hierarchical 
network model of semantic memory. In the hierarchical structure envisaged by 
this model concepts are represented as "nodes". There are also associations 
between concept nodes stored at different levels reflecting the fact that some 
concepts are superordinates (e.g., animal) or subordinates (e.g., emu) of others. 
Nodes are associated (i.e., linked) with a number of properties at each level. To 
ensure economy of representation, properties relevant to a particular concept are 
stored at the highest level of generalization. So, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, the 
property "breathes" is stored with the concept animal rather than with all specific 
types of animals. Thus, the hierarchy proposed is one in which the properties
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animal moves
flies
has feathers 
has wings domesticated
Australian
flightless
emu
Figure 3.1 Illustration of a hierarchical semantic network structure 
of the type proposed by Collins and Quillian (1969).
range from being general to increasingly more specific. It is also assumed that 
retrieval of information from such a structure takes time and that this is a 
function of the number of levels that must be traversed in order to locate the 
relevant details.
This model appealed to researchers involved in early investigations of the 
generalities phenomenon in dementia (e.g., Warrington, 1975; Warrington & 
McCarthy, 1983; Warrington & Shallice, 1979). With this model, the pattern of 
knowledge loss in dementia could be explained in terms of a loss of nodes at 
lower-levels in the hierarchy. However, an explanation in these terms required a 
modification of one of the central assumptions of a hierarchical semantic 
network. This concerned the point of entry in a taxonomic hierarchy. In Collins 
and Quillian's model this is proposed to be at the level of item-specific 
information. So, for example, one accesses information that a dog breathes from
51
the animal node after having identified it as a dog. Yet because lower-level 
knowledge of this type is unavailable to dementia sufferers, such an assumption 
clearly cannot be incorporated into explanations of the generalities phenomenon 
in dementia. Noting this shortcoming, Warrington (1975) suggested that the 
point of entry into a taxonomic hierarchy might be at the highest or most general 
level. Thus, one may retrieve the knowledge that a dog breathes by first 
accessing the fact that it is living, then that it is an animal at which level the 
particular attribute in question is stored. With reference to this retrieval process 
the pattern of semantic memory deterioration observed in these patients could be 
explained by the selective vulnerability of attribute knowledge contained at lower 
levels of taxonomic hierarchies (i.e., a bottom-up theory of semantic memory 
deterioration). For example, we may retain the connection between emu and bird 
but lose the specific attributes associated with the former property set.
A number of fundamental problems have been identified both with 
Collins and Quillian's hierarchical model and Warrington's reformulation. As 
noted earlier, one of the major premises of the model is that verification of 
properties takes time and that the time involved is determined by the number of 
levels that must be searched to recover the answer to a particular question (e.g., 
does a dog breathe?). Collins and Quillian (1969) used a sentence verification 
task to test this prediction. They found that the time taken to judge the accuracy 
of statements increased as the number of postulated levels between the concept 
and the relevant property increased (e.g., "a poodle is a poodle" is verified faster 
than "a poodle is a dog" both of which would be verified faster than "a poodle is 
an animal"). However, it was subsequently found that some atypical examples of 
concepts took longer to verify (Rips, Shoben & Smith, 1973). For instance, 
verifying the association between dingo and dog would take much longer than 
verifying the association between poodle and dog, although the number of levels 
involved in these two cases was the same. Additional problems emerged with
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the finding that some concepts do not have clearly defining attributes (Barsalou, 
1987; McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978).
The modified hierarchical model proposed by Warrington and her 
colleagues can also be criticized. In any model of semantic memory structure it 
is important to specify the processes involved both in entering the knowledge 
base and in differentiating concepts. These processes are unclear. Specifically, 
how do we enter the knowledge base at the level of "living" when provided with 
the concept "dog"? It is difficult to envisage a system that would allow entry at 
the level of "living" without initial association of that concept with "dog". If the 
processes involved in entering the knowledge base can be explained, there is the 
additional problem of differentiating concepts at progressively lower levels (see 
Rapp & Caramazza, 1989). How, for example, does one differentiate between 
trees and dogs if they have a common overriding entry point at the level of living 
things? Furthermore, one of the assumptions of such a model is that performance 
on tests of categorization provides a direct indication of the actual contents of 
semantic memory. In other words, accurate classification of a dog as an animal 
indicates that the information contained in semantic memory concerning this 
concept is the attribute "animal" and perhaps other more superordinate attributes 
(e.g., living). However, such an assumption is not a necessary requirement. A 
random combination of both general and specific attributes (e.g., that a dog has 
fur, legs, breathes and barks) could also produce a pattern of differential 
performance on tests of general and specific knowledge (see the fragmentary 
knowledge account below). Together, these criticisms of both the hierarchical 
semantic network model and Warrington's reformulation have led researchers to 
seek alternative conceptualizations of semantic memory structure to account for 
the dissociation between exemplar and categorical knowledge.
The familiaritv/frequencv account
As noted earlier, Funnell (1995) has suggested that the differential 
performance observed on tests of attribute and category knowledge can be
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explained by a familiarity/frequency account. She claims that category-level 
information is both more familiar and more frequently encountered in language 
and as a result acquires greater representational strength than specific attribute- 
level information. That is, items higher in familiarity/frequency are argued to 
have increased representational strength and this strength is postulated to 
enhance their resilience when brain structures are damaged. Tippett, McAuliffe 
and Farah (1995) used computer simulation to model this suggestion. They 
trained a network to produce names in response to a visual stimulus — the 
computer equivalent of a confrontation naming task. The network was trained to 
associate patterns of activity between visual, semantic and name units.
Essentially, it was trained to produce a "name" pattern when presented with a 
"visual" pattern via a set of "semantic" patterns. Half of the semantic pattern 
contained category-based information (which was shared by a number of items), 
while the other half contained item-specific information. After the semantic units 
were damaged randomly, the authors found that their network produced more 
within- than between-cate gory errors. This is the same pattern of responses 
produced by patients with AD on confrontation naming tasks.
Tippett and her colleagues conducted a second simulation to determine 
whether the greater frequency of within-category errors was due to semantic 
confusion (between items that shared similar semantic components) or to the 
increased robustness of category-based information. The semantic units were 
again damaged randomly and comparison of the categorical and exemplar 
portions of resulting patterns revealed that the former were more resistant to 
destruction. Thus, not only had the network produced the same differentiation 
between category and exemplar knowledge observed in patients, but the results 
indicated that this pattern of performance was due to the greater resilience of 
categorical information.
The familiarity/frequency account has also been used to explain category- 
specific naming deficits. It has been suggested that there are differences between
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living and non-living categories in terms of item familiarity and frequency and 
that this could account for the apparent specificity of naming deficits. To 
examine this, Funnell and Sheridan (1992) and Stewart, Parkin and Hunkin 
(1992) controlled for effects of familiarity/frequency in naming tasks 
administered to patients diagnosed with a category-specific naming deficit and 
found no evidence of differential performance in naming. It is clear from these 
studies that performance on language-related tasks is influenced by item 
familiarity/frequency. Though, whether familiarity/frequency accounts fully for 
the differentiation between exemplar and categorical knowledge or is simply one 
of several factors that influence the phenomenon has yet to be determined.
The fragmentary knowledge account
Patterson and Hodges (1995) and Hodges et al. (1995) acknowledge the 
importance of frequency effects, but argue that it represents another aspect of 
language function that requires its own explanation. In particular, 
familiarity/frequency models offer little in terms of an analysis of knowledge 
structure. If attribute knowledge is selectively affected because of its weakness 
relative to category knowledge, how is the structure of these memory 
representations altered in the course of the dementing process? Hodges and his 
colleagues (1995) address this issue without resorting to assumptions about 
hierarchical structures or selective vulnerability. Their fragmentary knowledge 
account is based on an earlier proposal by Rapp and Caramazza (1989, 1993) that 
a randomly degraded semantic representation will be able to support performance 
on tests of categorical or higher-level knowledge. Under this view, sufficient 
knowledge remains in fragmentary semantic representations to support 
generalizations but not specifics. For example, imagine that as a consequence of 
damage, the remaining properties of the concept "cat" consist of knowing that it 
has fur, legs, whiskers and is a mammal (see Figure 3.2). This residual 
information would be sufficient to identify a cat as an animal, but not to 
discriminate it from other animals with similar characteristics (e.g., dogs and
rabbits). Thus, the differential performance on tests of category and attribute 
knowledge could result from the interaction between a randomly damaged 
knowledge base and normal retrieval mechanisms.
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Figure 3.2 Illustration of the structure of degraded concepts 
according to a fragmentary knowledge account.
Summary
Since Warrington's (1975) original observations, we have gained some 
ground both in terms of establishing the existence of preserved memory for 
generalities in particular forms of dementia and the relevance of the phenomenon 
to theories of semantic memory organisation. However, there has been no 
discussion (apart from that offered by Haslam et al. (1997)) of the 
generalizability of the phenomenon to other clinical conditions where semantic 
knowledge is compromised. For instance, both remote and newly acquired 
general knowledge can be compromised as a consequence of the various
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pathologies that result in global amnesia. In fact, there is some evidence to 
suggest that the residual knowledge demonstrated by amnesic patients may 
reflect preservation of memory for generalities. This evidence will be examined 
in the next section.
3.2. Preservation of memory for generalities in amnesia
The evidence for preserved higher-level knowledge in amnesia consists 
mainly of studies in which the generalities phenomenon was not the principal 
focus of investigation. In these studies, differential memory performance was 
either an indirect consequence or a direct consequence of the testing procedures 
used. The former provide indirect evidence of the generalities phenomenon and 
the latter direct evidence. The second type of evidence to be considered comes 
from research in which memory for generalities in amnesia was central to the 
investigation. The single case study by Haslam et al. (1997) appears to be the 
only explicit investigation of the preserved memory for generalities phenomenon 
in amnesia. This study provided the basis for the present program of research 
and therefore will be considered in detail.
3.2.1. Research primarily concerned with other theoretical issues 
Indirect evidence
Several studies provide indirect indications of preserved higher-level 
knowledge in amnesic patients. These studies focused on issues in the amnesia 
literature — first, the role of semantic and episodic memory in vocabulary 
acquisition (Verfaellie et al., 1995) and secondly, susceptibility to memory 
illusions (Cermak et al., 1973; Schacter, et al., 1996).
Verfaellie et al. (1995) conducted a series of experiments with an amnesic 
patient, SS, in which the primary aim was to identify the processes involved in 
vocabulary acquisition. In the first experiment they used explicit tests of recall 
and recognition to examine knowledge of words that had entered the language
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both before and after the onset of amnesia. Having found that knowledge of 
postmorbidly encountered words was more severely impaired, the researchers 
proceeded to examine the nature of the memory deficit. It was possible that 
impaired performance on the explicit tests reflected a deficit in accessing 
information about novel words. This question was examined in the second 
experiment using a semantic priming task. In this task novel words, unknown to 
SS, served as primes and lexical decisions were made to both related and 
unrelated targets. If the deficit in recall and recognition was due to a failure to 
acquire novel words (i.e., acquire novel representations) then lexical decision 
time for related and unrelated words should be equal. In fact, this is what 
occurred, which suggested that SS had no knowledge of the meanings of novel 
words. Although it was clear from these experiments that SS had no access to 
novel word meanings, it was possible that he had acquired some familiarity with 
them in terms of their lexical status. To examine this, a third experiment was 
conducted in which SS's ability to identify the lexical status of novel words and 
pseudowords (which were derived from the novel words) was examined. It was 
found that SS was very poor at discriminating real words from pseudowords 
compared to controls, again suggesting that he had acquired little if any 
knowledge about novel items.
While the findings from these experiments implied that SS had acquired 
no knowledge at all of postmorbidly encountered words, results of a fourth 
experiment provided evidence to the contrary. In this experiment a sentence 
verification task was used to measure novel word acquisition. It was considered 
that provision of context at test might facilitate performance. SS was asked to 
identify which of a pair of sentences used target, or novel, words appropriately. 
There were two types of sentence pairs. One type assessed knowledge of a 
word's general meaning: the incorrect sentence completely misused the target 
(e.g., "The warehouse was secured after all the futons had been latched"). The 
second type assessed knowledge of specific meaning: the incorrect sentence in
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this case preserved the word's general semantic meaning (e.g., "In her new 
apartment the tablecloth looked best on the futon"). Results indicated that SS had 
acquired sufficient knowledge about the meaning of novel words to differentiate 
sentences in terms of their general meaning only. Further analysis revealed that 
this result was due to SS's superior performance on compound words, which 
were items consisting of two meaningful (and pre-existing) words.
Based on these findings Verfaellie et al. (1995) concluded their patient 
was capable of acquiring novel information. This knowledge was evident for 
compound words only and was restricted to more generic information about word 
meaning. These researchers suggested that SS's superior performance with 
compound words was facilitated by the formation of novel connections during 
learning between pre-existing concepts in semantic memory. Non-compound 
words require the establishment of novel items in semantic memory, a function 
they attribute to episodic memory, in addition to the formation of connections.
On this basis, the authors claimed that acquisition of category-based knowledge 
was restricted to items that have some form of pre-existing representation. The 
results of Verfaellie et al.'s final study can be seen as representing a case of 
preserved memory for generalities corresponding to the condition reported in 
dementia. That is, SS may have been accurate in discriminating on the basis of 
general and not specific meaning because he could only acquire partial, perhaps 
broad category-based, information about the target items.
Semantic confusions or errors provide one means of indirectly 
demonstrating preservation of knowledge in dementia. A similar approach has 
been used to investigate residual knowledge in amnesic patients. For instance, 
Cermak et al. (1973) examined the errors that Korsakoff patients made in the 
course of identifying item repetitions in a word list (see Experiment 4). While 
some words were actually repeated, others were either direct associates (i.e., 
table-chair), homonyms (i.e., meat-meet) or synonyms (i.e., robber-thief) of 
preceding items. Patients were asked to read through a list of words and indicate
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whether any of the items had been shown previously. They found that Korsakoff 
patients made more recognition errors than controls and that these comprised 
mainly homonym and associate errors. While these findings were seen as 
reflecting on patients' encoding preferences, they could also be interpreted as 
supportive of partial knowledge preservation in amnesia. That is, the findings 
suggest that patients must have formed some general memorial representation of 
items during study.
Schacter et al. (1996) investigated memory illusions in amnesic patients 
to determine their susceptibility to recall and recognize falsely associates of 
studied items. Patients were presented with a series of word lists which they 
were asked to remember. Each list contained words that were strongly related to 
a particular target item or lure. The lure itself was not actually presented. For 
example, if the non-presented target word was "sleep" then the words heard by 
participants might include: bed, rest, tired and dream. After the word list had 
been presented participants were asked either to recall as many items as they 
could remember or to perform some calculations. This was followed by 
presentation of the next list. This procedure was repeated until a total of eight 
lists had been presented. Recognition was examined several minutes after 
completion of the final recall or calculation task.
Although these researchers found that non-impaired controls were more 
prone to false recollection than amnesics, several observations indicated that 
patients had acquired at least partial knowledge of words presented during study. 
The first observation relates to the recall data. Here, Schacter et al. separated 
responses according to whether they were unrelated to the studied list, related to 
the list just studied or related to previously studied lists. On the basis of this 
breakdown it was found that controls produced significantly more critical lures 
(i.e., related to the list that was just studied) than amnesics indicating that the 
former group were more susceptible to false recollection. It could be argued 
though, that separation of related responses into just studied and previously
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studied lists is clearly biased against amnesic patients (particularly when all eight 
lists were presented in the same session). Such a discrimination may require 
access to more specific memory representations which are not available to these 
patients. This bias can be removed if related responses (from just studied and 
previously studied lists) are combined. To determine susceptibility to false 
recollection, "related" responses can be compared with "unrelated" responses.
This comparison shows that the percentage of "related" relative to "unrelated" 
responses is approximately equal in amnesic patients and controls (78% versus 
22% for amnesics and 81% versus 19% for controls, for related and unrelated 
responses respectively). Thus, results of this alternative analysis suggest that 
both groups tended to falsely recall words that were semantically-related to 
studied items.
Schacter et al.'s recognition data provide further evidence of partial 
knowledge preservation in patients. Again, as expected, recognition accuracy 
was significantly lower in patients. Amnesics also tended to recognize fewer 
critical lures than controls. However, they recognized significantly more critical 
lures than distractors as "old". This result indicates that patients were influenced 
by critical (or just studied) items to some degree. Together, the findings from 
recall and recognition data indicate that patients acquired and retained partial 
knowledge of studied materials sufficient to influence their memory performance 
on certain tasks. Schacter et al. (1996) concluded that amnesic patients relied 
more heavily on general semantic associations formed at study due to the 
absence of specific representations. In order to account for the greater frequency 
of non-critical responses that patients tended to make, the authors raised the 
possibility that the semantic trace itself was poorly organized and degraded.
The finding common to all these studies is that amnesic patients exhibited 
partial knowledge. This indicates that they formed some memorial 
representation of materials they encountered at study. More important though, is 
the fact that this partial knowledge was general in nature. Irrespective of whether
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semantic confusions or word meaning were examined, patients were only 
successful in making judgements that required knowledge of more general 
categorical (or semantic) relationships. In other words, the patients in these 
studies appear to have shown preservation of higher-level knowledge in the 
context of impaired item-specific knowledge.
Direct evidence
While some of the relevant studies revealed higher-level knowledge in 
amnesia only incidentally, there are several studies in which this has been the 
primary focus. These have involved patients with anterograde amnesia as well as 
retrograde amnesia. In the case of retrograde amnesia, researchers have 
examined knowledge at several levels of detail including both general and 
specific (Hodges & McCarthy, 1993; McCarthy & Warrington, 1992). Results 
indicate that remote memory is not completely lost in these patients and that the 
pattern of preservation appears to be characterized by loss of item-specific 
information.
In the case of anterograde amnesia, researchers have been motivated by a 
wish to understand the processes that support acquisition of categorical 
knowledge. Two types of study have yielded evidence indicating preservation of 
memory for generalities. The first involves a series of experiments which 
focused largely on artificial grammar learning and categorization of dot patterns 
(Knowlton, Mangels & Squire, 1996; Knowlton, Ramus & Squire, 1992; 
Knowlton & Squire, 1993, 1994, 1996; Kolodny, 1994; Squire & Knowlton, 
1995), and the second relates to a study by Verfaellie and Cermak (1994) which 
addressed the relative components of generic and episodic components of recall 
in list learning. It appears that general-level knowledge was preserved and more 
specific lower-level knowledge was impaired in these studies. However, this 
inference was not drawn by the researchers. Instead, the authors presented 
interpretations based on dissociations between semantic and episodic, or implicit 
and explicit, memory.
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Retrograde amnesia
The pattern of residual knowledge reported in two amnesic patients 
appears consistent with preservation of memory for generalities. Both patients 
presented with memory loss for knowledge acquired prior to the onset of 
amnesia, including that concerning famous people and events. However, it was 
clear that all of their knowledge from the past was not lost. One case, RFR, 
became globally amnesic following a bout of herpes simplex encephalitis 
(McCarthy & Warrington, 1992) and a second patient, PS, developed retrograde 
amnesia as a consequence of thalamic infarction (Hodges & McCarthy, 1993). In 
both cases the period of retrograde amnesia was quite extensive and reported to 
be at least 20 years.
McCarthy and Warrington (1992) used several different tests to assess 
residual remote knowledge in RFR. When faces were used as the stimuli, RFR 
was only accurate in judging familiarity. He could select the famous face 
contained in a set of unknown faces but could only provide minimal information 
about several people when asked to define a set of faces. However, the 
information sourced from names was richer in detail. Not only was RFR able to 
recognize famous names as familiar, he could also provide the superordinate 
professional role (i.e., actor or politician) for the majority of names presented. 
Thus, while RFR's responses were limited to familiarity judgements for faces, 
they extended to the superordinate professional role with names. In both 
modalities though, the knowledge retained can be considered relatively high 
level.
Hodges and McCarthy's (1993) patient, PS, was also accurate in making 
fame judgements. In this case this was irrespective of whether the stimuli 
presented were names or faces. Furthermore, he was able to provide additional 
descriptive information when asked to identify famous faces and names. 
However, he performed best when providing superordinate category information.
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Although PS was able to provide detailed semantic information about some 
people on the famous faces task (presumably including more detailed 
professional information — such as type of politician), identification of the 
superordinate professional role was clearly superior (i.e., 92% and 68% accuracy 
for superordinate role and detailed semantic information respectively). This 
pattern is again consistent with superior memory for generalities.
Results obtained from these two cases of retrograde amnesia were 
interpreted by the researchers in terms of particular patterns of dissociation 
between postulated memory functions. In the case of RFR, McCarthy and 
Warrington (1992) focused on the dissociation between factual knowledge about 
a person and knowledge for event-related information. They proposed that 
RFR’s knowledge of the former was preserved and the latter was impaired. The 
authors used this dissociation to support their argument that person-specific 
attributes were often embedded within particular events. For example, one's 
ability to differentiate between two previous Australian prime ministers (e.g., 
Gough Whitlam and Bob Hawke) from the same political party may be 
facilitated by the involvement of one of them in a controversial event (the 
dismissal of Gough Whitlam). Accordingly, if memory of events is lost, then 
ability to discriminate between people who share many common attributes (e.g., 
both labour politicians and leaders of the party) will be compromised.
In contrast, the results for PS (Hodges & McCarthy, 1993) were 
interpreted as due to a difference in the preservation of semantic and 
autobiographical knowledge, with the former preserved and the latter impaired. 
Thus, although there is some suggestion that these patients (especially RFR) had 
difficulty accessing specific details about people, an explanation of the 
phenomenon in these more general terms was not considered.
Anterograde amnesia
The majority of studies directly investigating higher-level knowledge in 
amnesics have involved anterograde amnesia. These studies have concentrated
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on patients' capacity to acquire categorical information. The main advantage in 
exploring new learning capacity is that no estimates of pre-existing knowledge 
are required. In the case of retrograde amnesia, researchers assume that patients 
have knowledge about famous people prior to the onset of their amnesia. 
However, the limits of this pre-existing knowledge are rarely known. Such 
assumptions are not required in studies conducted with anterograde amnesics, 
where researchers need only ensure that the studied materials are novel.
Knowlton, Squire and colleagues have attempted to identify the processes 
involved in category-based learning (Knowlton, et al., 1996; Knowlton, et al., 
1992; Knowlton & Squire, 1993, 1994, 1996; Kolodny, 1994; Squire & 
Knowlton, 1995). In particular, they have tried to determine whether category 
learning is supported by implicit or explicit memory. Much of this research has 
focused on artificial grammar learning (Knowlton, Mangels & Squire, 1996; 
Knowlton, Ramus & Squire, 1992; Knowlton & Squire, 1994, 1996), though 
several studies have also investigated categorization of dot patterns (Knowlton & 
Squire, 1993; Squire & Knowlton, 1995) and paintings (Kolodny, 1994). In 
artificial grammar learning, patients are shown a series of letter strings which 
conform to a system of rules. Knowledge for these items is tested after several 
minutes using classification and recognition tests. In the classification test 
patients categorize novel strings as either grammatical or non-grammatical on the 
basis of "gut feeling". In the recognition test patients identify the specific items 
used in training. The findings from all these studies are consistent — patients 
perform well on classification tests but poorly on recognition tests.
This differentiation between classification and recognition has been used 
by the researchers to support the notion that categorical knowledge was acquired 
implicitly by these amnesic patients. They argue that accurate categorization 
does not require conscious knowledge of grammatical rules. However, others 
have suggested that classification may be supported by the residual resources 
contained within a partially damaged and inefficient explicit memory system
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(e.g., Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990). Knowlton and colleagues (Knowlton et al. 
1992; Squire & Knowlton, 1995) have argued against this proposal. Their 
amnesic patients were as accurate as controls in making classification judgements 
and it is argued that this is inconsistent with the notion of explicit contamination 
— if explicit memory were required for these judgements then control 
performance should have been superior to that of amnesic patients. Furthermore, 
comparison of recognition and classification results did not support the 
suggestion of explicit contamination. Not only was recognition performance in 
amnesic patients at chance level, it was also significantly worse than that on 
classification. Given the difference in performance on these tests, it is difficult to 
argue that classification and recognition rely on the same explicit memory 
processes.
Another issue concerns the information used for grammaticality 
judgements. In the course of learning, do patients acquire abstract knowledge 
about grammatical rules or do they use more concrete information specific to 
trained items? Knowlton and Squire (1996, Experiment 3) investigated the 
generalizability of grammatical learning. They examined transfer of grammatical 
knowledge to letter-strings not used in training. A lack of generalization would 
indicate reliance on concrete or exemplar-based information, while transfer of 
knowledge would indicate reliance on more abstract information about 
grammatical rules. It was found that amnesic patients and controls could transfer 
knowledge, but that in both groups classification was significantly improved 
when the same letters were used in training and test. Based on these and other 
related findings, Knowlton and Squire (1996) conclude that both abstract and 
exemplar-based knowledge are used in making grammaticality judgements.
The studies by Knowlton and her colleagues imply that a kind of 
category-based learning is preserved in amnesia. However, results of another 
study suggest that this is only true for certain types of tasks. Kolodny (1994) 
found that a group of amnesic patients could learn to classify dot patterns but
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could not categorize Italian Renaissance paintings. He suggested that this 
differentiation in performance reflected the richer content of paintings making 
categorization of such materials more complex. The greater involvement of 
explicit memory processes in the categorization of paintings was also considered 
to be a possible factor underpinning patients' poor performance on such tasks.
Pickering (1997) has expanded on Kolodny's conclusions by analyzing 
the differences between various categorization tasks and relating this to the 
possible brain structures involved in these tasks. While Kolodny provided no 
basis (apart from complexity) for discriminating between classification tasks, 
Pickering's analysis is based on the degree to which reference to exemplar 
representations was required in such tasks. He argued that some classification 
tasks required individuals to reference exemplar representations and that painting 
categorization was an example of this. In contrast, classification of dot patterns, 
and presumably artificial grammar learning, requires access to prototype 
representations formed by averaging across specific exemplars. Pickering 
postulated that hippocampal structures are important in the formation of 
exemplar representations and that the mammillo-thalamic pathway is involved in 
associating these representations with responses (e.g., category naming). This 
enables predictions about amnesic categorization performance based on the type 
of task employed and the particular brain structures compromised. For instance, 
diencephalic amnesics should be able to develop exemplar representations and 
patients with hippocampal damage should not. However, lesion-based 
predictions would be limited by the degree to which damaged structures can be 
specified precisely. While neuroimaging techniques are certainly improving, 
there remain many cases where the exact location of lesions is unknown.
A different approach to higher-level learning in amnesia was taken by 
Verfaellie and Cermak (1994). As in the case of Knowlton and her colleagues, 
these researchers were interested in the nature of general knowledge acquisition 
in amnesic patients. However, the focus in Verfaellie and Cermak's study was on
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the implications of generic learning for semantic and episodic memory. In 
particular, was higher-level knowledge in anterograde amnesics supported by a 
preserved generic (i.e., semantic) system or was it supported by a partially 
operational episodic memory system? To examine this they adopted a task in 
which context-free (or generic) and episodic components could be differentiated. 
This involved presenting a word list to patients. Some items were presented once 
and others twice. Words were presented in unique colours to determine whether 
an item's individual presentation could be remembered. It was reasoned that if 
memory for repeated items was based on item-specific knowledge (or the item's 
individual presentation), then no difference should be found in item and colour 
recall.
Both amnesic patients and controls were more accurate in recalling 
repeated words. However, more importantly, there was a difference between 
item and colour recall. While amnesic patients recalled a greater-than-expected 
number of repeated words, the opposite pattern was observed on colour recall. 
Since recall of colours for repeated items was worse than that for items presented 
only once, it was concluded that the superior performance observed for repeated 
items did not reflect any memory for particular presentations of words. Rather, it 
reflected some more general knowledge about the items. One possible 
interpretation of this is that semantic, or generic, knowledge is acquired 
independently of episodic memory. This view is in opposition to that of 
researchers who believe that semantic knowledge emerges from episodic 
experience (e.g., Kinsbourne & Wood, 1982). In addition though, Verfaellie and 
Cermak's patients performed significantly worse than controls on the measure of 
generic memory (i.e., recall of repeated items). Thus, there was evidence of an 
additional deficit of generic or semantic memory that could not be explained by 
damage to episodic memory.
68
Summary of direct and indirect evidence
Both direct and indirect assessments of higher-level learning in amnesic 
patients have been directed towards testing theories of amnesia. They are of 
interest in the present context because, irrespective of whether they involved 
direct or indirect examination, or remote or newly acquired knowledge, they 
found a differentiation in performance on tests of generic and item-specific 
knowledge. This pattern of performance is similar to that reported in particular 
forms of dementia and raises the possibility that the generalities phenomenon 
occurs outside of this particular condition. While there are clear differences 
between patients with amnesia and dementia in terms of the structural locus of 
the deficit(s) and their clinical presentation, it is possible that the mechanism 
responsible for the differences between exemplar and higher-level knowledge 
observed in both groups is the same. This link between the two conditions was 
first highlighted by Haslam et al. (1997). This study will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next section.
3.2.2 Research primarily concerned with the generalities phenomenon
Preserved category learning in amnesia: The case of MK.
In contrast to other research, the study previously published by the author 
and her colleagues (Haslam et al., 1997) explicitly attempted to relate the 
generalities phenomenon to amnesia. In this study capacity for new learning in 
an amnesic patient was determined by performance on tests of high- and low- 
level categorization. The findings suggest a possible link between amnesic 
patients and dementia sufferers in terms of their apparent preservation of memory 
for generalities.
The primary aim of Haslam et al.'s (1997) study was to determine 
whether an amnesic patient (MK) could acquire any knowledge at all of novel 
materials, and if so, to clarify the nature of that learning. The patient was asked 
to study novel items from two familiar categories — animals and
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fruits/vegetables. There were 14 items in each category, all of which were 
identified by MK and his wife as non-words in a lexical decision task. MK's task 
was to learn picture-name associations. The study phase took place over a period 
of four weeks. Each day, MK received two training sessions during which all 
target items were presented individually. For every item, its picture and name 
were displayed together and MK was instructed to remember the associations 
(via free-association). Each study session lasted 30 minutes at most. At the end 
of each week MK's knowledge for these associations was tested using recall and 
matching-to-sample tests. The recall test involved presenting studied pictures 
only that MK was required to name. In the matching-to-sample test MK was 
presented with individual pictures (from one category and then the other) and a 
list of names, and he was asked to choose the correct name for the pictured item. 
The list of names contained 14 studied names and 14 non-studied (or distractor) 
names from the same category. The non-studied names were also items that MK 
identified as non-words in a lexical decision task.
Over the four week period no evidence of learning was found on these 
traditional tests of memory (see Table 3.1). MK could not recall the name of any 
item from either the animal or fruit/vegetable categories. In the matching-to- 
sample test, four items at most were correctly identified on any individual session 
and there was no consistency in item-responding from week to week. However, 
since these memory tests were explicit in nature, and amnesic patients perform 
poorly on such tests, it was not surprising that no evidence of learning was found. 
To determine whether MK had acquired any information at all about items, an 
alternative forced-choice method was used to access knowledge. No further 
study sessions were administered after the completion of the four week learning 
phase.
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Session Animals Fruits/Vegetables
Recall Match-to-sample Recall Match-to-sample
1 0 3 0 1
2 0 1 0 4
3 0 0 0 2
4 0 0 0 4
Table 3.1 Recall and matching-to-sample test results (No. correct
identifications/14) during the initial study phase (from Haslam et al., 
1997).
Two sets of forced-choice tasks were employed. In the first set two tests 
were administered in which only the names of stimuli were presented. One 
consisted a two-alternative forced-choice test in which MK was presented with 
two studied names, one from each category (animals and fruits/vegetables), and 
asked to select the animal from the pair. MK was accurate in identifying animals 
correctly (scoring 13/14), but claimed that he was only guessing. A yes/no 
recognition test was also administered several months after completion of the 
study phase. In this test MK was presented, first, with studied items and then 
with non-studied items (i.e., distractor items from the word list used in the 
matching-to-sample test) and in each case he was asked to determine whether the 
name belonged to an animal. He was capable of identifying the animals which 
had been in both the studied and non-studied sets. Thus, his performance on both 
tests indicated he had acquired some novel information about each item although
he could not name them.
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Additional evidence of a differentiation in performance between 
categorical and exemplar knowledge was provided by a second set of forced- 
choice tasks. Three tests were administered all of which involved presentation of 
pictures together with name pairs. The first test, a between-category 
discrimination test, involved presentation of a picture and the name of an item 
from each category. MK selected the correct name for the picture with a high 
degree of accuracy (22/28 correct). A within-category discrimination test was 
then administered in which the name-pair comprised items from the same 
category (i.e., two animal names or two fruit/vegetable names). On this test 
MK's ability to correctly assign a name to the picture was at chance (14/28 
correct). A final between-category (with foils) discrimination test was 
administered in which the name-pair consisted of an item from each category, but 
with neither name correct. MK showed no hesitation in making a selection 
though, as in the previous tests, claimed he was guessing. Although all of his 
responses were necessarily incorrect, there was a significant tendency to select 
names on the basis of the semantic category cued by the picture (22/28 were from 
the correct category).
Several conclusions can be drawn from these tests. First, MK acquired 
sufficient knowledge about studied materials to discriminate between items on 
the basis of their higher-level semantic category (indicated by the accuracy with 
which MK discriminated animal from non-animal names). Secondly, categorical 
knowledge was better preserved than item-specific knowledge. MK's 
judgements were accurate when items in the name-pair were from different 
categories, but he was no better than chance when items were from the same 
categorical group. More importantly, between-category judgements were 
significantly better than within-category judgements. Further evidence of 
impaired exemplar knowledge relative to category knowledge was found in the 
discrimination test with foils. Had MK refused to select one of the names 
offered, then this would indicate preservation of knowledge beyond the category
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level. However, he chose items on a categorical basis freely and claimed that he 
was only guessing. Based on these findings, Haslam et al. (1997) concluded that 
the pattern of memory performance produced by MK was characterized by 
preservation of higher-level category knowledge and impairment of exemplar 
knowledge.
This pattern of performance, labelled as preserved memory for 
generalities, implies similarities between patients with amnesia and dementia. 
Given these similarities, it is worth considering MK's results in terms of 
theoretical analyses of the generalities phenomenon in the dementia literature.
Of the two most feasible theories of "generalities" in dementia, the fragmentary 
knowledge account offered by Hodges and his colleagues (1995) fares best in 
explaining MK's performance. It is possible that MK acquired only fragments of 
the information he studied and this could explain the high degree of accuracy in 
his performance on all tests of categorical discrimination. In the course of 
learning to associate a picture with a name, he may only have been capable of 
remembering some fragments of the information provided in the picture (e.g., 
that the item has a head, moves and has legs). These fragments would have been 
sufficient to identify the name as that of an animal, for example, through a 
process of deduction — if the item has a head, legs and moves it is probably an 
animal. Thus, in the forced choice tests when matching one of two names from 
different categories to a picture, MK would simply refer to the fragmentary 
knowledge he had of the names to identify the category of item the picture cued. 
This knowledge would be sufficient to discriminate animals from 
fruits/vegetables. However, these fragments of knowledge for items from the 
same category may be quite similar to one another and thus would not support 
within-category discriminations.
A fragmentary knowledge account can also explain MK's performance in 
categorization of non-studied/distractor names from the matching-to-sample test. 
MK was accurate in identifying the animal from a set of distractor names (i.e., in
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the yes/no recognition test) and this result was somewhat unexpected. However, 
it is possible that distractor animal names, for example, acquired animal 
attributes through their association with studied animal names. This information 
would be sufficient to discriminate animal distractors from fruit/vegetable 
distractors. Thus, not only does this fragmentary knowledge account explain the 
degradation of semantic memory observed in dementia, it also explains the 
acquisition of partial semantic knowledge observed in MK.
Funnell's familiarity/frequency account, on the other hand, cannot explain 
the acquisition of higher-level knowledge in MK. His success in category 
discrimination could only be supported through the association of some 
categorical properties with names. For example, to distinguish between "vicuna" 
and "aubergine" MK would have to know that the first name had some animal 
properties and the second name some fruit/vegetable properties. These were 
presumably acquired in the course of presenting picture-name associations during 
study. In this experiment, a familiarity/frequency account predicts superior 
performance on the basis of greater exposure to particular items. However, 
because the names themselves represent an infrequently encountered attribute of 
the item in question (i.e., "vicuna" was only presented once even though 
examples of animals appeared 14 times), preservation of categorical knowledge 
in this study is inconsistent with Funnell's account.
Haslam et al.'s results suggest that preservation of memory for 
generalities may not be confined to dementia. The link between these two 
patient groups is based largely on results of this one study (although, as noted 
earlier, this conclusion is supported indirectly by a range of other studies). 
Additional evidence of this phenomenon in amnesics is required to establish a 
generalities-type account as an alternative characterization of deficient memory 
processes in these patients. Furthermore, the majority of studies that provide 
support for the generalities phenomenon in amnesia have examined acquisition 
of new information. In the case of dementia, preservation of memory for
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generalities has been demonstrated in the context of knowledge loss. This issue 
concerning damage to pre-existing knowledge should also be investigated in 
patients with the retrograde form of amnesia. Earlier in this chapter, evidence of 
partial knowledge preservation in retrograde amnesia was presented (i.e., Hodges 
& McCarthy, 1993; McCarthy & Warrington, 1992) and the pattern of memory 
preservation appeared consistent with a generalities account. As in the case of 
anterograde amnesia though, additional evidence of the generalities phenomenon 
is required in retrograde amnesia. This is provided by the series of experiments 
reported in this thesis. These studies attempt not only to clarify the reliability of 
the generalities phenomenon but to tease out theoretical issues related to its 
explanation.
3.3. Overview
The relevance of the generalities phenomenon to semantic memory 
structure has been demonstrated most clearly in patients suffering from dementia. 
The pattern of semantic memory deterioration observed in these patients has 
served to highlight various aspects of conceptual organisation and representation, 
in particular the composition of individual concepts in terms of their attributional 
structure and the relationship between concepts. Several theoretical accounts 
have been developed to address these issues, though there is no general 
agreement at this stage about whether familiarity/frequency or fragmentary 
knowledge accounts provide the best analysis of conceptual structure.
There is some indication of preserved memory for generalities in the 
amnesia literature. However, only limited evidence supports differential 
performance on tests of exemplar and higher-level knowledge in amnesia and 
much of this is based on results of studies in which other issues were examined. 
In the dementia literature, preservation of memory for generalities has been 
demonstrated in the context of categorization behaviour involving discrimination 
of high- and low-level information. The majority of relevant studies reported in
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the amnesia literature have used quite different methodologies and thus, it could 
be argued that links between these studies and those from the dementia literature 
are tenuous. Only one study, by Haslam et al. (1997), has looked explicitly at 
categorization behaviour in the course of examining memory performance in 
amnesia. Additional evidence is required if the similarities between these 
conditions are to be strengthened. This thesis extends the findings of Haslam et 
al. by providing additional evidence of the phenomenon in amnesia and 
exploring its properties. In particular, the use of direct and indirect tests in 
accessing higher-level knowledge is investigated. Preservation of memory for 
generalities is considered in relation to retrograde amnesia as well as anterograde 
amnesia. The influence of study context is also explored. Finally, an 
examination of the relevance of the generalities phenomenon to normal memory 
function is provided.
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Chapter 4 mmmmSm
Overview of empirical chapters
It is clear that amnesic patients have some residual memory capacity.
The question is, what information do these patients acquire or retain? This thesis 
addresses this question by investigating the nature of partial knowledge 
preservation in these patients. Specifically, do amnesic patients acquire or retain 
partial knowledge, and if so, is this knowledge more general (i.e., higher-level) in 
nature?
In the following chapters a series of experiments are presented in which 
preservation of memory for generalities is investigated in amnesic patients. The 
aim of these studies was, first, to provide additional evidence of the generalities 
phenomenon in amnesia and, second, to explore its properties. The latter 
involved examination of the role of direct and indirect testing, the influence of 
study context and the relevance of the phenomenon to both anterograde and 
retrograde amnesia. The empirical work in this thesis is based largely on results 
of studies conducted with three amnesic patients who are described in Chapter 5.
Results of three experiments in which memory for novel face-occupation 
associations was examined are presented in Chapter 6. In the first of these 
experiments patients acquired sufficient knowledge of face-occupation 
associations to discriminate faces according to their general class (i.e., whether 
they were educators or tradespeople) but not on the basis of the specific 
professions they had studied (i.e., teachers, lecturers, electricians and plumbers). 
Classification at a lower occupational level was introduced in the second study 
and results showed that for at least one patient a modification in study context 
facilitated access to knowledge (i.e., at the level of teacher/lecturer) that had not 
been available in the previous study. Finally, the contribution to these results of
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the mode of testing higher-level knowledge was investigated. It was possible 
that results in the first two experiments were due to differences in response mode 
between tests of high- and low-level knowledge. Knowledge at the high-level 
was examined indirectly in terms of patterns of response confusion, while that at 
the low-level was examined directly. Findings indicated that indirect tests were 
indeed more effective than direct tests in accessing higher-level knowledge.
Thus, these first three experiments provide additional evidence that the 
generalities phenomenon might be found in amnesia as well as dementia. It is 
also shown that what constitutes a "generality" may be dependent on study 
context and that response mode has an important influence on the memory 
performance of amnesic patients.
In this first series of experiments there was no evidence of higher-level 
knowledge in tests that were of a direct nature. Yet this did not rule out the 
possibility that such knowledge might be demonstrated provided the information 
tapped is sufficiently general. This question was investigated two studies 
(Experiments 4 and 5) described in Chapter 7. Memory for face-name- 
occupation associations was examined in these experiments and up to five levels 
of knowledge, ranging from the very general to the very specific, was tested 
directly. Results showed that patients could access some knowledge directly and 
that this tended to be at the most general levels examined. However, the amount 
of information accessible under direct questioning differed between patients.
Evidence of preserved memory for generalities in retrograde amnesia was 
investigated in three experiments which are reported in Chapter 8 using the same 
techniques as those employed in Chapters 6 and 7. In the first two studies, 
knowledge in the autobiographical domain was examined. The first of these 
investigated autobiographical knowledge directly using the procedure employed 
in Experiments 4 and 5. A pattern of preserved memory for higher-level 
information and impaired memory for lower-level detail was found, but only 
with face cues. The patient was capable of accessing all information requested
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with name cues. This suggested that the amount of semantic information 
accessible from faces and names differed — a result that has important 
implications for models of face recognition. Having identified the level of 
generality at which memory broke down on direct questioning in the 
autobiographical study (i.e., the level requiring discrimination between family 
and friends), a second experiment was conducted to determine whether 
knowledge at this level could be accessed using indirect methods of testing. The 
approach was similar to that employed in the studies reported in Chapter 6. 
Indirect examination of higher-level knowledge was achieved by asking the 
patient to discriminate between types of family member (i.e., discriminating 
people from her side and her husband's side of the family) and types of friend 
(i.e., discriminating old friends from new friends). It was found that under these 
conditions the patient could differentiate family members from friends, but not 
between types of family and types of friend.
The final study reported in Chapter 8 investigated remote memory for 
generalities in the domain of public knowledge. This experiment focused 
exclusively on the amount of information that patients could provide in response 
to direct questions about famous people (i.e., actors and sportspeople). Evidence 
of memory impairment was found in the one patient who suffered from 
retrograde amnesia. This patient was only capable of responding accurately to 
questions at the most general knowledge levels examined. In addition, the 
patient accessed more semantic information from name cues and this confirms 
the previous observation that cue type had an influence on the availability of 
knowledge. Results of these three studies indicate that preservation of memory 
for generalities also occurs in retrograde amnesia.
The fact that patients with amnesia and dementia remember higher-level 
information better than lower-level information is not necessarily surprising, 
since a similar finding might be predicted in non-clinical populations. It could be 
argued that many of the confusions we make on a daily basis reflect better
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memory for generalities. For example, when two names are confused there is 
tendency for them to be related in some way (e.g., you may confuse the name of 
a teacher with the name of lecturer). The relevance of the generalities 
phenomenon to normal memory is investigated in Chapter 9. The experiment 
reported in this final chapter adapted the first three studies (in Chapter 6) in a 
non-impaired sample. This sample showed a pattern of superior memory for 
higher-level information similar to the amnesic patients, indicating that the 
generalities phenomenon is not confined to cases of pathological memory. 
However, unlike the amnesics, normal subjects were not influenced by 
manipulations in testing. They performed equally well in direct and indirect tests 
of higher-level knowledge.
Several conclusions can be drawn from these studies. Most importantly, 
they demonstrate that the generalities phenomenon previously reported in 
dementia can occur in other clinical conditions and, indeed, in normal memory. 
This has implications for understanding of the memory disturbance in both forms 
of amnesia and memory function in general. There were some other findings 
whose implications are either less clear (e.g., the role of context and the 
demonstration of preserved memory for generalities at lower levels of 
categorization) or not directly relevant to the generalities phenomenon (e.g., the 
differentiation in performance with faces and names). These issues and their 
theoretical implications are considered in the concluding chapters of this thesis.
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Chapter 5
■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■
Investigating memory for generalities in amnesia:
Case histories
Preservation of memory for generalities in amnesia was investigated with 
the assistance of three patients who are identified in the following empirical 
chapters as IP, GS and TG. These patients were selected on the basis of two 
criteria. First, a diagnosis of global amnesia was required. Two patients, IP and 
GS, suffered from anterograde amnesia. TG, suffered from both retrograde and 
anterograde amnesia. A second requirement was that knowledge about concepts 
(i.e., an aspect of semantic memory) was preserved. This was particularly 
important given that knowledge about certain occupations and the relationships 
between these occupations was required in the majority of studies conducted. 
Only common occupations were included in the studies and all patients indicated 
that they had a good understanding of them.
A battery of tests was administered to determine whether patients met 
these criteria. The test battery examined a number of cognitive functions. These 
comprised: general intelligence, memory, visual perception and executive or 
frontal lobe function. Results are summarised in Tables 5.1 to 5.3 and 
impairment is indicated by an asterisk marked alongside the relevant test scores 
(with the exception of category fluency for which appropriate norms were not 
available). An indication of current intellectual status was provided by the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981). 
Comprehension was examined objectively using a modified version of the token 
test (Spreen & Benton, 1969).
Three areas of memory function were examined. Remote memory was 
examined using the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI; Kopelman,
81
Wilson & Baddeley, 1989, 1990) as well as a modified version of the Crovitz- 
Schiffman technique which involves presentation of high frequency nouns (in 
this case 10 nouns) to evoke past memories (Zola-Morgan, Cohen & Squire, 
1983). Although there are other tests of remote memory function, examining 
knowledge about famous people and famous events, these were deemed to be 
inappropriate for an Australian population given their European bias. Capacity 
for new learning was examined using the Wechsler Memory Scale - Revised 
(WMS-R; Wechsler, 1987), the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT; 
Lezak, 1995; Taylor, 1959) and the Rey-Osterrieth Figure (Corwin & Bylsma, 
1993; Spreen & Strauss, 1991). The WMS-R also provided an indication of 
attentional capacity. Semantic memory was examined using tests of category 
fluency (Hodges, et al., 1995), letter fluency (i.e., Controlled Oral Word 
Association Test; Benton & Hamsher, 1976) and picture naming (Test 14, 
Birmingham Object Recognition Battery; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1993). The 
category fluency test was used to determine whether patients' knowledge for 
living and non-living concepts differed. This was included because one patient 
suffered from herpes simplex encephalitis — a condition in which category 
specific naming deficits are common (Snowden, Griffiths & Neary, 1994). In 
addition, a number of subtests from the WAIS-R are relevant to semantic 
memory function. Information, vocabulary, comprehension and similarities are 
particularly important as they provide an indication of an individual's general 
factual and word knowledge, both of which are believed to be contained in 
semantic memory. Other subtests, such as picture completion and picture 
arrangement provide an indirect measure of conceptual knowledge as 
performance on these tests will be hindered by any impairment to knowledge of 
objects and action sequences.
Two remaining functions were examined as impairment to either of these 
could have impacted on interpretation of patient performance in the series of 
studies presented in this thesis. Visual perception was examined, given that faces
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were used to cue memory in the majority of studies. To examine this function 
Benton's Facial Recognition Test (Benton, Hamsher, Varney & Spreen, 1983), 
Benton's Line Orientation Test (Benton, Varney & Hamsher, 1978) and the form 
discrimination component of Benton's Visual Retention Test (BVRT; Benton et 
al., 1983) were administered. Frontal lobe functions were evaluated since 
executive abilities, such as deficits in organisational capacity, may impact on 
memory performance (Lezak, 1995). Executive function was examined using the 
Rey-Osterrieth Figure, the Trailmaking Test (A and B; Davies, 1968), the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton, 1981) as well as relevant subtests from the 
WAIS-R (i.e., block design, similarities and mental arithmetic).
5.1 Case IP
IP was 16 years of age when he became amnesic as a result of an 
intracerebral haemorrhage which he suffered in March 1995. Initial cranial CT 
scans pointed to the presence of haemorrhage involving the left caudate nucleus 
and ventricular system and the presence of an aneurysm at the bifurcation of the 
left internal carotid artery. A ventricular drain was inserted on the day of 
admission and the aneurysm was clipped on the following day. Several weeks 
after admission, ventricular enlargement was noted on repeat cranial CT scanning 
and this resulted in the insertion of a ventriculo-peritoneal shunt. A cranial MRI, 
performed in May 1995, revealed the recent insult involving the caudate nucleus 
and the presence of a shunt passing through the frontal horn of the lateral 
ventricle with the tip in the supramedial thalamus. Subsequent scanning 
(perfusion brain study with tomography) revealed cortical perfusion in the left 
hemisphere involving the prefrontal and mesial temporal regions, believed to be 
related to the recent vascular episode.
As he recovered from this insult significant, problems with his memory 
were apparent. In particular, IP was extremely forgetful, had great difficulty 
remembering recent events and appeared unable to acquire new information. As
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part of the investigations into his memory disturbance he was referred for 
neuropsychological assessment. These assessments were conducted in May and 
September 1995. Both examinations revealed a profound and global disturbance 
to memory with relative preservation of other cognitive functions. His profile 
had not changed over the course of these assessments, and it was no different 
from that revealed on the assessment conducted as part of the selection criteria 
for involvement in this study. The latter assessment was conducted in March 
1996 and these results are discussed in detail below.
At the time IP was assessed for his suitability for the research program he 
was 17 years of age and had returned to school. He had adjusted reasonably well 
to his return to school as he was familiar with many of the teachers and students. 
However, he could not continue with the same classes given the severity of his 
memory problems. IP was aware of his memory problems and changes in his 
course of study but did not appear to be overly concerned by them.
Table 5.1 shows results of IP's assessment. On examination he was 
oriented for person and place, but not for time. There was no evidence of any 
language difficulties with respect to either comprehension or expression. 
Performance on a test of general intellectual function revealed consistent ability 
in verbal and performance domains and his overall intelligence quotient placed 
him in the "superior" range (performance was at the 95th percentile). However, 
performance on one subtest, measuring psychomotor speed, was inconsistent 
with this profile and the result obtained represented a moderate to severe 
reduction in ability (37th percentile). IP performed well on tests of 
planning/organisation, problem solving, abstract thinking and mental flexibility 
— all believed to be indicators of the integrity of frontal lobe functions (Lezak, 
1995). Performance on tests of visual perception was largely intact with the 
exception of a moderate impairment on the face recognition test. In fact, this 
reflected a problem in matching degraded faces only (i.e., faces darkened to
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General Intellectual Function:
WAIS-R: Information 14 Picture Completion 13
Digit Span 13 Picture Arrangement 14
Vocabulary 11 Block Design 14
Arithmetic 18 Object Assembly —
Comprehension 13 Digit Symbol 9 *
Similarities 13
Verbal IQ: 1 2 2
Performance IQ: 124
Full Scale IQ: 125
Anterograde Memorv:
WMS-R: Verbal Memory Index 62*
Visual Memory Index 80*
General Memory Index 58*
Attention/Concentration Index 115
Delayed Recall Index <50*
RAVLT: Trials 1 -5  ( /15) 5,7, 5, 6 , 8 *
Recall after interference 4/15*
30 min. recall 0/15*
30 min. recognition 5(+3)/15*
Rey Figure: Copy 36
3 min. delay 1 0 *
30 min. delay 9 *
Autobiographical Remote Memorv:
AMI: Personal - Childhood 21 Autobiog - Childhood 8
Early Adult — Early Adult —
Recent Life 19 Recent Life 4*
Modified Crovitz Technique (10 cue words) 26/30
Semantic Memory:
Letter Fluency (FAS) 23*
Category Fluency: Total animate 43
Total inanimate 39
Picture Naming (BORB) 75/76
Comprehension:
Token Test 163/163
Visual perception:
Benton's Facial Recognition (long conversion) 37/54*
Benton's Judgement Line Orientation (total) 29/30
BVRT: form discrimination 32/32
Executive Functions (additional tests'):
Trailmaking Test: A: 21" B: 45"
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test: 6 / 6  sorts in 89 trials, .06%
perseverative responses
Table 5.1 IP's neuropsychological test profile (Note: * = impairment)
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obscure much of the face). IP experienced no difficulty at all in matching non- 
degraded faces in this test and, in addition, was able to match faces used in the 
empirical section of this thesis with ease. On the whole, semantic memory 
function was preserved. Picture naming was normal as was his performance on 
WAIS-R subtests that are indicative of semantic memory function (e.g., 
vocabulary, comprehension, information). A test of category fluency revealed no 
difference in his knowledge of animate and inanimate concepts. However, a 
severe reduction in letter fluency was found (4th percentile) and, on its own, this 
may reflect a greater problem with selective generation of words than with 
semantic memory per se.
There was no evidence of impairment on tests of autobiographical remote 
memory. IP recalled very detailed memories in response to cue words and 
recalled both semantic and autobiographical events from his childhood with ease. 
Exploration of memories from early adulthood were inappropriate in this case 
given that IP was 17 years of age when the test was administered. As expected, 
recall of recent autobiographical memories was impaired. However, recall of 
recent personal semantic memories was within acceptable limits and this is 
generally inconsistent with an amnesic profile. This was mainly due to the 
accuracy of responses to questions pertaining to his present institution (i.e., part 7 
of the AMI), which in this case was his school. He had attended the school for 
the past 5 years and so responses to questions relating to this institution may have 
been generated from past knowledge.
In contrast, performance on all tests of new learning was profoundly 
reduced. IP's ability to learn new information was very poor as was his capacity 
to retain this material over time (e.g., see RAVLT trials 1 to 5). There was little 
difference in his delayed recall of verbal and non-verbal material (performance 
on the delayed recall index of the WMS-R was <.05th percentile). Only marginal 
improvement was noted on tests of recognition. In sum, IP's neuropsychological 
profile was consistent with that reported in anterograde amnesia in which a
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profound deficit to new learning is present with relative preservation of other 
cognitive functions.
5.2 Case GS
GS was 33 years of age when he was admitted to hospital with a 
suspected brain haemorrhage. Initial cranial CT scanning revealed the presence 
of a subarachnoid haemorrhage in the right fronto-parietal region. This was the 
result of an aneurysm in the anterior communicating artery which was surgically 
clipped on the same day of admission. An initial neuropsychological 
examination was conducted six weeks following the insult. Results of this 
assessment revealed a pattern of severe memory impairment and slowed rate of 
information processing together with general preservation of intellectual and 
executive/frontal lobe functions. Prior to the insult, GS had a variable 
employment history that included labouring positions and work as a hospital 
wardsman. He was undergoing rehabilitation when referred for involvement in 
this study.
GS was seen in May 1996 to determine his suitability for the research 
program. Initial interviews with his mother revealed that GS had been an 
aggressive, violent and impulsive person prior to the insult. She reported 
noticing considerable improvement in his behaviour following the insult and 
claimed that he had changed for the better. No behavioural difficulties were 
evident during the examination. On the whole, GS presented as cheerful in 
manner and co-operated fully with testing procedures.
Results of the assessment are presented in Table 5.2. GS was generally 
oriented for person and place, but was not oriented for time. Attentional capacity 
was preserved as was his performance on all tests of visual perception. No 
language problems were evident in either expression or comprehension.
Although his current intellectual ability was found to be in the average range 
(37th percentile), a mild discrepancy was noted between verbal and performance
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General Intellectual Function:
WAIS-R: Information 9 Picture Completion 12
Digit Span 8 Picture Arrangement 12
Vocabulary 12 Block Design 9
Arithmetic 9 Object Assembly 12
Comprehension 8 Digit Symbol 5}
Similarities 8
Verbal IQ: 91
Performance IQ: 99
Full Scale IQ: 94
Anteroerade Memorv:
WMS-R: Verbal Memory Index 74*
Visual Memory Index 84*
General Memory Index 73*
Attention/Concentration Index 99
Delayed Recall Index <50*
RAVLT: Trials 1 -5  ( /15) 6, 6, 5, 5,7*
Recall after interference 3/15*
30 min. recall 3(+2)/15*
30 min. recognition 12(+2)/15*
Rey Figure: Copy 36
3 min. delay 11*
30 min. delay 10*
AutobioeraDhical Remote Memorv:
AMI: Personal - Childhood 18.5 Autobiog - Childhood 9
Early Adult 19 Early Adult 8
Recent Life 14.5 Recent Life 5*
Modified Crovitz Technique (10 cue words) 22/30
Semantic Memorv:
Letter Fluency (FAS) 35
Category Fluency: Total animate
Total inanimate
Picture Naming (BORB)
Comprehension:
Token Test 
Visual perception:
Benton's Facial Recognition (long conversion) 
Benton's Judgement Line Orientation (total) 
BVRT: form discrimination
Executive Functions (additional tests): 
Trailmaking Test: A: 61” *
46
37
76/76
163/163
49/54
27/30
32/32
B: 117"*
Table 5.2 GS's neuropsychological test profile (Note: * = impairment)
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quotients. The majority of scores on verbal subtests tended towards low average 
apart from that on vocabulary. His mother indicated that prior to the 
insult he was well-read and this could explain the comparatively good 
performance obtained on this subtest. Another notable result was obtained on a 
measure of psychomotor speed which was severely reduced (5th percentile) 
given both premorbid and current estimates of ability. This impairment in 
psychomotor speed also seemed to contribute to the reduction in performance 
observed on one test of executive function (trailmaking test; Part A: < 10th 
percentile, Part B: 10th - 25th percentile). GS made no errors in either 
component of this test and furthermore, performed within the expected range on 
the other tests of executive function administered.
With respect to memory, no evidence of impairment was found on tests of 
semantic and remote memory functions. In comparison though, performance on 
all tests of new learning was profoundly reduced. GS experienced considerable 
difficulty in acquiring new information and his ability to retain this information 
following interference and time delay was poor (e.g., on the delayed recall index 
of the WMS-R performance was <.05th percentile). This pattern of memory 
performance was observed in both verbal and non-verbal domains. Cueing 
provided some improvement in memory performance on one test of recognition 
(i.e., RAVLT), but the same degree of facilitation was not observed on other tests 
of this nature.
Memory performance was reviewed 3 months later and results indicated 
that there had been no improvement in this function during that time. Overall, 
the assessment results indicate that GS suffers from a profound impairment to 
new learning, which is consistent with that reported in cases of anterograde 
amnesia, together with severe impairment to psychomotor speed. The remaining 
functions were relatively preserved in comparison.
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5.3 Case TG
TG was admitted to hospital in December 1995 having suffered several 
days of fever, vomiting and acute confusion. She was 36 years of age at the time. 
Initial cranial CT scans revealed hypodensity in both temporal lobes and this was 
more marked in the right hemisphere. The MRI scan report noted altered signal 
intensity in the cortex of both temporal lobe regions and this was extended to the 
anterior pole in the right hemisphere. These findings, together with lymphocyte 
count and EEG changes, were reported to be consistent with herpes simplex 
encephalitis.
As TG recovered from the acute stages of her illness she was confused, 
disoriented for place and time and she demonstrated no recollection of ongoing 
events. She confused members of her immediate family during this early phase 
of her recovery (e.g., thinking her son was her nephew, providing anecdotal 
evidence of preserved autobiographical memory for generalities). However, this 
had improved by the time that TG was interviewed for possible inclusion in the 
present research program. Prior to her illness TG had been trained as a 
social/welfare officer and was employed most recently in a teaching and 
counselling capacity.
Early neuropsychological examinations revealed severe impairment of 
remote memory and new learning. Moderate impairments to executive function 
and psychomotor speed were also noted. Another examination was conducted in 
July 1996 as part of the selection criteria for the present research program and 
these results are presented in Table 5.3. On testing TG was disoriented for time 
and place. Attentional and visuoperceptive skills were intact. Her performance 
on a test of general intellectual function was moderately reduced given 
premorbid estimates (premorbidly TG was estimated to be of above average 
ability and current performance placed her at the 50th percentile), and a 
discrepancy was evident in verbal and performance quotients. Mild to moderate
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General Intellectual Function:
WAIS-R: Information 8 * Picture Completion 9 *
Digit Span 1 1  Picture Arrangement 1 2
Vocabulary 13 Block Design 8 *
Arithmetic 7* Object Assembly 7 *
Comprehension 13 Digit Symbol 7 *
Similarities 10
Verbal IQ: 1 0 1 *
Performance IQ: 95*
Full Scale IQ: 99*
Anterograde Memorv:
WMS-R: Verbal Memory Index 6 8 *
Visual Memory Index 67*
General Memory Index 61*
Attention/Concentration Index 1 1 2
Delayed Recall Index <50*
RAVLT: Trials 1 -5  ( /15) 4, 6 , 6 , 5, 5*
Recall after interference l(+2)/15*
30 min. recall 0/15*
30 min. recognition 13(+27)/15*
Rey Figure: Copy 36
3 min. delay 0 *
30 min. delay 0 *
Autobiograohical Remote Memorv:
AMI: Personal - Childhood 19 Autobiog - Childhood 0 *
Early Adult 15 Early Adult 0 *
Recent Life 10* Recent Life 0 *
Modified Crovitz Technique (10 cue words) 8/30*
Semantic Memorv:
Letter Fluency (FAS) 39*
Category Fluency: Total animate 35
Total inanimate 36
Picture Naming (BORB) 69/76
Comprehension:
Token Test 163/163
Visual perception:
Benton's Facial Recognition (long conversion) 43/54
Benton's Judgement Line Orientation (total) 28/30
BVRT: form discrimination 32/32
Executive Functions (additional tests):
Trailmaking Test: A: 41" * B: 90" *
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test: 5/6 sorts in 128 trials, 22%
perseverative responses*
Table 5.3 TG's neuropsychological test profile (Note: * = impairment)
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impairment was found on tests of planning/organisation, problem solving (e.g., 
block design, 5th - 9th percentile), mental flexibility (trailmaking test, both A and 
B at 25th percentile) and fluency (40th - 44th percentile). Because these tests 
were timed it was felt that reduced processing speed contributed to the reduction 
observed in performance. Category-specific naming deficits were not apparent 
on picture naming or category fluency tasks. In addition, performance on other 
tests indicative of semantic memory function was generally preserved 
(performance on vocabulary and comprehension subtests of the WAIS-R was at 
the 84th percentile).
Performance on tests of remote memory was poor. Recall of personal 
semantic memories was impaired from early adulthood. TG's memory for events 
that had taken place from early adulthood were particularly vague and devoid of 
content. This, together with reports from her husband, suggest that her 
retrograde memory deficit for this material covered a period of approximately 20 
years. Memory for autobiographical incidents, as evident from all time periods 
examined on the AMI and the Crovitz task, was particularly poor (TG obtained 
an average of 1.3 points out of 3 per item). These memories tended to be very 
general. For example, in response to the cue word boat, TG responded "I went 
on a cruise ship once", but could not provide any more detail. Thus, recall of 
personal factual details, although impaired, was clearly superior to that for 
personally experienced events.
In addition, a profound impairment was found on tests of new learning 
across both verbal and non-verbal domains. TG had no recollection of material 
being presented at all following distraction or a delay of several minutes. No 
improvement was provided with cueing and in fact a positive response bias was 
evident in her recognition performance (e.g., see RAVLT recognition 
performance where TG made 27 false positive responses). TG's performance in 
all these areas was reviewed in a subsequent examination conducted 6 months 
later. Moderate improvement was evident on some tests of executive function
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(e.g., problem solving, mental flexibility), but her memory performance 
remained unchanged.
In summary, TG presents with a global disturbance to memory consistent 
with that observed in the amnesic syndrome in which the two forms of the 
disturbance, anterograde and retrograde, are present. Performance in the area of 
executive functioning, although representing a relative strength when compared 
to that observed in the area of memory, was also moderately impaired.
5.4 Patient summary
As the above profiles indicate, all three patients satisfied the two selection 
criteria for inclusion in the present research. All patients suffered from a 
profound deficit to new learning consistent with that observed in anterograde 
amnesia. One patient, TG, also suffered from retrograde amnesia which was 
estimated to cover a period of at least 20 years for autobiographical information 
that was factual nature. Her remote memory disturbance for autobiographical 
information that was episodic in nature was more severe and appeared to extend 
back to childhood. In addition, there was no evidence of semantic memory 
impairment, particularly in relation to conceptual knowledge. All patients had 
adequate knowledge of the occupations used in investigations of the preservation 
of memory for generalities phenomenon.
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Accessing knowledge of higher-level categorical relationships
in amnesia1
The evidence discussed in the previous chapters indicates that patients 
with anterograde amnesia acquire some novel information. It seems pertinent to 
ask how much, in addition to what type of, information they remember. It is 
generally agreed that amnesic patients cannot access specific details of episodes 
or events. Access to detailed knowledge is required to support conscious 
recollection and to identify the unique features of particular events, and these 
patients do neither. However, if patients cannot access specific details, can they 
access partial knowledge represented at higher or more general levels of 
classification as occurs in dementia? Although there is some evidence to suggest 
that memory for generalities may be preserved in amnesia, this is limited by an 
absence of studies explicitly examining discrimination of high- and low-level 
knowledge. The following chapters address this limitation in the course of 
investigating the nature of partial knowledge acquisition (Chapters 6 and 7) and 
retention (Chapter 8) in amnesia.
The three experiments reported in this chapter investigate the dissociation 
between exemplar and higher-level categorical knowledge in two amnesic 
patients. Memory for novel face-occupation associations was examined in all 
studies. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that patients acquired enough 
knowledge of face-occupation associations to discriminate individuals according
1 The material presented in this chapter is reported in Haslam et al. (in press).
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to their higher-level occupational grouping (i.e., whether they were educators or 
tradespeople), but not their specific occupations (i.e., teachers, lecturers, 
electricians and plumbers). In other words, memory for generality (i.e., higher- 
level knowledge) was preserved and item-specific knowledge was impaired. In 
Experiment 2 we introduced a lower level into our occupational hierarchy — 
subtypes of teacher and lecturer — and found that for at least one patient this 
modification in study context facilitated access to knowledge (i.e., at the level of 
teacher/lecturer) that was not available in the previous study. A third experiment 
was conducted to examine the contribution of direct and indirect testing to the 
results of these earlier studies. Although we found that indirect tests were more 
effective than direct tests in accessing higher-level knowledge, there is some 
indication that this was not the only factor that influenced memory performance.
6.1 Experiment 1: Preservation of memory for generalities in 
anterograde amnesia
The phenomenon of preserved memory for generalities was first applied 
to amnesia by Haslam et al. (1997). This study found evidence of differential 
memory performance on tests of categorical and item-specific knowledge in an 
amnesic patient. In the course of studying specific picture-name associations, the 
patient only acquired sufficient knowledge to discriminate novel concepts on the 
basis of their higher-level semantic category. The present experiment extends 
these findings in several ways. First, the generalities phenomenon was 
investigated in another domain — that involving knowledge about people. The 
latter was chosen because of its applicability to both past and newly acquired 
knowledge. Second, a different methodology was employed to support 
comparison of the generalities phenomenon in amnesia and dementia. 
Specifically, a hierarchical knowledge structure was devised to explicitly 
examine the differentiation between high- and low-level knowledge in amnesia.
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The present experiment examined patients' ability to acquire face- 
occupation associations to determine whether they could remember any novel 
information in this domain. Of particular interest was possible evidence of 
partial knowledge of these associations. Memory at two levels of detail was 
examined — general and specific. Participants studied face-occupation pairs.
The occupations comprised teachers, lecturers, electricians and plumbers (see 
Figure 6.1, Level II). These formed the specific level of detail. The four specific 
occupations could also be categorized at a general, or higher-level of 
occupational grouping, involving educators and tradespeople (see Figure 6.1, 
Level I). Although previous research suggests it is unlikely that amnesics would 
remember specific face-occupation associations, there is evidence from other 
studies reviewed in Chapter 3 which suggest that these patients can access partial 
knowledge of studied materials. It was therefore reasoned that amnesic patients 
might be able to acquire partial memory of face-occupation associations 
sufficient to support performance at higher levels of categorization. Thus, 
although these patients were not expected to distinguish between specific types 
of educator and types of tradesperson, it was hypothesized that they might 
demonstrate partial knowledge of face-occupation associations by distinguishing 
educators from tradespeople.
Experiment 1 examined this issue by analysing the nature of errors made 
when amnesic patients were unable to assign a specific occupation to a face 
correctly. Preservation of generality would be demonstrated if an incorrectly 
assigned occupation tended to come from the same superordinate class as the 
correct occupation.
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educator tradesperson
teacher lecturer electrician plumber (Lvl II)
high primär)
school school
teacher teacher
TAFE university 
lecturer lecturer (Lvl III)
Figure 6.1 The hierarchy of occupations used in Experiments 1, 2 and 3.
Method
Participants
Six people took part. Two participants, IP and TG, were globally 
amnesic. The relevant history and results of neuropsychological examination for 
each patient were discussed in Chapter 5. Four non-clinical participants were 
matched to these patients on the basis of age and sex — two were matched to IP 
and two to TG.
Materials
Materials consisted of two booklets, a study and test booklet, and a list 
containing studied occupations.
The study booklet comprised 28 pages. Each page contained a male face 
and one of four occupations: teacher, lecturer, electrician and plumber. The faces 
were collected from advertisements in magazines and were both non-famous and 
unknown. They were scanned into a computer using Adobe Photoshop software 
to control for factors such as colour, size and background. All faces were printed 
in black and white on a 600dpi laser printer and were scaled to a width of 8 cm 
and height of between 10 to 12 cm. Features including age and presence of facial
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hair were controlled across occupations. Examples of these faces are provided in 
Appendix la. Despite these controls, faces may have provided some cues 
relevant to the occupation. For example, a particular face may have looked like 
that of a teacher. However, in a pilot study, a group of participants who had not 
seen the faces previously (N = 10, mean age = 32 years, SD = 13.98) performed 
no better than chance in their attempts to identify either specific (i.e., teacher, 
lecturer, plumber, electrician) or higher-level (i.e., educator, tradesperson) 
occupations. The pages were ordered randomly in the study booklet with the 
constraint that no more than two faces from the same occupation appeared after 
each other.
The test booklet contained the studied faces only without associated 
occupations. They were also distributed randomly with the same proviso that no 
more than two faces from the same occupation were presented together. The 
order of presentation of faces in the test booklet differed from that in the study 
booklet.
The list of occupations contained the four studied professions written on 
one line with the types of trade printed alongside the types of educator.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in two stages: a training phase followed 
by a delayed recognition phase. Participants were presented with the study 
booklet and told they would see a series of face-occupation pairs. They were told 
that the faces were divided equally among four occupations — electricians, 
plumbers, teachers and lecturers — and that they were to learn the occupation of 
each person. The training phase consisted of five study/test trials, each 
comprising a single presentation of face-occupation pairs from the study booklet 
followed by a recognition test. In the first trial, participants were shown the face- 
occupation pairs in the study booklet, one at a time, and for each were asked to 
comment on whether the face matched the occupation (e.g., Does this person
98
look like a plumber?). This ensured that participants processed the face together 
with the noted occupation.
On each trial, after the 28 faces had been presented, participants were 
immediately shown the test booklet together with a sheet containing the four 
studied occupations. They were informed that this second booklet contained the 
faces they had just seen and that their task was to identify the occupation 
associated with the face. Participants were told that it was alright if they 
experienced problems in remembering the correct occupation, or any of the faces 
contained in the booklets, and that under these circumstances they should choose 
the occupation they felt best matched the person's face. This ensured that a 
response was given for every face. No feedback regarding the accuracy of 
recognition performance was given. The study/test procedure was repeated five 
times.
At the completion of the training phase a distractor task was 
administered. The distractor task was the digit span test from the Wechsler 
Memory Scale - Revised (Wechsler, 1987) in which both digits forward and 
backward were administered. Immediately following this, participants were 
given a delayed recognition test. They were again presented with the test booklet 
together with the list of occupations and were asked to choose the profession that 
matched the face.
Results and Discussion
Response distributions for the five training trials and delayed test are 
presented separately for IP and TG in Figure 6.2a. In the bottom panel responses 
have been grouped according to whether the nominated profession fell in the 
correct category (correct responses and semantically-related errors combined) or 
the incorrect category (semantically-unrelated errors). In the top panel the 
correct category responses have been divided into correct responses and 
semantically-related errors.
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(b) Results of Experiment 2
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Figure 6.2 Indirect measures of higher-level knowledge in two amnesic patients 
(a) results of Experiment 1 (educator/tradesperson) and (b) results 
of Experiment 2 (teacher/lecturer)
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As there were four studied occupations, it was expected that 25% of 
responses would be correct merely by chance. This leaves a 25% chance of 
selecting an occupation that was semantically-related to the target and a 50% 
chance of selecting an occupation unrelated to the target. In other words, even if 
no information had been acquired by participants, 50% of responses were 
expected to be related (i.e., to fall into the correct category) and 50% were 
expected to be unrelated to the target (i.e., to fall into the incorrect category). To 
determine whether memory for higher-level occupational grouping was preserved 
we compared the frequencies of correct-category responses and incorrect 
responses (bottom panel). This comparison provided an index of between- 
category discrimination that indicated whether the participant could differentiate 
educators from tradespeople irrespective of errors made at the specific level. If 
no information was acquired about face-occupation associations at this higher 
level then the frequency of related and unrelated responses should have been 
equal. To determine whether participants acquired specific knowledge of face- 
profession associations the frequencies of semantically-related errors and correct 
responses were compared (top panel). This provided an index of within-category 
discrimination (i.e., measuring the patients' ability to differentiate at the more 
specific level of types of educator and types of trade). Again, the frequency of 
correct responses and semantically-related errors would be equal if specific 
knowledge of face-occupation associations was not available.
Figure 6.2a shows the performance of the two patients across the five 
study/test and the delayed recognition trials. IP's between-category judgements 
(lower panel) show that he was able to categorise faces according to whether they 
were educators or tradespeople. On the very first exposure to the stimuli there 
was a (non-significant) difference between correct-category and incorrect- 
category responses, favouring the former, and the difference between these 
response types was significant from the second trial in the study phase onwards 
(X2( l ) Trial 2 = 10.3, E< .005; X2( l) Trial 3 = 10.3, J2< .005; X2(l)Trial 4 = 18.8,
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£<.001; 5C2( 1 )Trial 5 = 15.8, £< .001; 2C2(l)D eiay = 15.8, £<.001). There was no 
significant difference between semantically-related errors and correct responses 
on any trial (i.e., within-category judgements — top panel) indicating that IP 
could not discriminate teachers from lecturers or electricians from plumbers. 
Together, these results indicate first, that IP had acquired sufficient knowledge of 
face-occupation associations to discriminate educators from tradespeople, and 
secondly, that the knowledge acquired was not sufficient to discriminate between 
types of educator and types of tradespeople.
A similar pattern of accurate between-category and impaired within- 
category judgements was produced by TG. However, between-category 
discrimination was not as marked as that found with IP. The difference between 
the frequency of correct- and incorrect-category responses was significant from 
the third trial onwards (X2( l)xrial 3 = 6.04, £<.03; X2( 1 jxrial 4 = 6.04, £<.03; 
X2(l)Trial 5 = 4.3, p<.05; X2(l)oeiay = 6.04, £<.03). Thus, by these trials TG had 
acquired enough knowledge about face-occupation associations to discriminate 
educators from tradespeople. Like IP, TG showed no evidence of access to more 
specific details of face-occupation associations. The frequencies of correct 
responses and semantically-related errors (involved in within-category 
discrimination) did not differ significantly on any trial and, indeed, there was a 
bias towards semantically-related errors on each trial. Thus, TG also 
demonstrated that she had acquired some knowledge of face-occupation 
associations at the higher-level of educator/tradesperson, but the information 
available was not sufficient to support discrimination within professional groups. 
For both patients, memory performance was superior on tests of higher-level 
categorical knowledge.
To determine whether this pattern of performance was peculiar to our 
amnesic patients, we administered the same task to matched controls. Controls 
had no difficulty remembering specific face-occupation associations. Controls 
matched to TG were accurate in identifying specific occupations from the second
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trial onwards (3C2(l)Triai 2 = 7.8, £< .01; X2(lhnal 3 = 13.9, £< .001; X2(l)Trial 4 
= 15.9, ^<.001; 5C2(l)Trial 5 = 16.8, £< .001; X2(l)Delay = 15.4, £<.001) as did the 
controls matched to IP (X2(l)Triai 2 = 6.9, £< .01; 5C2( 1 )Trial 3 = 7.0, £< .01; 
X2(l)Trial 4 = 16.0, £<.001; %2(l)Trial 5 = 17.4, £< .001; X2(l belay = 9.4, £<.005).
From these results we can conclude that neither patient could remember 
specific occupations but that in each case their knowledge of higher-level 
occupational grouping was preserved: IP and TG both discriminated accurately 
between educators and tradespeople even though their responses within these 
classes was random. That is, the amnesic patients were showing the same 
dissociation between loss of information at the specific level and preservation at 
the general level as previously reported in particular forms of dementia 
(Chertkow et al., 1992; Funnel!, 1995; Hodges et al., 1994, 1995; Martin, 1987). 
However, as in the case of our earlier patient (Haslam et al., 1997), this 
phenomenon was here manifested in relation to material acquired after the onset 
of memory disturbance.
6.2 Experiment 2: The role of study context
In Experiment 1 we found that amnesic patients acquired some 
knowledge of face-occupation associations during study, but the information was 
only sufficient to categorize faces at the higher-level of classification. 
Occupations, like other taxonomic hierarchies, span a range of levels of 
specificity from the most general (works with people) to the most specific 
(teaches Advanced Chemistry at Fairfield High School). What was it about the 
particular “general” level used in Experiment 1 (educator/tradesperson) that 
enabled participants to perform adequately and what was it about the particular 
“specific” level (subtypes of educator and tradesperson) that hindered memory? 
One possibility is that performance was level-specific — that it was intrinsic to 
the particular points in the hierarchy that we happened to select. For example, 
our specific level contained professions that were arguably basic level
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"Roschian" categories, while our general level involved superordinate categories 
(Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Braem, 1976). It is possible then that 
patients could not acquire new knowledge involving basic level categories.
Alternatively, performance may not have been intrinsic to the levels 
selected. That is, the results for our categories may reflect the particular 
semantic context provided by our learning task. In this case the distinction 
between general and specific classifications may be relative rather than absolute 
— patients may be able to recall relatively general but not relatively specific 
information. This may reflect changes in encoding demands (e.g., the depth of 
processing) imposed by the study conditions (e.g., see Baddeley, 1982b; Tulving, 
1982, 1983; Wiseman & Tulving, 1976). For instance, in the course of studying 
the face-occupation associations presented in Experiment 1 (i.e,, teacher, lecturer, 
electrician and plumber), information concerning their educator- or trade-related 
status may be highlighted at the time of encoding as one means of discriminating 
between people. The latter information, however, will not be particularly useful 
in remembering more specific face-occupation associations (e.g., subtypes of 
teacher and subtypes of lecturer) and hence an alternative encoding strategy must 
be employed.
Experiment 2 examined this question by changing the context of the 
teacher/lecturer distinction. In Experiment 1, this distinction had been at the 
specific level within the study context that separated tradespeople from educators 
(involving Levels I/II in Figure 6.1). In the second experiment the distinction 
between teacher and lecturer was transformed into the general level, by 
restricting items to educators alone and distinguishing between subtypes of 
teacher and lecturer (involving Levels II/III in Figure 6.1). In other words, 
participants were asked to make a coarse occupational discrimination in 
Experiment 1 and a comparatively fine discrimination in Experiment 2.
The same two amnesic patients studied face-occupation associations, but 
on this occasion occupations comprised subtypes of teacher and subtypes of
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lecturer. As in Experiment 1, there were two levels at which knowledge could be 
demonstrated. Specific knowledge would be demonstrated if patients could 
discriminate accurately between subtypes of teacher and subtypes of lecturer. 
Given the performance of our patients in the earlier experiment, discrimination of 
faces at this specific level seemed unlikely. Preservation of higher-level 
knowledge, would be demonstrated if patients discriminated teachers from 
lecturers. This higher-level occupational grouping represented the specific level 
of detail in the previous experiment. The question of interest in this experiment 
was whether knowledge at the level of teacher/lecturer could be demonstrated in 
the new study context.
Method
Participants
The two amnesic patients, IP and TG, who participated in Experiment 1 
also took part in this second experiment. Additional participants included four 
new matched controls, two of whom were paired with IP and two with TG.
Materials
Novel face-occupation associations were introduced in this experiment. 
The study booklet comprised 28 pages with a single male face and profession 
presented on each page. Occupations comprised high school teachers, primary 
school teachers, university lecturers and TAFE lecturers (i.e., lecturers at a 
college of Technical and Further Education). The test booklet contained studied 
faces only. A sheet listing the four studied occupations on a single line was also 
used in conjunction with the test booklet — subtypes of teacher were followed by 
subtypes of lecturer.
Faces were collected from magazine advertisements and were both non- 
famous and unknown. They were scanned into a computer and reproduced using 
the procedure employed in Experiment 1 (see Appendix lb for examples of these 
faces). Size, colour, background and mode of presentation were all consistent
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with those employed in our earlier experiment. Factors such as age and presence 
of facial features (i.e., facial hair and glasses) were controlled across professional 
groups. Results of pilot testing indicated that faces did not cue occupation. 
Participants in the pilot study (N = 10, mean age = 32 years, SD = 13.98) were no 
better than chance in identifying either specific (i.e., primary school teacher, high 
school teacher, TAFE lecturer, university lecturer) or higher-level (i.e., teacher, 
lecturer) occupations.
Stimuli were presented in a random order in each booklet with the 
constraint that no more than two faces from the same occupation were presented 
after each other. The order of stimulus presentation in the study booklet differed 
from that in the test booklet.
Procedure
The general procedure employed in the current experiment was identical 
to that used in Experiment 1. Thus, participants were presented with five 
study/test trials, a distractor task and a delayed test trial. The distractor task used 
on this occasion was the digit span test from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale - Revised (Wechsler, 1981).
Results and Discussion
The data analysis paralleled that for Experiment 1. The matched controls 
were accurate in making within-category judgements after only a few study/test 
trials. These subjects had no difficulty remembering specific face-occupation 
associations and could discriminate primary from high school teachers as well as 
university from TAFE lecturers. This was evident from the second trial onwards 
for controls matched to TG (X2( 1 )irial 2 = 9.8, p< .005; 9C2(l)xriai 3 = 10*2, £< 
.001; 2C2(l)Trial 4 = 23.1, P<.001; 2C2( l)Trial 5 = 20.1, g< .001; X2(l)öelay = 15.4, 
p<.001) and from the third trial for controls matched to IP (X2( 1 )xrial 3 = 11.9, p< 
.001; x2( 1 )Trial 4 = 16-5, £<.001; X2( 1 )Trial 5 = 17-0 P< -001’ ^2(l)öelay = 15.4, 
£<.001).
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The results for the patients are presented in Figure 6.2b (on page 99). As 
expected, there was no evidence of discrimination at the specific level (subtypes 
of teacher and lecturer — upper panels). Within-category discrimination was no 
better than chance on all trials for both patients. With respect to performance at 
the higher-level occupational grouping, the results were less clear than those 
obtained in the first experiment. However, there was evidence of improvement 
in performance with the change in study context for at least one patient. 
Between-category discrimination (lower panels) was better than chance on all 
trials for TG and on the last four trials for IP. This effect was either significant 
(trial 4 for IP and trial 3 for TG , %2(1) = 6.04, p<.03 in both cases), or narrowly 
failed to reach significance in each case (all p's ranged from .09 to .19).
It was possible that the failure to reach significance in these cases 
reflected insufficient training. To examine this issue, the experiment was 
repeated several weeks later but this time the amount of training was doubled 
(i.e., 10 learning trials were administered instead of 5). No improvement in 
overall memory performance was found. Neither patient could discriminate 
people on the basis of their specific occupations. In addition, between-category 
judgements were only significantly better than chance on two trials for each 
patient (i.e., Trial 10 and the delayed recognition trial for IP and Trials 9 and 10 
for TG, %2(1) = 6.04, p<.03 in all cases). Thus, additional training led to no 
improvement in memory performance for either patient.
Further evidence of an improvement in performance with change of 
context, for TG at least, is provided by direct comparison between performance 
in Experiments 1 and 2. We compared within-category discrimination for the 
educator-related occupations in Experiment 1 (where teacher/lecturer was the 
specific level) with between-category discrimination in Experiment 2 (where 
teacher/lecturer was the general level). The top panels in Figure 6.3 show 
performance when the teacher/lecturer distinction represented the specific level 
(Experiment 1) and the bottom panels show performance when these occupations
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Figure 6.3 Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2: Direct and indirect 
measures of knowledge at the level of teacher/lecturer in 
two amnesic patients.
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represented the general level (Experiment 2). TG's ability to discriminate 
teachers from lecturers was significantly better in the second experiment on 
Trials 3 and 4 (X2( 1 )Trial 3 = 6.0, £<.001; X2( 1 )Trial 4 = 5.1, £< .001). There was 
no difference in IP's ability to discriminate faces at the level of teacher/lecturer in 
the two experiments. For this patient there was therefore no direct statistical 
evidence of an improvement in Experiment 2.
In view of the less-than-conclusive results of these analyses, we sought 
further evidence of memory for higher-level occupational grouping by examining 
the patterning of responses to individual items across trials. As noted, in the 
lower panel of Figure 6.2b, there was a majority of correct-category responses on 
most trials. Superficially, this repeated pattern would seem to provide evidence 
of learning. However, this is misleading if there is a correlation between 
responses given to particular items on different trials. Cross tabulations of 
responses (correct/incorrect category) between pairs of trials confirmed the 
existence of intertrial correlation for between-category discrimination 
(correlations ranged from 0.2 to 0.7). That is, the patients tended to make the 
same general class of response across consecutive pairs of trials. If they 
responded "teacher" to a particular face on one trial then they were more likely to 
respond with either "teacher" or "lecturer" on the next trial. We considered the 
possibility that this pattern of repetition might provide further evidence of an 
acquired memory trace. It was argued that if response repetitions were based on 
memory for the studied items (as opposed, for example, to cued guessing — “this 
person looks like a teacher”), then correct responses would be more likely to be 
repeated on consecutive trials than incorrect ones.
An index of response repetition was calculated by expressing the number 
of same-class responses (both correct/both incorrect) for each pair of consecutive 
trials as a proportion of the number of responses in that class on the second of the 
pair (e.g., if 10 items were identified correctly on both trials and 12 items were 
correct on the second administration, the proportion of consecutively correct
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responses was 0.8). These measures are presented in Table 6.1. For TG, 
repetition of correct between-category responses was more likely than repetition 
of incorrect ones in every case, indicating retention of some information about 
higher-level occupational grouping, and supporting the analysis of her overall 
accuracy data. For IP the proportion of correct responses was greater than 
incorrect in the last pairing only (i.e., T4/T5), providing little evidence of 
retention. Again, this was consistent with his overall performance in this 
experiment.
Patient T1/T2 T2/T3 T3/T4 T4/T5
IP 0.8 : 0.8 0.6 : 0.8 0.9: 1 0.8 : 0.4
TG 0.8 : 0.5 0.7 : 0.4 0.8 : 0.4 0.8 : 0.6
(T1 = trial 1; T2 = trial 2; T3 = trial 3; T4 = trial 4; T5 = trial 5)
Table 6.1 Proportion of correct to incorrect category responses across 
consecutively paired study/test trials in amnesic patients.
In Experiment 1, neither patient could distinguish between teachers and 
lecturers when these constituted lower-level occupations. Considered as a whole, 
the results of Experiment 2 suggest that at least one of our patients could 
discriminate between the teachers and lecturers when the context was changed so 
that these constituted the higher-level occupational grouping. This would imply 
that the performance in Experiment 1 was not intrinsic to the absolute levels of 
categorisation used there, but rather that the status of a category as "high" or 
"low" may be defined relative to the context provided by the learning task. In
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other words, the study context alters the manner in which information is 
processed. If there is little difference between studied items (e.g., high school 
teacher, primary school teacher) then the knowledge supporting their 
discrimination must be reasonably specific and such knowledge requires a greater 
depth of processing at the time of encoding. As the difference between studied 
items increases, the depth of processing required for discrimination decreases.
6.3 Experiment 3: Direct examination of higher-level knowledge 
In both of the preceding experiments, the patients were unable to assign 
items to the correct professional category. However, their errors indicated 
preservation of information about higher-level category membership. This was 
interpreted as evidence of impaired memory for specific material, but of 
preservation of memory for generalities. However, there is another possible 
explanation of these results: they may be a consequence of the different measures 
used to assess knowledge at the two levels. Knowledge at the higher-level was 
expressed indirectly, while knowledge at the lower-level required explicit recall 
of the material. It is possible that indirect measures yield superior performance 
in amnesics, and that our patients would not have been able to distinguish, 
educators from tradespeople say, if asked to do so directly. This analysis is 
consistent with implicit-explicit theory (discussed in Chapter 2) in which a 
distinction is made between tests that refer to previous study episodes (i.e., 
explicit or direct memory tests) and those that do not (i.e., implicit or indirect 
memory tests). In this theory it is argued that amnesic patients can demonstrate 
knowledge when their memory is tested implicitly but not when it is tested 
explicitly. To examine this question concerning the influence of direct and 
indirect memory tests, the same two patients were presented with the same face- 
occupation associations used in Experiments 1 and 2, but at test they were asked 
to nominate the higher-level occupational grouping (educator/tradesperson or 
teacher/lecturer) explicitly.
I l l
Method
Participants
Participants included IP, TG, two controls matched to IP and two controls 
matched to TG. Controls who took part in the current experiment had not 
participated in the earlier experiments.
Materials
Materials consisted of the study and test booklets used in Experiments 1 
and 2 as well as two lists of occupations. One list contained the professions 
"educator" and "tradesperson" on a single line and this was presented with 
materials from Experiment 1. The other list contained the professions "teacher" 
and "lecturer" on a single line and this was presented with materials from 
Experiment 2.
Procedure
There were two parts to the experiment. The first part involved direct 
examination of knowledge at the higher-level of educator/tradesperson and the 
second part involved direct examination of knowledge at the higher-level of 
teacher/lecturer.
(i) Knowledge of educator/tradesperson: The materials and training procedure 
were identical to those employed in Experiment 1. There were five study/test 
trials, in which four specific occupations were studied (i.e., teachers, lecturers, 
electricians and plumbers), followed by administration of a distractor task and 
then a delayed recognition test. The test procedure generally followed that of the 
earlier experiment, but participants were given a forced choice between 
"educator" and "tradesperson" instead of a list of specific occupations. The delay 
between administration of Experiment 1 and the current phase of the final study 
was approximately one month for IP and three months for TG.
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(ii) Knowledge of teacher/lecturer: The general procedure used to examine 
knowledge at the level of teacher/lecturer directly was essentially the same as 
that employed in Experiment 2. Five study/test trials were administered in which 
the specific occupations high school teachers, primary school teachers, university 
lecturers and TAFE lecturers were studied. This was followed by administration 
of a distractor task and then a delayed recognition test. Face-occupation 
associations and the distractor task were identical to those used in Experiment 2. 
In each of the five study/test and delayed recognition test trials participants were 
asked whether the face belonged to a "teacher" or "lecturer". The delay between 
administration of the second experiment and the current phase of this final study 
was at least three months for both patients.
Results and Discussion
The frequencies of correct and incorrect responses to higher-level 
occupational categories are presented in Figure 6.4. Results for 
educator/tradesperson are presented in Figure 6.4a and results for teacher/lecturer 
are presented in Figure 6.4b.
(i) Knowledge of educator/tradesperson: When knowledge about educators and 
tradespeople was examined directly, both TG and IP showed a tendency to 
choose the correct higher-level occupational grouping on all trials. However, the 
difference between correct and incorrect responses was not significant on any
trial. This suggests that when explicit reference was made to these higher-level 
occupations memory performance was not as good as that in Experiment 1 where 
it was tested indirectly. In contrast, controls matched to TG were significantly 
better than chance in identifying the correct higher-level profession from the first 
study/test trial (X(i) 2( l)x rja] 1 = 7-0, E< .01; X2( l) Tria| 2 = 8.0, p< .005; X2(l)x rial 3 = 
15.8 E< .001; X2(l)Tria, 4 = 14.3, E<.001; X2( l) Trial 5 = 15.8, e< -001; X2( l ) Delay 
= 18.9, p<.001) while those matched to IP were better than chance from the
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(a) Educator/tradesperson
5 Delay
Trial
TG
5 Delay
(b) Teacher/lecturer
■ Correct 
□ Errors
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Figure 6.4 Results of Experiment 3: Direct measures of knowledge at the 
higher level of (a) educator/tradeperson and (b) teacher/lecturer 
in two amnesic patients.
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second study/test trial (5C2( 1 )irial 2 = 5.1, £< .03; X2( l) x rial 3 = 10-3, £< -005; 
X2(l)Trial 4 = 8.0, £<.005; %2(l)xrial 5 = 10.3, £< .005; X2( l ) Delay = 10.3, £<.005).
(ii) Knowledge of teacher/lecturer: When knowledge about teachers and 
lecturers was tested directly, IP and TG performed at chance, indicating that both 
patients had insufficient knowledge to make such a judgement. On the other 
hand, controls had no difficulty performing this task. Controls matched to TG 
made significantly more correct higher-level judgements from the second trial 
onwards (X2( l ) Trial 2 = 8.0, £< .005; X2(l)xrial 3 = 15.8, £< .001; X2( l ) Trial 4 = 
20.6, £<.001; X2(l)xrial 5 = 22.3, £< .001; X2( l ) Delay = 22.3 £<.001) as did 
controls matched to IP (X2( l)xrial 2 = 9.1, £< .005; X2( 1 )xrial 3 = 18.9, £< .001; 
X2( 1 )Trial 4 = 26.0, £<.001; X2( 1 )Trial 5 = 24.1, £< .001; X2( 1 )Delay = 24.1,
£<.001).
These results suggest that the manner in which knowledge is expressed 
(i.e., directly or indirectly) does influence memory performance in these patients. 
Although they were unable to recall higher-level occupations explicitly, in the 
earlier experiments retention of information at this level was implied by their 
errors when recalling lower-level occupations. This finding speaks to the 
question of whether the results of Experiments 1 and 2 were due to differences in 
response mode rather than enhanced recall of higher-level category. Experiment 
3 suggests that the good performance at the level of educator/tradesperson was 
made possible by the indirect nature of our test. It is also possible (though this 
does not necessarily follow) that performance at the specific occupational level 
(i.e., types of educator and types of trade) was due to the explicit nature of the 
response required. The results of Experiment 2 appear to support this suggestion 
since at least one patient showed improved performance at the teacher/lecturer 
level when this was tested indirectly.
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6.4 Conclusions from Experiments 1 to 3
The primary aim of these experiments was to provide further evidence of 
preserved memory for generalities in amnesia. This was demonstrated most 
clearly in Experiment 1. In this experiment, patients were unable to recognize 
the specific occupations associated with particular faces but, nonetheless, their 
responses preserved the higher-level occupational grouping of educator and 
tradesperson. This result confirms previous reports that, in spite of their memory 
impairment, amnesic patients are capable of acquiring new information (e.g., 
Hirst, et al., 1988; Van der Linden, Meulemans & Lorrain, 1994). However, the 
information these patients acquired supported high-level but not low-level 
categorical distinctions.
The influence of study context was investigated in Experiment 2 and it 
was found that this factor affected the performance of one patient. Although TG 
had not distinguished between specific types of educator in the previous 
experiment, her responses preserved this distinction in Experiment 2 when it 
constituted a higher-level grouping of specific subtypes of teacher and lecturer. 
Though not conclusive, this finding suggests that a "generality" is at least partly 
defined with respect to the context in which information is encountered. One 
implication of this, if we accept that memory for generalities is preserved in 
amnesia, is that knowledge at any level might be acquired by these patients 
provided the learning conditions ensure a semantic representation at an 
appropriate level of specificity.
Experiment 3 examined the contribution of response mode (i.e., direct 
and indirect testing) to the results of Experiments 1 and 2. Results of these 
earlier experiments suggested that memory for generalities was preserved in 
these patients, and particularly in patient TG. Alternatively, it is possible that 
the differentiation on tests of high- and low-level knowledge is a consequence of 
indirect testing procedures used in earlier experiments. Results of Experiment 3 
indicated that neither patient could directly identify the higher-level occupation
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associated with a face, even though response confusions in the earlier studies had 
implied retention of knowledge at this level. From this it can be concluded that 
indirect measures were more effective than direct ones in accessing patients' 
residual knowledge.
The difference in performance on direct and indirect tests might suggest 
that the apparent preservation of memory for generalities observed in earlier 
experiments was simply an effect of response mode. If item-specific knowledge 
was impaired because it was tested directly, then an indirect test for the same 
lower-level detail should improve memory performance. In fact this test was 
provided in Experiment 2 and there was indeed some improvement in memory 
performance at the teacher/lecturer level for TG when this was tested indirectly. 
However, the effect was confined to this one patient. IP did not discriminate 
teachers from lecturers in either experiment and his performance at the higher- 
level in Experiment 1 (i.e., educator/tradesperson) was better than that at the 
higher-level in Experiment 2 (i.e., teacher/lecturer). On this basis we can 
conclude that, for IP at least, the preservation of memory for generalities in 
Experiment 1 was not simply a consequence of response mode.
As noted earlier, the implicit-explicit dissociation might be invoked to 
account for the finding that amnesic memory for higher-level categorization was 
facilitated by the use of indirect tests. In particular, the evidence here for 
preservation of memory for generalities was based on contrasting the poor 
memory for specific occupations (cf. explicit) and the relatively good 
identification of occupational grouping (cf. implicit). However, there are 
important differences between our procedure and those employed in traditional 
implicit memory tests. Unlike other studies where effects of previous exposure 
are manifested in tasks which do not require explicit recall, our tasks always 
required explicit recall (i.e., in all studies patients were asked to identify the 
person's occupation directly). In our case, the "implicit" knowledge was 
manifested in the pattern of failure of explicit memory. It is not sufficient to
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explain this result as yet another case of implicit memory phenomena. Indeed to 
invoke a universal implicit memory to explain all cases of preserved memory in 
the brain impaired is not an adequate appraisal. Each manifestation of "implicit 
memory" requires its own particular explanation. There is no reason to expect 
that a postulated "implicit memory", indicated by a correct choice of higher- 
occupational grouping, would bear any relationship to the "implicit memory" 
indicated by, say, stem-completion.
There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from results of these 
experiments. First, it is clear that amnesic patients acquire novel information. 
This information is sufficient to make high-level but not low-level judgements 
when knowledge is examined indirectly. Having found a differentiation between 
exemplar and higher-level knowledge in amnesia, it can also be argued with 
reasonable certainty that preservation of memory for generalities is not confined 
to patients suffering dementia.
However, conclusions relevant to the possible structure of memory 
representations in amnesic patients are more tentative. It is possible that the 
information the patients acquired was confined to relatively abstract properties of 
stimulus materials. Yet the difference in performance on direct and indirect tests 
suggests that patients had not simply acquired higher-level knowledge. There 
must be an additional feature of their memory that facilitates performance on 
indirect tests, though it is not clear what this feature may be. At this point, there 
is also some uncertainty about the role of response mode in demonstration of the 
generalities effect in amnesia. There is some suggestion that at least one patient's 
performance (IP) was not influenced by response mode, but on its own this 
finding is inconclusive. Although results of these experiments raise some doubts 
about the role of response mode, some clarity on this issue was obtained in a 
subsequent experiment conducted with non-clinical participants (see Chapter 9). 
Suffice it to say that results of the latter study provided clear evidence that the 
generalities phenomenon is not simply a consequence of testing conditions.
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Although the preservation of memory for generalities observed in 
amnesic patients in these experiments is similar to that reported in dementia, 
there is one important difference between these groups in terms of the influence 
of response mode. Patients with dementia are capable of providing higher-level 
information about concepts explicitly. However, as Experiment 3 showed, 
amnesic patients only revealed memory for higher-level information when their 
knowledge was examined indirectly. It is possible that the latter patients are only 
capable of remembering "generalities" under these circumstances. Alternatively, 
it is also possible that amnesic patients performed poorly on direct tests because 
the knowledge levels employed in these experiments were not sufficiently 
general. The question of whether there are levels of generality at which amnesic 
patients can demonstrate knowledge directly is examined in Chapters 7 and 8.
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Amnesic memory for generalities: Can knowledge 
of higher-level associations be accessed directly?
In Chapter 6 evidence of preserved memory for high-level associations 
and impaired memory for low-level associations was found in two amnesic 
patients. However, the effect was only demonstrated when higher-level 
knowledge was examined indirectly. The patients could not explicitly report the 
higher-level category in Experiment 3 (i.e., discriminate educators from 
tradespeople or teachers from lecturers), although their errors indicated that this 
knowledge was available under indirect testing conditions. One interpretation of 
this result is that amnesic patients are only capable of accessing higher-level 
knowledge indirectly. Alternatively, it is possible that the level of categorization 
in the previous experiments was not sufficiently general for patients to 
demonstrate their knowledge explicitly. To investigate this, another experiment 
was conducted which examined memory for information that was more general 
than that investigated in the previous studies. Participants were asked to study 
face-name-occupation associations. As in Experiment 3, knowledge was 
assessed by asking a series of direct questions. The level of detail tapped by 
these questions ranged from the very general to the very specific. It was found 
that the patients could indeed provide some higher-level information directly. 
Furthermore, the level of generality at which this was possible varied between 
patients.
7.1 Experiment 4: Accessing higher-level knowledge directly
The aim of this experiment was to determine whether amnesic patients 
could directly report any knowledge of higher-level associations. Results of 
Experiment 3 indicated that the patients could not access knowledge directly at
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the highest level examined (i.e., at the level of educator/tradesperson). 
Accordingly, if they were capable of accessing any knowledge directly then it 
was likely to be at a level that is higher than that represented by 
educator/tradesperson. However, since there were no clues as to what this level 
might be, we therefore examined knowledge at a range of levels of varying 
degrees of specificity.
Patients were again asked to study a series of face-name-occupation 
associations. Direct access to knowledge about these associations was examined 
by asking a series of questions. These questions made explicit reference to 
details about people encountered at study (e.g., "Is this person a musician?"). 
Knowledge was probed in this manner at several levels. The levels in the 
knowledge hierarchy were created according to a principle of "sharedness" (see 
Figure 7.1). At the most general level 20 targets shared the attribute in question, 
and this number decreased with increasing specificity. For instance, at the top of 
the knowledge hierarchy participants were asked to indicate whether they were 
familiar with the person's face and name. In this case all the people studied 
shared the attribute of "familiarity". At the lowest end of the knowledge 
continuum, patients were asked to provide the name of the person — an attribute 
that was unique to the person in question. It was anticipated that if patients were 
capable of accessing some information directly then it was most likely to occur at 
the top of the hierarchy. That is, they would be more likely to provide accurate 
information in response to questions tapping the most general levels of 
knowledge. In addition, it was likely that they would reach a point beyond which 
they could no longer provide accurate information. As indicated in Figure 7.1, 
five levels of knowledge were examined.
In summary, Experiment 4 examined the patients' capacity to access 
higher-level information about studied people explicitly. The amount of 
information they could provide was determined by their responses to a series of 
direct questions which were used to elicit knowledge about these people.
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familiar novel
(Lvl II) entertainer (non-entertainer)
musician educator(Lvl III)
(Lvl IV) violinist pianist high 
school 
teacher
primary
school
teacher
(Lvl V) Richard
Lacey
Victoria Gary 
Adams Harris
Figure 7,1 The hierarchy of knowledge levels used in Experiment 4
Method
Design
The experiment had two phases: a study phase and a test phase. In the 
study phase participants were shown the names and faces of 10 musicians and 10 
educators. There were two groups of musicians, consisting of pianists and 
violinists, and two groups of educators, consisting of high school and primary 
school teachers. In the test phase five levels of knowledge were examined and 
these comprised: familiarity, general occupational category (i.e., entertainer or 
not), basic occupational category (i.e., musician/teacher), specific occupational 
category (i.e., subtypes of teacher and subtypes of musician) and name (see 
Figure 7.2 for an outline of the design). The dependent measure was memory
performance and this was determined by responses to yes/no recognition and 
two-alternative forced choice.
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STUDY
musician educator
violinist pianist high school primary school 
(N = 5) (N = 5) teacher teacher
(N = 5) (N = 5)
?
TEST
Level I: Familiar? (N = 20 studied, N = 20 novel)
Level II: Entertainer? (N = 20 studied)
Level III: Musician? / Educator? (N = 20 studied)
Level IV: Primary school teacher? / Violinist?
(N = 20 studied)
Level V: Name? (N = 20 studied)
Figure 7.2 Design of Experiment 4
Participants
Nine people took part, comprising three amnesic patients — IP, TG and 
GS — and six controls. Two controls were matched with each patient on the 
basis of age and sex.
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Materials
The materials consisted of a study booklet, a test booklet, a set of face cue 
cards and a set of name cards.
The study booklet comprised 20 pages. Each page contained a face, a 
name (both first name and surname) and an occupation. The faces were collected 
from advertisements in magazines and were both non-famous and unknown. 
Responses from a small group of first year psychology students (N = 9, mean age 
= 21 yrs, SD = 2.1) confirmed that these faces were unfamiliar. The faces were 
scanned into a computer and reproduced using the same procedure employed in 
Experiments 1 to 3. Thus, size, colour, background and mode of presentation 
were all consistent with those employed in the previous experiments. Half the 
faces were male and the remainder were female. Examples of these faces are 
presented in Appendix 2a.
Each face was assigned one of four occupations: high school teacher, 
primary school teacher, violinist and pianist. An equal number of males and 
females were allocated to teaching and musical occupations. A name was also 
assigned to each face. Surnames were selected from the local telephone 
directory. They were reasonably common (i.e., at least 15 people or more with 
that name) and comprised two syllables which did not constitute a meaningful 
word (e.g., surnames like "Baker" were not used). Common first names were 
added to the surnames (see Appendix 2b for a list of these names). The face- 
name-occupation associations were ordered randomly in the study booklet with 
the added constraint that people from the same occupation did not appear after 
one another.
The test booklet contained 40 pages — two pages relevant to each person 
studied. The first page in the pair consisted of a face together with the questions 
"Name?" and "Profession?". The second page in the pair contained the answers 
to these questions. Again, these pairs of pages were distributed randomly in the 
booklet with the proviso that information about people from the same profession
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were not presented together. The order of presentation in the test booklet 
differed from that in the study booklet.
The face cue cards, used to elicit information at each level, consisted of 
40 faces. Half of these had been studied and the remainder were non-studied.
The non-studied faces were matched as closely as possible to the studied faces 
with respect to age and sex. The latter faces were scanned into a computer and 
reproduced using the same procedure as that for studied faces (see Appendix 2c 
for examples of these faces).
The name cards were used with face cues to probe knowledge about face- 
name associations and there were two types of cards as indicated in Figure 7.3. 
One type (illustrated in Figure 7.3a), contained a single name (both first name 
and surname) and the other type (illustrated in Figure 7.3b) contained a pair of 
names. Half of the single name cards contained correct names and the remainder 
contained incorrect names. The incorrect names consisted of an accurate first 
name and a modification of the surname in which the second syllable was 
changed (e.g., Mary Logan was changed to Mary Lomas, see Appendix 2b). The 
name pair cards contained two studied names both from the same gender and 
from the same basic occupational category (i.e., they were both names of 
teachers or names of musicians). The position of the correct name varied so that 
half the time it was the first name and half the time it was the second name.
Procedure
As in the previous experiments there were two phases: a study phase and 
a test phase. The study phase was conducted over four days. On the fifth day 
memory was examined.
There were two training sessions per day in the study phase, with a delay 
of several hours between administration of the first and second session. At the 
commencement of each session, participants were presented with the study 
booklet and were told that it contained a series of face-name-occupation 
associations that they were to remember. For each association they were asked to
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(a) Mary Lomas
(b) Mary Logan Wendy Ogden
Figure 7.3 The two types of name cards used to test knowledge for face- 
name associations: (a) single name card and (b) name pair card.
comment, first, whether the name was appropriate for the person (e.g., "Does this 
person look like they could be named Mary Logan?"), and second, whether the 
occupation matched the person (e.g., "Does this person look like a primary 
school teacher?"). These questions required a yes/no response. The purpose was 
to ensure that participants processed the relevant information to a sufficient depth 
by making them attend to the relationship between the face, name and 
occupation.
After the 20 items had been presented, participants were shown the test 
booklet. They were informed that this second booklet contained the faces they 
had just seen and that their task was to name each person and identify their 
occupation. For each item, regardless of the accuracy of their responses, 
participants were shown the answers to questions concerning the person's name 
and occupation and they read them aloud. This procedure was followed for the 
remaining training sessions during the study phase. Each training session took
no more than 15 minutes.
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The test phase was conducted on the fifth day. Face cues were used to 
elicit information at five levels of knowledge. The questions presented at these 
levels proceeded in sequence from the very general (Level I) to the very specific 
(Level V). They required either a yes/no response or a forced-choice judgement. 
The questions at each level were as follows:
Level I: "Is this person familiar?"
Level II: "Is this person primarily in the entertainment industry?"
Level III: "Is this person an educator?" or "Is this person a musician?"
Level IV: "Is this person a primary school teacher?" or 
"Is this person a pianist?"
Level V: "Is this person's name______ ?"
"Is this person's name______ o r_______ ?"
Forty face cue cards, comprising studied and non-studied faces, were 
presented individually and randomly to test performance at Level I. From the 
second level onwards only the studied faces (i.e., N = 20) were presented. All 
items relevant to Level I were presented together with the appropriate question 
before proceeding to the next level of questioning and this continued until 
knowledge at all levels had been examined. Three knowledge levels (i.e., Levels 
III, IV and V) were assessed using two questions. At Level III, for half the faces 
the question "Is this person an educator?" was asked and for the remainder the 
question "Is this person a musician?" was asked. At Level IV the question "Is 
this person a primary school teacher?" was presented with the faces of educators 
and the question "Is this person a pianist?" was presented with those of 
musicians. Two types of question were used to assess knowledge about face- 
name associations. The first required a yes/no response and was included to 
maintain consistency with the format of questions asked at the previous levels. 
However, it was also possible for participants to base their responses to this 
question on familiarity with names rather than knowledge of face-name 
associations. This is because incorrect names would be sufficiently different
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from studied names to be classified as unfamiliar. For example, a person may 
decide that the name "Mary Lomas" is unfamiliar and on this basis judge that it is 
incorrect. In this case, the response is supported by high-level and not low-level 
knowledge. To address this problem, a two alternative forced choice question 
was included in which participants were required to choose between two studied 
names. Accurate responding to this question would require specific knowledge 
of face-name associations2.
Results and Discussion
The yes/no recognition data is presented in Figure 7.4a for patients and 
Figure 7.4b for matched controls3. At each knowledge level, performance was 
assessed in terms of the difference between the proportion of hits (i.e., HR) and 
the proportion of false alarms (i.e., FAR). A dotted line has been added to each 
figure to indicate the point at which the score was significantly better than chance 
level. Fisher's exact test was used to evaluate yes/no recognition performance 
(i.e., Levels I to V). Performance on the two-alternative forced choice question 
(also at Level V) was evaluated using the chi-square goodness-of-fit test.
2 The order in which experiments were conducted differs from that reported in 
this thesis. As a result there are differences in methodology between the current 
and previous studies — namely, in relation to the amount of study provided and 
the type of memory test (i.e., yes/no recognition versus forced-choice) employed.
3 These figures differ from those presented in the previous chapter (i.e., bar 
graphs were used in the earlier experiments). This is because line graphs provide 
the best illustration of the declining trend in memory performance.
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(a) Amnesic patients
0.6 -
0.4 -
0.2 -
Level I Level II Level III Level IV Level V 
(Y/N)
Knowledge Level
(b) Matched Controls
1.0 -
IP Controls 
GS Controls 
TG Controls
Level I Level II Level III Level IV Level V 
(Y/N)
Knowledge Level
Figure 7.4 Accuracy (as a proportion of hits from false alarms) of yes/no 
recognition for novel faces as a function of level in (a) amnesic 
patients and (b) matched controls.
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Figure 7.4a shows memory performance for the three patients at the five 
levels of knowledge examined with face cues. The three patients were 
significantly above chance in discriminating studied from non-studied faces at 
Level I (i.e., familiar versus novel, p < .01 in all cases), suggesting they were all 
familiar with the studied materials. However, from this point their memory 
performance differed. TG's performance was at chance at the remaining levels, 
indicating that she was unable to provide additional information explicitly 
beyond the most general level examined. IP and GS remembered more 
information as indicated by the accuracy of their responses at Levels II (i.e., 
entertainer versus non-entertainer) and III (i.e., educator or musician). Both 
patients could identify the faces of entertainers and could discriminate musicians 
from teachers (p < .01 for IP and p < .05 for GS at both levels). GS could not 
discriminate items at Levels IV (i.e., subtypes of educator and subtypes of 
musician) and V (i.e., names). IP's memory performance was also at chance at 
Level IV.
IP's results at Level V were unexpected. In the yes/no recognition test at 
Level his responses were significantly better than chance (p < .01), suggesting 
he had explicit access to knowledge about face-name associations even though he 
failed at Level IV. However, it is possible that this was not based on knowledge 
of face-name associations, but rather on mere familiarity with the studied names. 
As noted earlier, patients needed only to be familiar with the studied names to 
respond accurately to the question requiring a yes/no response at Level V. The 
forced-choice question at Level V addressed this problem. As expected, both TG 
and GS performed at chance when asked to identify which of two studied names 
matched a face, confirming that they had insufficient knowledge to make face- 
name associations. However, IP was still able to identify 18 names correctly in 
this forced choice test and this was significantly above chance (X2(l) = 11.25, p< 
.001). This result indicates that this patient had explicit knowledge of face-name 
associations despite performing poorly at the
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previous level requiring discrimination of subtypes of musician and subtypes of 
teacher. In short, TG was only capable of making familiarity judgements, while 
GS and IP provided additional semantic information down to the basic 
occupational category (i.e., Level III). IP could also discriminate faces at the 
most specific level examined (i.e., Level V), even though he was unsuccessful at 
the previous knowledge level.
To determine whether the breakdown in memory performance observed 
at the various levels was peculiar to amnesic patients, the same procedure was 
administered to a group of matched controls. The results for the two controls for 
each patient were averaged at each level. The means are shown in Figure 7.4b. 
The controls were accurate in discriminating faces at all levels examined. Their 
performance was significantly better than chance at Levels I to V in the tests 
requiring yes/no responses (p < .01 at all levels). In addition, they identified all 
names from the pair correctly (%2(1) = 18.05, p< .001) at Level V. Thus, the 
controls could access the entire range of knowledge directly.
An interesting feature of the patient results is the difference between 
individuals in the amount of information accessible in response to direct 
questioning. TG was capable of making only the most general judgement, 
indicating "familiarity". Her responses to questions posed at Level I provide 
additional evidence of this inability to access semantic details about the studied 
people. Although participants were not asked to provide a rationale with their 
responses, TG did. In many cases she attributed a familiar face to an incorrect, 
but nonetheless logical, source (e.g., "I know this person. They must be the 
mother of a friend of my daughter's."). Both GS and IP were able to access 
semantic information about people beyond a judgement of familiarity. GS had 
sufficient knowledge to support discrimination down to the third level (i.e., 
involving the teacher/musician discrimination). Like GS, IP could not 
discriminate between subtypes of musician and subtypes of teacher (at Level IV),
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but was accurate in making face-profession associations at the more specific 
knowledge level.
IP was the only patient who performed above chance on both yes/no 
recognition and forced-choice at Level V, indicating he was able to acquire 
knowledge at the level of face-name associations. It is difficult to explain this 
result in light of his impaired performance at the previous knowledge level. If a 
name is to be considered as another very specific semantic fact about a person, 
this result is surprising. IP could not differentiate faces at the higher-level 
involving subtypes of musician and subtypes of teacher and the amount of 
specific knowledge required at Level IV would be less than that at Level V.
There is an increased load on memory at Level V because knowledge about 20 
individual names is required to support performance, whereas at Level IV 
knowledge about occupational subtypes only is required.
There is another way to conceptualise this. Although names were 
considered to lie at the base of the hierarchy of specificity used in the 
experimental design (see Figure 7.2), it can be argued that a person's name is not 
at the lowest level in such a hierarchy. In general, the classification of a low 
level entry in a semantic hierarchy is implied by its properties (e.g., knowing that 
someone is a violinist entails knowing that they are a musician and an 
entertainer). However, there are no properties intrinsically associated with a 
name. Each name could belong to any branch in the hierarchy. In this sense, a 
name should be seen as an arbitrary stimulus which has been associated during 
pairing with a branch of the semantic hierarchy in just the same way as a face 
was.
From this it might be suggested that in this experiment the patients were 
taught to associate two classes of physical cue, faces and names, with entries in 
the semantic hierarchy. The face-attribute tests at Levels I to IV examined face­
meaning associations. Presumably, there were also name-meaning associations. 
The two tests at Level V did not examine these. Rather, they tested incidental
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associations between the face and name cues. It appeared that IP could form 
these face-name associations even though he could not form the most specific 
lace-meaning association (i.e., at Level IV). The question that arises is whether 
he, and the other amnesic patients, could form name-meaning associations. This 
was examined in Experiment 5.
7.2 Experiment 5: Accessing higher-level knowledge directly from 
names
Results of Experiment 4 raised some questions concerning the inclusion 
of names at the lowest-level in a knowledge hierarchy. This issue was examined 
by evaluating the effectiveness of name cues in accessing information about 
people. Knowledge at Levels I to IV, used in the previous experiment, was 
examined with name cues.
If names represent the lowest level in a semantic hierarchy, then the two 
patients who failed at this level (i.e., TG and GS) should also be unable to 
provide any information about a person when names are presented as cues.
These patients could not recover information at Level V, suggesting either that 
their knowledge was insufficient to support face-name associations or that they 
had acquired no information concerning the names themselves. An inability to 
recognize name-attribute associations at any level suggests that names might be 
appropriately placed at the most specific level in a hierarchy. Conversely, if 
patients can access information from names, then it suggests that they might have 
the same status as faces and thus should be excluded from such knowledge 
hierarchies. IP's performance is also important. Although he had acquired 
knowledge of face-name associations, it does not necessarily follow that he had 
associated names with other semantic attributes. If names are no different from 
other semantic attributes (and thus, have a different status to that of faces) then it 
is possible that IP could have acquired knowledge of face-name associations but 
not, for example, name-occupation associations.
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In short, Experiment 5 had two aims. The first, was to determine whether 
patients could access any information about people from their names. If 
evidence of residual knowledge was found, the second aim was to determine 
whether the pattern of preserved and impaired performance displayed 
preservation of memory for generalities.
Method
Design
The design was similar to that employed in the test phase of Experiment 
4. However, in the present experiment only the first four knowledge levels, used 
previously in Experiment 4, were examined (see Figure 7.2). The dependent 
measure was memory performance and this was determined by responses to 
yes/no recognition.
Participants
The people who took part in Experiment 4 also participated in 
Experiment 5.
Materials
The materials in this experiment consisted of a set of name cards which 
was used to cue knowledge about the people studied in Experiment 4. This set 
consisted of 40 names (first names and surnames), half of which were studied 
and the remainder non-studied. The non-studied names were constructed using 
the same procedure as that employed for studied names (see Appendix 2d for a 
list of these non-studied names).
Procedure
Experiment 5 was conducted after Experiment 4. For most participants a 
delay of about 10 minutes was provided between experiments. However, IP, 
whose performance prompted this experiment, was tested with name cues two
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days after his involvement in Experiment 4. No additional training was provided 
between the experiments.
The general procedure corresponded to that employed in the test phase of 
Experiment 4, but this time name cues were presented instead of face cues. 
Knowledge at four levels was assessed. These were identical to Levels I through 
IV in Experiment 4. As with faces, 40 name cues (comprising studied and non- 
studied names) were presented at Level I and 20 name cues (comprising studied 
names only) were presented at the remaining levels. All items relevant to Level I 
were presented before proceeding to Level II and so on until all knowledge levels 
had been examined.
Results and Discussion
Results for name cues are presented in Figure 7.5a for patients and 7.5b 
for matched controls. In IP and TG the pattern of memory performance was 
generally consistent with that found with face cues. TG had sufficient 
knowledge to discriminate studied from non-studied names on the basis of 
familiarity only (p < .03). IP was capable of discriminating between names down 
to Level III. Thus, he judged old names as familiar (p < .01), could identify the 
names of entertainers (p = .05) and could discriminate the names of teachers 
from musicians (p < .05). This result is particularly striking in IP's case because 
of the greater delay imposed between study and test.
However, GS's performance with name cues was worse than that 
observed with face cues, even though the former were presented after the latter. 
While he could answer questions at Levels I to III in response to face cues, his 
performance with name cues was only significantly better than chance at the first 
level, familiarity (p < .01). Thus, it appeared that GS could associate 
intermediate levels of semantic detail with faces, but not with names.
GS's knowledge was examined again several days later but this time the 
order of cue presentation was reversed (i.e., name cues were followed by face 
cues). Additional study was not provided. There was no change in performance
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
(H
R 
- F
A
R)
 
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
(H
R
 - 
FA
R)
135
(a) Amnesic patients
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Level I Level II Level III Level IV
Knowledge Level
(b) Matched Controls
Figure 7.5 Accuracy (as a proportion of hits from false alarms) of yes/no 
recognition for novel names as a function of level in (a) amnesic 
patients and (b) matched controls.
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with name cues. His responses were only better than chance at Level I (p < .01). 
However, memory performance with face cues deteriorated. He was only better 
than chance in discriminating faces on the basis of familiarity (p < .01). Thus, 
after a delay of several days no difference in performance with face and name 
cues was found and the knowledge available to GS was now only sufficient to 
support explicit discrimination of items at the most general level of knowledge 
examined.
Results from the matched controls are shown in Figure 7.5b. They were 
significantly better than chance in making familiarity judgements (p < .01 in all 
control pairs), identifying entertainers (p < .01 in all control pairs), 
discriminating teachers from musicians (p < .01 in all control pairs) and 
discriminating subtypes of teacher and subtypes of lecturer (p < .01 in controls 
matched to TG and IP, p < .05 in the pair of controls matched to GS). Thus, as 
with faces, controls were capable of accessing all information requested when 
cued with names.
Of these results, those from the patients are most pertinent to the aims of 
this experiment. The first aim concerned the relative position of names in a 
taxonomic hierarchy. It was suggested that an inability to access information 
about studied people from their names might support its placement at the lowest 
level of person-related knowledge hierarchies. However, responses from all 
three patients indicated that they could access some knowledge via names. TG 
and GS had sufficient knowledge to identify old names as familiar. IP could 
discriminate names down to Level III. Thus, while it was originally thought that 
names represented the most specific detail in a taxonomic hierarchy concerning 
people, these findings suggest that this is not the case. Patients were capable of 
forming name-attribute associations in addition to face-attribute associations. In 
fact, several patients (i.e., IP and TG) were capable of accessing the same amount 
of information from faces and names.
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More important to the present thesis is whether the pattern of residual 
explicit knowledge in patients displayed preserved memory for generalities. IP's 
responses provide the clearest example of preserved memory for generalities. He 
acquired sufficient knowledge to respond accurately to questions posed at the 
first three levels and failed to discriminate names at the fourth level. Thus, he 
had shown that his knowledge at the more general levels was preserved and that 
at the most specific level was impaired. TG and GS, in making accurate 
judgements of familiarity, also demonstrated residual knowledge at the highest 
level examined. However, whether this can be interpreted as evidence of explicit 
memory for generalities is debatable and this issue will be discussed further in 
the concluding section of this chapter.
A final point relates to the differential performance observed between 
faces and names on initial testing with GS. When his knowledge was tested with 
face cues he had access to enough information to discriminate items at the first 
three levels. However, with name cues he could only discriminate studied from 
non-studied items (i.e., at Level I). This differentiation in memory performance 
suggests that GS had associated semantic information with faces but not with 
names. Given that face cues were presented before name cues, this result cannot 
be explained by priming. However, it might be explained by the increased 
salience of face cues. It could be argued that a face provides additional 
information (e.g., about attractiveness and age), and hence is more salient than a 
name. Accordingly, the information associated with face cues may have greater 
representational strength and thus, can be recalled more readily.
7.3 Conclusions from Experiments 4 and 5
In the previous experiments reported in Chapter 6, it appeared that 
amnesic patients could only demonstrate their knowledge of higher-level 
categorical relationships indirectly. The purpose of these experiments was to 
determine whether there was a level of "generality" at which amnesic patients
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could access knowledge explicitly. Results indicated that all patients could 
provide some information explicitly and that accuracy of responding tended to be 
greater at the more general knowledge levels, but worse than controls at all 
levels. There are several issues that arise from these findings and these involve: 
the evidence for direct access to higher-level knowledge, differences between 
patients in the accessibility of higher-level knowledge and comparison of the 
present results with those from a previous study in which higher-level knowledge 
was tested directly (i.e., Experiment 3).
The evidence for direct access to higher-level knowledge
In Experiments 4 and 5 results indicated that all three patients had 
acquired knowledge about novel people. In general, their residual memory was 
only sufficient to support performance at the higher levels of knowledge 
examined (IP's accuracy in face-name association was the only exception). All 
three patients were accurate in their judgement of familiarity with both cue types. 
IP could discriminate people down to Level III, again with both cue types, and 
GS could only achieve this level of discrimination with faces. Thus, the pattern 
of responding was generally characterized by preservation of memory for 
generalities.
The key issue though, was whether patients were capable of 
demonstrating their residual knowledge explicitly. Results indicate that two 
patients, IP and GS, accessed higher-level knowledge directly. Both responded 
accurately to questions down to the third knowledge level, though in GS this was 
only found with face cues. Thus, there is evidence from at least two patients to 
support the proposal that memory for generalities can be demonstrated explicitly 
when knowledge is examined at a sufficiently high-level of categorization.
There remains the question of how to interpret performance when 
memory is restricted to familiarity judgements. TG was only successful in 
making judgements of familiarity in response to both face and name cues. 
Similarly, GS was only accurate in judging familiarity with name cues. Is this
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performance based on implicit or explicit knowledge about studied people? It 
has been argued that familiarity judgements are based on some form of automatic 
response or an unconscious attribution which results from facilitation in 
processing of repeated items (Whittlesea, Jacoby & Girard, 1990; Whittlesea, 
1993). Accordingly, accurate performance at Level I does not necessarily imply 
explicit access to knowledge. However, familiarity judgements can be explicit. 
There are situations in which you know a person is familiar, although you cannot 
access additional information about them. Such judgements are based on an 
explicit awareness of familiarity. This explicit judgement of familiarity is quite 
different from a correct guess (an "implicit" manifestation of familiarity) as the 
former is based on conscious knowledge.
TG's familiarity judgements were arguably of the explicit kind. This is 
indicated in the additional responses she provided at this level (i.e., stating that 
the person was known to her). TG's familiarity-based judgements were explicit 
because she knew the items were familiar. In this case, her memory was limited 
to an explicit feeling of familiarity — knowing that she knows a person without 
knowing why. The fact that she was inclined to justify her familiarity 
judgements could be seen as additional support for this argument. TG may have 
been compelled to justify her responses (at least to herself if not to the examiner) 
because she knew the person was familiar. Thus, there is a case for interpreting 
familiarity as an explicit expression of knowledge. If one accepts this, then TG's 
performance can also be interpreted as evidence of explicit memory for 
generalities.
Differences between patients in access to knowledge
The amount of information that the patients could provide in response to 
direct questioning varied. IP provided the most information followed by GS and 
then TG. Variation in severity of memory impairment is perhaps the most 
plausible explanation. It is possible that this affected the specificity of 
knowledge stored or how much information could be accessed explicitly. Either
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of these explanations could account for differences between patients and also 
within patients (i.e., the differentiation in GS's performance with faces and 
names).
Comparison of results from Experiments 3. 4 and 5
Results from Experiments 4 and 5 can be compared with those from 
Experiment 3. In Experiment 3, direct access to higher-level knowledge was also 
examined. Only two patients, IP and TG, participated in that experiment and 
both failed to access information at the levels of educator/tradesperson and 
teacher/lecturer in response to direct questioning. The failure by IP at the level 
of educator/tradesperson in Experiment 3 is inconsistent with his performance in 
the current experiments, where he was accurate in discriminating teachers from 
musicians. It may be that the educator/tradesperson and teacher/musician 
discriminations are not of equivalent difficulty, but it is also possible that IP 
accessed more information directly here than in the previous experiment. This 
could be a consequence of additional training provided in the present experiment 
(i.e., 4 days of training compared with one session in Experiment 3) which may 
have facilitated his memory performance, perhaps by increasing the strength of 
associations. In contrast, TG's memory performance in these experiments was 
consistent. The information she accessed in the present experiment (i.e., 
familiarity only) was more general than that represented at the level of 
educator/tradesperson.
In summary, results of Experiments 4 and 5 provide evidence of direct 
access to higher-level knowledge in all patients, and this confirms that 
preservation of memory for generalities is not simply a consequence of testing 
conditions. This was demonstrated most clearly in the performance of two 
patients, IP and GS, and the extent to which TG's memory performance reflected 
explicit knowledge might be debated. In addition, the results provide further
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evidence of preservation of memory for generalities. Accuracy of responses was 
greater at the more general knowledge levels.
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Preservation of memory for generalities in retrograde amnesia
The experiments reported in the previous chapters provide evidence of 
preserved memory for generalities in a condition other than dementia, namely 
anterograde amnesia. Chapter 6 reported evidence of preserved memory for 
generalities when higher-level knowledge was tested indirectly. Experiments 4 
and 5 indicated that patients could also access some higher-level knowledge 
directly, but that this was limited to the most general levels examined. All of 
these studies investigated the generalities phenomenon with respect to new 
learning. While there are similarities between patients suffering from amnesia 
and dementia in relation to the generalities phenomenon, there is also an 
important difference. In the case of amnesia the observed preservation of 
memory for generalities was manifested in relation to material acquired after the 
onset of the memory disturbance, whereas the deficiency reported in dementia 
concerns knowledge acquired before the onset of the condition.
Retrograde amnesia, like dementia, affects knowledge acquired prior to 
the onset of the condition. As in anterograde amnesia, the memory loss in 
retrograde amnesia (RA) is not total, and it was considered possible that the 
pattern of preserved and impaired ability in this form of amnesia might also show 
a differentiation between high- and low-level knowledge. If preservation of 
memory for generalities occurred in dementia and both forms of amnesia, then 
this would suggest that the phenomenon has wide application — it may be 
characteristic of deficient memory in general and not simply of particular clinical 
conditions. It was seen in Chapter 3 that several findings could be interpreted as 
evidence of preserved higher-level knowledge in RA. However, the evidence is
scant and the studies concerned did not focus primarily on this issue. These 
shortcomings are addressed in the present chapter.
The aim of the present series of experiments was to test for the existence 
of the generalities phenomenon in retrograde amnesia using the direct and 
indirect testing techniques described in previous chapters. As in the previous 
studies, knowledge about people was investigated using face and name cues to 
elicit the information. However, in the present experiments, pre-existing 
knowledge about face-name associations was examined. The question of 
preserved memory for generalities in RA was explored in two knowledge 
domains — autobiographical and public. When tested directly TG, one of the 
three patients participating in the present series of experiments, remembered 
higher-level information better than lower-level detail in both autobiographical 
and public knowledge domains (i.e., in Experiments 6 and 8 respectively). 
Interestingly, in both experiments, more information was accessible in response 
to names. The influence of indirect testing procedures was examined in the 
autobiographical domain only. When TG's knowledge was tested indirectly in 
the autobiographical domain (i.e, in Experiment 7) it was found that she could 
access information that had previously been unavailable with direct testing4.
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4 In previous chapters, results of indirect tests are reported before results of 
direct tests. This order of reporting is reversed in the present chapter. This is 
because the levels used in examining autobiographical memory for generalities 
indirectly was contingent on results of the experiment examining 
autobiographical memory for generalities directly.
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8.1 Investigation of autobiographical memory for generalities
8.1.1 Experiment 6: Direct examination of autobiographical 
knowledge
Preservation of autobiographical memory for generalities was 
investigated in the one patient who suffered from RA (i.e., TG). As in 
Experiments 4 and 5, knowledge across a range of levels (see Figure 8.1) was 
examined by asking a series of direct questions. These questions were used to 
elicit information about people known personally to TG. They ranged from the 
very general to the very specific, and were presented with both face and name 
cues.
The aim was to determine whether TG's residual autobiographical 
knowledge would display the generalities phenomenon. Her responses on the
familiar novel
famouspersonally
known
(Lvl II)
friend(Lvl III)
(Lvl IV) TG's side husband’s c 
of family side of family (>
d new
0 yrs) (< 10 yrs)
(Lvl V) Elizabeth Alex
Figure 8.1 The hierarchy of knowledge levels used in Experiment 6
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Autobiographical Memory Interview (see Chapter 5) indicated that her memory 
for this information was not completely lost. This experiment was intended to 
determine whether this memory was better for general-level information than for 
specific detail.
Method
Design
The design was similar to that employed in Experiments 4 and 5 (see 
Figure 8.2). The two independent variables were cue type and knowledge level. 
There were two cue types, faces and names. As previously, five knowledge 
levels were examined with face cues but only four were examined with name 
cues. The dependent measure was memory performance and this was determined 
on the basis of responses to yes/no recognition.
Cue
I: Familiarity 
(family/friend vs novel)
II: General relationship 
(family/friend vs famous)
Level III: Basic relationship 
(family vs friend)
IV: Specific relationship
(X's child vs other's child or 
old vs new friend / TG's vs 
husband's side of family)
V: Name
Faces Names
N  =  4 0
(2 0  f/f, 2 0  n o v e l)
N  =  4 0
(2 0  f /f , 2 0  n o v e l)
N  =  4 0
(2 0  f/f, 2 0  fam ou s)
N  =  4 0
(2 0  f/f , 2 0  fam ou s)
N  =  20
(1 0  fam ily , 10 friend)
N  =  20
(1 0  fa m ily , 10 friend)
N =  12
(3 X 's, 3 other,
3 T G 's, 3 husband's)
N  =  26  
(9  o ld , 9  new ,
4  T G 's, 4  husband's)
N  =  2 0
(1 0  fam ily , 10 friends)
Figure 8.2 Design of Experiment 6
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Participants
One patient with retrograde amnesia, TG, took part in this study.
Materials
Two sets materials were used — one set of face cards and one set of name
cards.
The set of face cards consisted of 66 faces. There were two categories of 
faces. One category consisted of faces that were familiar to TG (N = 46) and the 
other consisted of novel or unknown faces (N =20). The familiar faces 
comprised: family members (N = 10), friends (N = 10), friends' children (N = 6) 
and famous people (N = 20). Pictures of people were either collected from 
magazines or supplied by TG's husband. Both famous and unknown faces were 
matched as closely as possible to those of family members and friends on the 
basis of age, sex and attractiveness. A list of the famous people used in this 
experiment is provided in Appendix 3a. They consisted of television, movie, 
sporting and royal personalities. The pictures/photographs were scanned into a 
computer and were reproduced using the same procedure discussed in previous 
experiments. They were printed in black and white, had a neutral background 
and were 5 cm in width and 6 to 7 cm in height (see Appendix 3b for examples 
of famous faces). Although these dimensions are smaller than those used in 
previous experiments, there was no reduction in the clarity of faces associated 
with this modification in size.
The name cue cards consisted of 68 names (first name and surname pairs) 
and these belonged to familiar (N = 48) and novel (N = 20) people. The familiar 
names comprised: family members (N = 10), friends (N =18) and famous people 
(N = 20, also used with face cues). Each of these names were matched to those 
of family members and friends on the basis of sex and syllable length (e.g., if the 
first name of a family member had two syllables then the novel first name also 
had two syllables). In addition, several of the novel surnames were repeated as
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there were family members and friends who shared the same surname. The novel 
names are listed in Appendix 3c.
Procedure
There were two phases. In the first phase knowledge about people was 
examined using name cues and in the second phase knowledge was examined 
using face cues. This order was the reverse of that used in previous experiments 
(i.e, in Experiments 4 and 5) where a difference was found in the amount of 
information recalled with face and name cues. This was done to maintain 
motivation levels, assuming that the same pattern of differential performance 
would occur.
Although the general procedure was similar to that employed in 
Experiments 4 and 5, there were some added complications because of the 
individualized nature of the stimulus set. The number of items presented at each 
level varied as did the category of person (i.e., family member, friend, famous 
and unknown) presented for discrimination at these levels. In addition, at Level 
IV, the questions presented with face cues differed from those presented with 
name cues at one level). This was because photographs of relevant friends were 
not available and thus a different question was required to test knowledge about 
people. These complications are addressed in discussion of the relevant phases 
below.
Four levels of knowledge were examined with name cues. The materials 
used to test knowledge at these levels were selected and prepared with the 
assistance of TG's husband. Names of people with the same surname and maiden 
name as TG were not included because judgements involving these names could 
be made on the basis of familiarity rather than on the basis of knowledge about 
the particular person in question. If the surname was the same as TG's, then she 
may have decided that the person is related to her without knowing anything 
about them. Questions were presented with each cue and these tapped a range of 
details from general to increasingly more specific. Specificity was determined on
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the basis of the amount of detailed knowledge required to answer the questions. 
The category of name cue (i.e., whether the person was family, friend, famous or 
unknown) presented at each level differed. The questions asked at each level 
were as follows:
Level I: "Is this person familiar?"
Level II: "Is this person a family member/friend?"
Level III: "Is this person family?"
Level IV: "Is this person from (husband's) side of family?"
"Is this an old (> 10 yrs) friend?"
At the first level, TG was asked to make a judgement of familiarity. At 
Level II, knowledge of general relationships was examined by asking TG to 
discriminate personally familiar from famous people. The discrimination at 
Level III, tested knowledge of basic relationships, and this involved 
differentiating family members from friends. At Level IV, specific knowledge 
about family relationships and friendships was examined. Knowledge of family 
relationships was examined by asking TG to discriminate between names 
belonging to people from her side and her husband's side of the family. In the 
case of friendships, she was asked to discriminate old friends from new. As in 
earlier experiments, all items at Level I were presented before proceeding to 
Level II and so on until knowledge at all levels had been examined.
After a short break (i.e., about 10 mins.) knowledge was tested with face 
cues. This time knowledge was examined at five levels. The questions at each 
level were as follows:
Level I: "Is this person familiar?"
Level II: "Is this person a family member/friend?"
Level III: "Is this person family?"
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Level IV: "Is this person from (husband's) side of family?"
"Is this (X's) child?"
Level V: "Is this person's name______ ?"
The questions asked about people at Levels I to III with name cues were the same 
as those presented with face cues. However, at Level IV, a change in procedure 
was introduced to address the problem of insufficient materials. The number of 
items presented with the family relationship question was reduced and this 
represented only a minor modification. The most significant modification 
involved a change in the items and question presented to test knowledge of 
friendships. To test knowledge of specific friendships TG was asked to 
discriminate children on the basis of whether they belonged to a particular friend 
(i.e., X) or other friends. To answer this question correctly TG would need to 
have knowledge of the parent-child relationships of her friends. Thus, although 
the question was not the same as that used with name cues, it nevertheless probed 
specific knowledge about friends. A final question was asked to elicit knowledge 
of face-name associations for family members and friends. Given the difficulties 
experienced with this level in previous experiments (namely, Experiments 4 and 
5) it was decided that only correct names would be included. Half were correctly 
paired with faces and half were incorrectly paired.
Results and Discussion
Accuracy of memory performance at each level with the two cue types is 
shown in Figure 8.3. As in the previous studies, accuracy was determined by 
subtracting the proportion of false alarms from the proportion of hits and, the 
dotted line shows the level of accuracy required for above chance performance. 
Performance was evaluated statistically using Fisher's exact test.
TG responded accurately to questions posed at all levels with name 
cues. Thus, she was significantly better than chance in discriminating known 
from unknown names (p < .01), personally familiar from famous names (p < .01),
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and the names of family members from friends (p < .01). Responses to the two 
questions at Level IV were combined and results indicated that TG could identify 
the names of people from her husband's side of the family and the names of old 
friends (p < .01). Errors at the latter level were only made in response to 
questions eliciting knowledge about friends. Thus, TG's performance with name 
cues indicated that she had access to a range of knowledge about people known 
to her personally.
Level I Level II Level III Level IV Level V
Knowledge Level
Cue Type
-•—  Faces 
—  Names
Figure 8.3 Accuracy (as a proportion of hits - false alarms) of TG's
autobiographical memory in response to face and name cues.
In contrast, performance with face cues was poor. TG was only 
accurate in discriminating faces at the first two levels. That is, she was 
significantly better than chance in discriminating known from unknown faces (p 
< .01) and personally familiar from famous faces (p < .01). However, her 
performance with face cues broke down at Level III and this result can be
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directly compared with that for name cues. Knowledge about the same people 
was examined at Level III with name cues, and TG's performance in this case 
was significantly better than chance. This indicates that information available in 
one modality was not available in another. Performance at the remaining levels, 
examining knowledge about specific family relationships and friendships as well 
as face-name associations, was also no better than chance. This pattern of 
performance again shows preservation of memory for generalities, this time in 
the domain of autobiographical memory. TG's knowledge for more general 
information about people known to her personally was preserved and that for 
more specific details was impaired. This confirms that memory for generalities 
can occur in amnesics with deficits to new learning as well as pre-existing 
knowledge.
The difference in performance with face and name cues was 
unexpected. TG accessed more information from names than she did with faces. 
This pattern is the reverse of what might be expected if the salience of clues is 
considered (see Discussion in Chapter 7). Faces contain semantic information 
about a person that is not present in names (e.g., about attractiveness, age, etc), 
and on this basis it could be argued that the former might be a more effective cue. 
Accordingly, memory that is cued with faces should be better than that cued with 
names. However, TG's performance is not consistent with this analysis, and she 
is not the only patient with retrograde amnesia who has shown such a 
differentiation (see RFR's performance in Experiment II reported by McCarthy & 
Warrington, 1992). The difference between faces and names, while not central to 
theories of amnesia, is relevant to theories of face recognition. In particular, 
differences in the amount of information accessible via faces and names 
challenge theories that propose a unitary semantic information store. These 
theories will be discussed in Chapter 10, where a theoretical analysis of findings 
is undertaken. The implications of TG's differential memory performance with 
faces and names will also be considered.
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8.1.2 Experiment 7: Indirect examination of autobiographical 
knowledge
Given TG's failure to provide specific details about people in response to 
direct questioning in the previous experiment, it was of interest to determine 
whether she could access any of this information indirectly. In the experiments 
reported in Chapter 6, it was found that indirect tests were more effective than 
direct ones in accessing higher-level knowledge. It was therefore considered 
possible that at least some of the autobiographical information TG could not 
access directly with face cues might be retrievable under indirect testing 
conditions.
In Experiment 6 TG's responses to faces was no better than chance from 
the third level, involving examination of basic relationships (i.e., involving 
discrimination of family members from friends). The aim of the present 
experiment was to determine whether TG could access this information when 
knowledge was tested indirectly. Adopting the methodology used in Chapter 6, 
TG was asked to discriminate between two types of family member (i.e., her side 
versus her husband's side of the family) and two types of friend (i.e., old versus 
new). Her errors in this discrimination task would provide an indirect measure of 
her ability to discriminate at the higher categorical level involving family and 
friends — a level at which she failed in the previous experiment. The two levels, 
general and specific, involved in this experiment are illustrated in Figure 8.4.
(  General \  
V Level Hi)
friend
new friend ( Specific^ 
(< 10 yrs) V Level IV>
husband's side old friend 
(> 10 yrs)
TG's side
Figure 8.4 Knowledge levels used in Experiment 7.
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Method
Participants
TG was the only participant in this experiment.
Materials
The materials consisted of 28 faces and a sheet listing four categories of 
people known personally to TG.
The faces consisted of people from TG's side of the family (N = 7), her 
husband's side of the family (N = 7), old friends (i.e., known for more than 10 
years, N = 7) and new friends (i.e., known for less than 10 years, N = 7). These 
faces were scanned from photographs collected by TG's husband. They were 
reproduced using the same procedure as was employed in the previous 
experiment. This set of faces contained additional items that were not presented 
in Experiment 6. This is because they were not available at the time that 
Experiment 6 was conducted.
The four categories consisting of TG's side of the family, her husband's 
side of the family, old friends (> 10 years) and new friends (< 10 years) were 
listed in order on a separate sheet for TG to use when making her judgements.
Procedure
TG was told that she would see a series of faces and that her task was to 
identify them according to whether they were from her side of the family, her 
husband's side of the family, an old friend or a new friend. She was encouraged 
to provide a response for every face even though it might be based on a guess. 
The faces were then shown individually, in a random order, and her responses 
were recorded.
Results and Discussion
TG's responses are divided into three categories. They were either 
correct, semantically-related (e.g., nominating the category "old friend" when the
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correct category was "new friend") or unrelated (e.g., choosing "old friend" when 
the correct response was "TG's side of the family") to the target. The frequency 
of these responses is shown in Figure 8.5. The top panel shows TG's 
performance on within-category discrimination (i.e., ability to make specific 
judgements) and the bottom shows performance on between-category 
discrimination (i.e., ability to make general judgements).
As the top panel of Figure 8.5 shows, the frequency of correct responses 
was only marginally greater than semantically-related errors. This difference 
was not significant. Thus, TG was no better than chance in making the specific 
discrimination involving subtypes of family member and subtypes of friend. In 
contrast, the frequency of correct category responses was significantly greater 
than unrelated responses (X2(l) = 22.3, p<.001), indicating that TG could 
discriminate faces at the higher-level of family/friend. This was a discrimination 
that she failed to make in the previous experiment when knowledge at the same 
level was tested directly. Closer inspection of correct category responses 
revealed that TG made twice as many confusions with the faces of friends. This 
may reflect the greater representational strength of memories associated with 
family, resulting in fewer confusions with this category of person. Such an 
imbalance was not found in similar experiments (i.e., Experiments 1 and 2) 
investigating the generalities phenomenon with respect to new learning.
However, in the latter studies no difference in the representational strength of 
newly acquired associations would be expected.
In sum, results of this experiment confirm that indirect tests reveal 
knowledge that is not available in direct tests. While in previous experiments the 
effect of indirect testing was demonstrated in new learning, the present findings 
show that the same effect also occurs with pre-existing knowledge.
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■ Correct category □ Incorrect category
_J i_ (Semantically-unrelated
error)
@ Correct □ Semantically-related
error
Figure 8.5 Results of indirect testing of higher-level autobiographical 
knowledge in TG.
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8.2 Investigation of memory for generalities in the public domain
8.2.1 Experiment 8: Direct examination of memory for famous 
people
Results of Experiment 6 showed that a patient with RA could explicitly 
remember higher-level information about familiar people at least from their 
faces. That experiment investigated knowledge in the autobiographical domain. 
However, remote memory also contains information relating to the public 
domain and it is considered of interest to see whether the same patient would 
display the preservation of memory for generalities phenomenon in this other 
knowledge domain.
Remote memory in the public domain was investigated in the three 
patients, two of whom had participated in earlier experiments. Two patients 
suffered from the anterograde form of amnesia only and one patient suffered 
from both forms of the disturbance. The performance of the latter patient, TG, 
was of particular interest. The other patients were included as additional control 
subjects and to check their status as anterograde amnesics. The aim was to 
determine whether TG could access any remote public knowledge directly and, if 
so, to determine whether her responses revealed preservation of memory for 
generalities. Knowledge about famous people was examined using the general 
procedure employed in Experiments 4 and 5. Again, a series of direct questions 
were asked to probe knowledge for a range of details, from general to specific, 
about these people (see Figure 8.6). Both faces and names were used to cue 
knowledge. It was anticipated that of the three patients only TG would 
demonstrate any impairment in remote memory function in accordance with their 
neuropsychological classification. TG's remote memory loss could either be 
complete or partial. A pattern of partial memory loss together with accurate 
responses to questions tapping general information only, would be consistent 
with preservation of remote memory for generalities.
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famous
(Lvl II) entertainer (other)
(Lvl III) actor sportsperson
(Lvl IV) comic tennis
player
(Lvl V) Tom
Hanks
Kevin Pete Kathy
Costner Sampras Freeman
Figure 8.6 The hierarchy of knowledge levels used in Experiment 8.
Method
Design
The independent variables were cue type and knowledge level, both of 
which were manipulated within subjects. Cue type had two levels, faces and 
names. Five knowledge levels were examined with faces. These comprised: 
fame status, general occupational category (entertainer/not entertainer), basic 
occupational category (actor/sportsperson), specific occupational category 
(subtype of actor and subtype of sportsperson) and name. Knowledge at the first 
four levels was also examined using name cues. The dependent measure was 
memory performance, determined on the basis of responses to yes/no recognition
(with both types of cue) and two alternative forced-choice (with faces only)5. 
The design is shown in Figure 8.7.
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Cue
Level
I: Fame
(famous vs novel)
II: General occupational category 
(entertainer vs non-entertainer)
III: Basic occupational category 
(actor / sportsperson)
IV: Specific occupational category 
(comic actor /  tennis player)
V: Name
Faces Names
N  =  4 0
(2 0  fa m o u s,2 0  n o v e l)
N  =  4 0
(2 0  fa m o u s,2 0  n o v e l)
N  =  2 0
(1 0  actors, 10 sports)
N  =  2 0
(1 0  actors, 10 sports)
N  =  2 0
(1 0  actors, 10 sports)
N  =  2 0
(1 0  actors, 10 sports)
N  =  2 0
(1 0  actors, 10 sports)
N  =  2 0
(1 0  actors, 10 sports)
N  =  2 0
(1 0  actors, 10 sports)
Figure 8.7 Design of Experiment 8
Participants
Nine people participated in this study — three amnesic patients (i.e., TG, 
GS and IP) and six matched controls. These controls were the same as those who 
had participated in Experiments 4 and 5.
5 This study was conducted prior to Experiment 6 and concurrent with 
Experiments 4 and 5. Thus, while examination of knowledge with faces at Level 
V (i.e., name) in the present study differs from that in Experiment 6, it parallels 
that of Experiments 4 and 5.
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Materials
The materials consisted of a set of face cue cards and two sets of name 
cards. The face cues comprised 40 faces, half of which were famous and the 
other non-famous. The famous people comprised 10 actors and 10 sportspeople. 
In each category, half were male. The names of the famous people are listed in 
Appendix 3d. They were selected on the basis of being currently famous and 
salient to an Australian population. They were initially chosen on the basis of 
responses to a pilot survey requesting the names of famous individuals (N = 10) 
and were subsequently identified as highly recognizable by a small group of first 
year psychology students (N = 9, mean age = 21 years, SD = 2.1). Salient 
famous people were selected to maximize the probability that they were known 
to patients prior to the onset of amnesia. The pictures did not contain any 
features that would provide clues about the occupation of the subject. They were 
scanned into a computer and reproduced in exactly the same manner as described 
in the previous experiments (see Appendix 3e for examples of these faces). The 
20 non-famous faces were collected from advertisements in magazines. They 
were matched to the famous people as closely as possible in terms of age, sex 
and attractiveness and were also scanned and reproduced using the procedure 
outlined in earlier experiments (see Appendix 3f for examples).
There were two sets of name cards. One set was used to test knowledge 
about famous people. This set consisted of 40 names. Half of these names were 
those of famous people and the remainder were unknown. The latter names were 
constructed according to the procedure outlined in Experiment 5 and are listed in 
Appendix 3g. The second set was used with face cues to examine knowledge of 
face-name associations and there were two types of cards as illustrated in Figure 
8.8. One type contained a single name (see Figure 8.8a) and the other type 
contained a pair of names (see Figure 8.8b). Half of the single name cards 
contained correct names and the remainder were incorrect. As in Experiment 7, 
the incorrect names were produced by changing the second syllable of the
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surname (e.g., "Mel Gibson" was changed to "Mel Gibbons", see Appendix 3h). 
The name pair cards contained two famous names from the same gender and 
basic occupational category. On half of the trials the correct name was the first 
item in the name pair and on the remaining trials it was the second item.
(a) Mel Gibson
(b) Mel Gibson Bruce Willis
Figure 8.8 The two types of name cards used to test knowledge for 
face-name associations (a) single name card and 
(b) name pair card.
Procedure
The general procedure employed in this experiment was similar to that 
used in the test phase of Experiments 4 and 5. Knowledge was tested in two 
ways — using face cues and name cues. In the case of patients, knowledge was 
examined first with face cues and then with name cues. The order of cue 
presentation was counterbalanced across the two controls matched to each 
patient. A short break of 10 minutes was provided between the two phases of 
testing.
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Five knowledge levels were examined with face cues and knowledge at 
each level was elicited by asking questions. The questions ranged from the very 
general to the very specific. As in the earlier experiment, specificity was 
determined by the number of people who shared the attribute in question. The 
attribute was shared by 20 people at the most general knowledge level, and this 
number decreased progressively as the questions became more specific. The 
questions presented at each level were as follows:
Level I: "Is this person famous?"
Level II: "Is this person primarily in the entertainment industry?"
Level III: "Is this person an actor?" or
"Is this person a sportsperson?"
Level IV: "Is this person a comic actor (i.e., appeared in comedy)?" or 
"Is this person a tennis player?"
Level V: "Is this person's name_______?"
"Is this person's name_______ or _______?"
Knowledge at Levels I to V was assessed progressively, in descending 
order. The entire set of 40 face cues (both famous and non-famous) were 
presented individually and randomly at Level I. From this level onwards only 
the famous faces were presented. At three knowledge levels (i.e., Levels III, IV 
and V) one of two questions were presented with faces. For half of the items at 
Level III participants were asked whether the face was that of an actor and for the 
remainder whether the face was that of a sportsperson. At Level IV, participants 
were asked to judge whether actors were comic actors and whether sportspeople 
were tennis players. Knowledge of face-name associations was examined in two 
ways at Level V. First, a yes/no response was required for all items at Level V 
(see Figure 8.8a). These items were then presented a second time, but here 
participants were required to choose between two names (see Figure 8.8b).
Knowledge at the first four levels was re-examined with name cues using 
the same questions. As was the case for faces, 40 name cues were presented at
Level I and 20 name cues were presented at the remaining levels. All Level I 
items were presented before proceeding to Level II and so on until knowledge at 
the four levels had been examined.
Results and Discussion
162
Faces
The face cue data are presented in Figure 8.9a for the patients and Figure 
8.9b for the controls. As predicted, TG (the only retrograde amnesic) was the 
only patient who had difficulty answering questions associated with famous 
faces. She was significantly better than chance in discriminating famous from 
non-famous faces (p < .05), but her performance declined at the next three levels. 
Thus, she had insufficient knowledge about famous people to discriminate 
entertainers from non-entertainers, actors from sportspeople and subtypes of 
actor as well as subtypes of sportsperson. There was some inconsistency in her 
responses at Level V. While responses to the yes/no question were generally 
accurate (p < .01), those to the forced choice question were no better than chance. 
As discussed earlier in Experiment 4, the latter result suggests that in the case of 
the former question performance was not based on knowledge of particular face- 
name associations, but rather on familiarity. Modified names were not familiar 
and accordingly could not belong to famous people. Overall, TG's results 
indicate that she was capable of accessing some knowledge directly about 
famous people when cued with faces, but that this was restricted to the most 
general level examined. In contrast, the remaining patients (IP and GS) and 
matched controls were significantly better than chance in their responses to 
yes/no questions at Levels I to V (p < .01 at all levels) and were also accurate in 
their forced choice judgements at Level V (X2( 1) = 18.05, p < .001).
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(a) Amnesic patients
Level I Level II Level III Level IV 
Knowledge Levels
Level V 
(Y/N)
(b) Matched controls
IP Controls 
GS Controls 
TG Controls
Level I Level II Level III Level IV Level V
(Y/N)
Knowledge Levels
Figure 8.9 Accuracy (as a proportion of hits - false alarms) of yes/no 
recognition for famous faces as a function of level in 
(a) amnesic patients and (b) matched controls.
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Names
Results for name cues are presented in Figure 8.10. The patient data is 
presented in Figure 8.10a and the matched control data is presented in Figure 
8.10b. Again, TG was the only participant who showed any evidence of 
impairment on this task, but only at the most specific level of knowledge 
examined. She was significantly better than chance in discriminating names on 
the basis of fame (p < .01), general occupational category (p < .01) and basic 
occupational category (p < .01). However, she did not discriminate between 
subtypes of actor and subtypes of sportsperson. The errors she made in the latter 
discrimination were distributed fairly equally across the two occupational groups. 
IP, GS and the matched controls responded accurately at all four knowledge 
levels examined (p < .01 at all levels).
It was possible that TG's performance with names was facilitated by prior 
exposure to the same questions since they had been presented first with face cues. 
To examine this the experiment was repeated three months later, but this time the 
order of cue presentation was reversed — that is, knowledge was examined first 
with name cues and then with face cues. Despite the reversal of cues, results on 
repeat testing were consistent with those obtained on initial examination: TG was 
significantly better than chance in discriminating names at the first three levels (p 
< .01 at all 3 levels), but could only discriminate faces at the most general level 
(p < .05).
The results of this experiment were consistent with expectations insofar 
as evidence of impairment was only found in the one patient with RA. In 
addition, the information she accessed on direct questioning was restricted to 
higher-level knowledge. Thus, TG's remote memory for public figures, like her 
autobiographical memory, is characterized by preservation of general-level 
knowledge and impairment of specific knowledge.
In addition, these results confirm TG's differentiation in memory 
performance between face and name cues. Performance with name cues was
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(a) Amnesic patients
Knowledge Levels
(b) Matched controls
Figure 8.10 Accuracy (as a proportion of hits -false alarms) of yes/no 
recognition for famous names as a function of level 
(a) amnesic patients and (b) matched controls.
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again clearly superior to that with face cues. It might also be argued that in the 
case of name cues performance in the autobiographical domain (i.e., in 
Experiment 6) was marginally better than that in the public domain (i.e., in the 
present experiment). TG responded accurately at all knowledge levels examined 
with name cues in Experiment 6, but in this study was only better than chance at 
the first three levels. Such a result might be explained by the greater strength of 
representations in the case of autobiographical memories because of their 
personal relevance (see Snowden, et al., 1994). However, it must also be noted 
that TG's results in these two experiments are not directly comparable and so, the 
suggestion that performance in one is better than the other can only be 
speculative.
Results of this study confirm and extend those of the previous 
experiments in two important respects. First, preservation of memory for 
generalities was confirmed, but this time in another domain of remote memory 
function. Thus, not only does it occur in anterograde amnesia, but it also occurs 
in retrograde amnesia, both in public and autobiographical domains. Second, 
there was a difference in performance between faces and names with 
performance on the former worse than the latter.
8.3 Conclusions from Experiments 6 to 8
The three studies reported in this chapter investigated the generalities 
phenomenon in RA. Evidence of preserved memory for generalities was found 
in all three experiments in the one patient who suffered from remote memory 
impairment. In the public knowledge domain, she remembered general 
information about famous people better than specific details. A similar pattern of 
performance was found in autobiographical memory' but only for faces. In both 
experiments there was a difference in the amount of information available to the 
patient in different modalities. More semantic information about people was
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available when knowledge was cued with names. This difference between 
performance with face and name cues will be considered further in Chapter 10.
In two experiments (i.e., Experiment 6 and 8) remote knowledge was 
examined by asking a series of direct questions. Experiment 7 investigated 
whether additional information could be accessed if knowledge was tested 
indirectly, but only in the autobiographical domain. Results indicated that 
knowledge previously unavailable on direct tests could be accessed using indirect 
testing procedures. This confirms results of previous experiments reported in 
Chapter 6, where it was also found that indirect tests facilitated access to 
knowledge (in this case knowledge about novel associations) in amnesia.
These findings support the claim that the preservation of memory for 
generalities phenomenon occurs in RA. As these studies investigated the pattern 
in residual remote memory function, they are also directly relevant to findings of 
preserved memory for generalities in dementia. Patients with RA and dementia 
have both lost access to knowledge acquired normally in the past. However, the 
main difference between these groups lies in the nature of their memory 
impairment. In dementia the knowledge base has been damaged. As a result of 
this loss, the residual information is only sufficient to support discrimination at 
more general levels of knowledge. In TG's case, there is evidence to suggest that 
retrieval mechanisms are damaged. It was clear from results of Experiment 7 
that TG retained sufficient knowledge to differentiate family and friends even 
though in the previous experiment she failed to make this discrimination. 
However, additional impairment to the knowledge store cannot be ruled out. For 
instance, it could be argued that TG's failure to discriminate subtypes of actor 
and subtypes of sportsperson with name cues in Experiment 8 reflects a storage 
deficit as this knowledge was not available in either modality. Thus, while the 
deficit in dementia can be located at storage, the deficit in amnesia may involve a 
combination of storage and retrieval mechanisms.
168
A final issue concerns TG's primary diagnosis. Does she suffer from 
retrograde amnesia or prosopagnosia? If prosopagnosia is considered simply as a 
deficit in face recognition (see Ellis & Young, 1996), then TG's behaviour is 
inconsistent with this diagnosis. She could identify faces as familiar and she 
could access information about people from other modalities (i.e., names). 
However, her knowledge about people from this alternative modality was not 
completely preserved as she could not answer all questions asked about famous 
people. On this basis it might be argued that TG suffers from a mild form of 
prosopagnosia. Yet all of her behaviour, even with faces, can be explained in the 
context of RA. There is no reason to expect that knowledge about people should 
be selectively preserved in cases of remote memory loss. In TG's case, the 
remote memory impairment affected knowledge in several domains (i.e., public, 
autobiographical) and was not restricted to people (i.e., it also affected episodic 
knowledge, as indicated by her responses to such questions on the 
Autobiographical Memory Interview). Although a diagnosis of mild 
prosopagnosia in addition to amnesia cannot be excluded, it seems that TG's 
condition can be explained by RA alone and on this basis it is argued that this 
represents the most parsimonious and hence the most appropriate diagnosis.
169
Chapter 9 ftifi ■
Memory for generalities in a non-impaired sample6
The studies reported in earlier chapters provide evidence that memory for 
generalities previously reported in patients suffering particular forms of dementia 
also occurs in both anterograde and retrograde amnesia. Thus, the differentiation 
between high- and low-level knowledge characterizes the memory disturbance in 
very different clinical populations. It is possible that this pattern of residual 
memory performance is a consequence of brain damage common to all three 
conditions. However, there is another interpretation — namely, that preservation 
of memory for generalities is simply a normal feature of poor memory, 
irrespective of its cause, and its occurrence in clinical cases simply reflects their 
acquired memory deficit.
In support of this, there is evidence of superior memory for generalities in 
people without memory impairment. For instance, a differentiation between 
general and specific knowledge is evident in semantic confusions which are 
common in everyday behaviour (e.g., confusing one colleague's name with that 
of another) and have also been demonstrated in the laboratory. Bartlett's (1932) 
classic experiment, involving the "The War of the Ghosts" story, provides an 
early demonstration of the errors that people make when attempting to recall 
specific details following delay (up to 10 years in one case). He found that 
people tended to add or modify details (e.g., "something black" was transformed 
into "foamed at the mouth") in order to make the story more consistent with their
6 The material presented in this chapter is reported in Haslam et al. (in press).
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expectations. The most specific details, such as proper names, were the most 
commonly omitted in recall. Yet despite these errors, the general theme of the 
story was retained.
A similar pattern of semantic confusion has been demonstrated in more 
recent studies of memory illusions. For example, Bransford and Franks (1971) 
found evidence of semantic confusion in sentence recognition. They examined 
memory by asking participants to differentiate between studied, semantically- 
related (i.e., non-studied) and unrelated sentences. While participants rejected 
the unrelated sentences with ease, they had difficulty differentiating studied from 
semantically-related sentences. This suggests that participants had retained 
generic knowledge, about the theme or idea presented in sentences, but not 
sufficient specific knowledge to identify them as the ones encountered at study. 
Deese (1959) developed a paradigm to investigate memory distortion in recall of 
items from word lists. The task simply involved presenting a list of related 
words during study (e.g., hill, valley, summit, etc.) and then testing recall. A 
high rate of intrusion errors was found. Specifically, there was a significant 
tendency to report words that were strongly associated with the studied items 
(e.g., mountain) even though they had not been presented. This paradigm has 
since been adopted by other researchers who report a similar pattern of memory 
distortion in normal samples (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Schacter, et 
al., 1996). Again, a differentiation between high- and low-level knowledge is 
indicated in these results.
The tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) phenomenon can be seen as another 
example of superior memory for generalities in normal individuals. This effect is 
characterized by an inability to recall a word or name in the context of partial 
knowledge about the item. Several researchers have attempted to identify the 
components of this residual knowledge and have found that it is of two general 
types. One type consists of structural or phonemic information about the target 
such as syllable length, its sound and knowledge about the first letter (e.g.,
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Brown & McNeill, 1966; Jones, 1989; Lovelace, 1987). The second type, which 
is of greater relevance to the current discussion, is semantically-related 
information. This includes, for example, knowledge about a person's profession 
(e.g., Lovelace, 1987; Yarmey, 1973). In fact, Yarmey (1973) found that partial 
semantic knowledge is more important in attempting to overcome the TOT state, 
at least in the case of naming famous people. This pattern of preserved memory 
for semantic information and temporary impairment of item-specific knowledge 
is consistent with that described here as the "generalities phenomenon".
These studies suggest that even non-clinical samples can remember 
general information better than specific details. This pattern tends to present 
when an increased burden has been placed on memory (e.g., by presenting 
information that is strongly related to studied materials or by increasing the delay 
between study and test). Thus, the generalities phenomenon may not be 
restricted to clinical populations, but rather, may occur in any situation where 
memory is imperfect.
9.1 Experiment 9: Investigation of the generalities phenomenon in a 
non-clinical sample
Although the evidence is strongly indicative of better memory for 
generalities in normal populations, the techniques used differ from those 
employed in the present program of research. This final experiment was 
conducted to determine whether non-clinical populations would, under 
conditions of imperfect memory, display the generalities phenomenon using the 
same techniques employed here with amnesic patients.
To achieve this aim, the first three experiments (reported in Chapter 6) 
were repeated in a non-clinical sample. These experiments investigated memory 
for face-occupation associations. Results of these experiments revealed the 
following phenomena in amnesic patients. When asked to make a coarse 
discrimination in Experiment 1, response confusions indicated that patients could
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identify the higher-level occupational grouping (i.e., discriminate educators from 
tradespeople) but failed to identify the lower-level occupation (i.e., discriminate 
subtypes of teacher and subtypes of lecturer). This pattern of results could not be 
explained solely in terms of the absolute levels that were used in our taxonomic 
hierarchy because introduction of a more refined discrimination in Experiment 2, 
where lower-level occupations studied in the previous experiment became the 
higher-level occupational grouping, led to an improvement in memory 
performance in at least one patient. In Experiment 3, patients could not identify 
the occupational grouping when knowledge was examined directly in either 
coarse (i.e., in Experiment 1) or fine (i.e., in Experiment 2) discrimination tasks.
To investigate these phenomena in a non-clinical population Experiments 
1, 2 and 3 were repeated. The only changes in procedure were first, a reduction- 
in exposure during study to induce partial learning and, secondly, presentation of 
items on video to facilitate group administration. The suboptimal learning 
conditions, while not rendering participants amnesic, were intended to reduce 
performance sufficiently for memory to qualify as imperfect. The primary aim 
was to determine whether non-clinical subjects would show preservation of 
memory for generalities analogous to that seen in our amnesic patients. In 
addition, we wished to examine the relative contributions of response mode (i.e., 
direct vs. indirect testing) in non-clinical subjects.
Method
Design
As illustrated in Figure 9.1, the experiment had a 2 (level in taxonomic 
hierarchy: high/low) x 2 (type of test: direct/indirect) design with repeated 
measures on the first factor (see Figure 9.1). The dependent variable was 
memory performance in a yes/no recognition test of the occupation associated
with each face.
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Participants
111 (73 females and 38 males; mean age = 22.97 years, SD = 6.06) 
undergraduate psychology students participated as part of their second year 
laboratory program in cognitive psychology. There were 58 subjects in the 
indirect test condition and 53 subjects in the direct test condition.
Test
indirect direct
high
L e v e l ___________________
low
Figure 9.1 Design of Experiment 9
Materials
Materials consisted of two sets of face-occupation associations and four 
lists of occupations. The face-occupation associations were identical to those 
used in Experiments 1 and 2, with the exception of two faces — one from each 
experiment (both were lost due to technical difficulties). These were replaced 
with other faces that resembled the original items as closely as possible (i.e., 
factors such as age and presence of facial features were controlled). The 28 male 
faces in each set were divided equally into four occupations. The occupations in 
Experiment 1 comprised "teachers, lecturers, electricians and plumbers" (Level 
II). These could be classified at the higher-level of "educator" and 
"tradesperson" (Level I). In Experiment 2 the occupations comprised "high
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school teachers, primary school teachers, university lecturers and TAFE 
lecturers" (Level III), which could be categorized at the higher-level of "teacher" 
and "lecturer" (Level II).
These materials were presented in two video recordings. One video 
contained the stimulus materials from Experiment 1 followed by those from 
Experiment 2. The second video contained the same information but in the 
reverse order. There were two sets of materials in each experiment. One set was 
used in the study phase and the other set was used in the test phase. In the study 
phase 28 face-occupation associations were shown. These were presented 
individually for 3 secs followed by presentation of a blank screen for 1 sec before 
the next item appeared. This duration of exposure was determined in the course 
of pilot testing (N = 6) in which the aim was to identify the amount of study 
required to render memory imperfect. In the test phase the same faces were 
presented again in a different order, but this time without occupations. These 
latter items were presented individually for 5 secs and then a blank screen 
appeared for a period of 10 secs before the next face was shown. The order of 
item presentation in both parts of each experiment was the same as that for 
Experiments 1 and 2.
Four lists of occupations were used to examine knowledge of face- 
occupation associations. Two lists contained the four studied occupations (i.e., 
teacher, lecturer electrician, plumber for Experiment 1 and high school teacher, 
primary school teacher, university lecturer, TAFE lecturer for Experiment 2) and 
the remaining lists contained two higher-level occupations (i.e., educator, 
tradesperson for Experiment 1 and teacher, lecturer for Experiment 2).
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in two phases. In one phase items from 
Experiment 1 (used in making a coarse occupational discrimination) were 
presented and in the other phase items from Experiment 2 (used in making a fine 
occupational discrimination) were presented. All students participated in both
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phases of the experiment, but half were presented with materials from 
Experiment 1 followed by those from Experiment 2 and the remaining students 
were presented with the same materials in the reverse order. This was achieved 
by having participants in each laboratory class view one of two video screens. 
The screens were placed back-to-back in the middle of the class facing opposite 
ends of the room. As students entered the room they were directed to sit in front 
of one of these screens. This randomized group assignment and also kept the 
number of participants viewing each video approximately equal.
Two tests were used to examine memory. Half of the participants (i.e., 3 
classes) received indirect tests of higher-level knowledge and the other half 
received direct tests of higher-level knowledge. The type of test employed was 
the same in both phases of the experiment in each subject. Different 
occupational lists were used depending on the nature of the test. When memory 
was tested indirectly participants received occupational lists that contained the 
four studied professions. When memory was tested directly participants received 
occupational lists that contained only two higher-level professions.
At the start of the experiment participants were told that there were two 
phases to the experiment and that in each phase their memory about people and 
number sequences was going to be examined. They were asked to attend to the 
video screen on which they would see a series of face-occupation associations. 
Participants were told that their task was to remember these associations and that 
their memory for these associations could be tested in a variety of ways. They 
could either be asked to remember the specific occupations or more general 
information about them. The first set of face-occupation associations (either 
from Experiment 1 or Experiment 2) was then presented.
Immediately following presentation of face-occupation associations, 
participants were given a distractor task — the digit-span subtest from the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1981). Instead of 
responding verbally, they were asked to write their responses down. They were
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encouraged to list as many digits in the sequence as they could remember. In the 
case of digits backwards, they were instructed to be honest when writing their 
responses, starting with the last digit from left to right and not from right to left. 
Apart from these modifications, administration of the task was consistent with 
standardized procedure. This distractor task, took about 10 minutes to 
administer. After it had been completed, participants were shown the faces they 
had seen earlier and were told to identify the occupations of each person whose 
face they were shown using the list of professions provided. They were 
encouraged to provide a response for every item and if they could not remember 
the occupation they were instructed to guess.
This entire procedure (study, distractor and test) was repeated in the 
second phase of the experiment with a different set of face-occupation 
associations (i.e., if stimulus materials from Experiment 2 were presented first 
then participants were presented with stimulus materials from Experiment 1 or 
vice versa) and a different version of the digit-span test. In this phase the digit 
span subtest from the Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1987) was 
used. Because there were fewer items in this version of the digit-span test, four 
number sequences containing eight digits were added to the test — two were 
added to the digits forward component of the task and two were added to the 
digits backward component of the task.
Results and Discussion
Results for the two types of discrimination, coarse (i.e., repetition of 
Experiment 1) and fine (i.e., repetition of Experiment 2), will be discussed 
separately to facilitate comparison with results from amnesic patients. Figures 
9.2 and 9.3 are both relevant to the discussion of results from coarse and fine 
discrimination tasks. Figure 9.2 shows results for indirect tests of knowledge for 
higher-level categorization. The top panel of this figure shows within-category 
performance for each type of discrimination and the bottom panel shows 
between-category performance. Figure 9.3 shows results for both direct and
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Figure 9.2 Indirect measures of higher-level knowledge in a 
non-clinical group.
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Figure 9.3 Comparison of direct and indirect measures of higher-level 
knowledge in a non-clinical group.
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indirect tests of knowledge for higher-level categorization. In this figure, 
memory performance is measured by a percentage of correct responses and the 
dotted line shows the point at which the score was significantly better than 
chance.
(i) Coarse occupational discrimination (Level I/II): The left side of Figures 9.2 
and 9.3 show the distributions of judgements involved in coarse discrimination of 
occupational categories. The critical question was whether accuracy of between- 
category judgements would be better than accuracy of within-category 
judgements. As indicated in Figures 9.2 (top panel, left side) and 9.3 (left side) 
participants performed above chance in making within-category judgements on 
both direct and indirect tests (i.e., direct: t(52) = 16.89, p < .0001; indirect: t(57)
= 5.93, p < .001). This means that unlike our clinical sample, our non-impaired 
sample could remember the specific professions associated with the faces. This 
was in spite of the limited exposure to these materials during study.
Nevertheless, there was evidence of superior memory for generalities in 
the non-clinical sample. Discrimination of occupations was better at the more 
general level of classification (i.e., at Level I) as evidenced by response 
confusions. Accuracy was measured in terms of the proportion of correct 
responses for each type of discrimination — for between-category judgements 
correct-category responses were divided by the total number of responses and for 
within-category judgements correct responses were divided by the number of 
correct-category responses. Accuracy of between-category judgements was 
significantly better than accuracy of within-category judgements (t(57) = 10.13, p 
< .0001). That is, participants were better at differentiating educators from 
tradespeople than they were in differentiating subtypes of educators and subtypes 
of tradespeople.
These findings indicate that the performance of non-clinical participants 
was similar to that observed in amnesic patients when making a coarse 
discrimination (i.e., in Experiment 1). In both cases there was a clear superiority
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in discriminating faces at the higher-level occupational grouping. However, 
unlike patients, our non-clinical sample could also identify lower-level 
occupations.
(ii) Fine occupational discrimination (Level II/III): The right side of Figures 9.2 
and 9.3 show judgements for the more refined occupational discrimination. As 
was the case for coarse discrimination, participants were significantly better than 
chance in discriminating faces on the basis of the specific occupations they had 
studied both on direct (t(52) = 10.97, p < .0001) and indirect (t(57) = 7.25, p < 
.001) tests of knowledge. Thus, irrespective of the type of test, participants 
accurately discriminated lower-level occupations involving subtypes of teacher 
and subtypes of lecturer.
However, in this case, no difference was found in the accuracy of 
between- and within-category judgements (t(57) = 0.66, ns) and this result 
differs from that observed in the coarse discrimination task. Thus, the non- 
clinical participants were no better in discriminating faces at the higher-level than 
they were in discriminating them at the lower-level. This pattern of performance 
contrasts with that observed in amnesic patients for the same type of 
discrimination (i.e., in Experiment 2). Amnesic patients had greater difficulty 
discriminating faces at the higher-level occupational grouping as their memory 
for generalities was only better than chance on several trials. Two factors may 
have contributed to the pattern of performance observed in these groups. It is 
possible that the professions studied at Level II/III (i.e., subtypes of teacher and 
subtypes of lecturer) were more meaningful for the non-clinical group and hence 
more salient. Educator-related professions may have been particularly important 
to these participants because they were university students and this may have 
increased the accuracy with which they recalled these particular face-occupation 
associations. At the same time, another factor may have contributed to the poor 
performance of amnesic patients in this condition. For them, the professions 
involved in the fine discrimination (i.e., Level II/III) may have been less
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meaningful than those involved in the coarse discrimination (i.e., Level I/II). For 
people outside of the education system, subtypes of teacher and lecturer may 
have more attributes in common than subtypes of educator and trade. This may 
have increased the difficulty in associating the professions with faces even at the 
higher-level of generality.
A second analysis was conducted comparing performance in the two 
discrimination tasks (i.e., coarse and fine) to address the issue of what 
constitutes a "generality". This analysis paralleled that used in Experiment 2.
The teacher/lecturer discrimination was a low-level categorization in the coarse 
discrimination task and a high-level categorization in the fine discrimination task. 
Educator-related items only were included in this analysis (i.e., trade-related 
items at Level I/II were excluded). The ability to discriminate teachers from 
lecturers was significantly better in the fine discrimination task, where this 
distinction represented a higher-level of categorisation (t(57) = 2.58, p < .05). 
Thus, as was the case with amnesic patients, the ability of the non-clinical sample 
to discriminate teachers from lecturers improved with a change in study context. 
Performance was best when the teacher/lecturer distinction represented the 
general level of categorization in a context where subtypes of teacher and lecturer 
were studied. This result provides further evidence against the role of an 
absolute level in the taxonomic hierarchy determining "generality" (e.g., basic 
level categories). Rather, it suggests that "generality" is relative and that it is 
influenced by the context in which information is encountered.
Finally, the influence of test type (direct or indirect) on memory 
performance was examined. In the coarse discrimination task, accuracy of 
responding on direct and indirect tests of higher-level categorization was 77%.
In the fine discrimination task participants identified 67% of occupations 
correctly in indirect tests and 65% in direct tests. A 2x2, level x test type, 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of level (F(l, 109) = 71.94, p < .0001) only. 
Thus, irrespective of the type of test administered, memory performance was best
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when knowledge at the top of our occupational hierarchy was examined. In fact, 
the type of test had no influence on memory performance at all. Non-clinical 
participants were just as accurate in identifying professions when tested 
indirectly as they were when tested directly. This result is of considerable 
interest in view of the findings of Experiment 3, and it clarifies the influence of 
response mode in producing the generalities effect. In the amnesic patients clear 
evidence of the generalities phenomenon was only found in the indirect tests of 
higher-level knowledge, and this raised the possibility that the apparent 
preservation of memory for generalities in the earlier experiments was a 
consequence of testing method. However, the results obtained with the non- 
clinical sample indicate that superior memory for generalities is not simply a 
consequence of indirect testing. If it were, then differences should also have 
been found in performance on these two tests in non-clinical subjects.
We can draw several conclusions from results of this experiment. First, 
non-clinical participants show better memory for generalities than specifics under 
suboptimal learning conditions. That is, the generalities phenomenon is not 
confined to the brain-injured. Second, like amnesic patients, non-clinical 
participants also showed improvement in memory performance with a change in 
study context. However, the performance of non-clinical participants did not 
mirror that of amnesic patients in one important respect. Mode of testing had no 
effect at all on the memory performance of our non-clinical sample although it 
had a substantial influence (at least in Experiment 1) on the performance of our 
amnesic patients. This suggests that preservation of memory for generalities in 
amnesic patients is not simply a consequence of poor memory. It is likely that 
another feature of amnesic memory is responsible for producing the difference 
observed on the direct and indirect tests, though it is not clear what this feature 
may be.
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Chapter 10
Preserved memory for generalities in amnesia: 
Conclusions
10.1 Overview
This thesis has examined an aspect of residual memory in amnesia. The 
phenomenon investigated involves the dissociation of higher-level category 
knowledge from exemplar knowledge and is described here as preservation of 
memory for generalities. This phenomenon has previously been demonstrated in 
certain forms of dementia. The present research showed that the effect also 
occurs in both anterograde and retrograde amnesia. This finding is important as 
it indicates that the generalities phenomenon is not restricted to pre-existing 
knowledge. Furthermore, the effect also presents in non-impaired individuals 
when partial learning has been induced. Thus, it appears that, irrespective of 
pathology, when knowledge is imperfect superior memory for generalities is 
manifested.
A number of specific conclusions were drawn from results of the 
experiments investigating this phenomenon. These are summarised in Table 
10.1. Caution is required in interpretation of some of these findings, largely due 
to limitations in both the sample size (i.e., of amnesic patients) and the number of 
items used to examine knowledge. While several firm conclusions can be drawn 
about the occurrence of the phenomenon in both forms of amnesia at 
intermediate levels of "generality", those concerning the role of context and 
evidence of the phenomenon at lower levels of "generality" (e.g., at the level of 
teacher/lecturer) are more speculative.
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There are five issues arising from these results and these concern:
• evidence of the generalities phenomenon in old and new memory,
• the influence of direct and indirect testing,
• the role of context,
• the presence of the phenomenon in non-clinical populations, and
• differential access to knowledge about people in response to faces and 
names.
While the latter finding is peripheral to the present investigation into preserved 
memory for generalities, it requires some explanation given its importance to 
models of face recognition.
Evidence of superior memory for generalities in both the amnesic patients 
and the non-impaired might highlight nothing more than a quantitative difference 
between the clinical and non-clinical groups. However, there was one aspect of 
amnesic performance that clearly differentiated this group from the non-impaired 
and, indeed, from dementia sufferers. At intermediate levels of "generality" the 
amnesic patients accessed more information on indirect measures of higher-level 
knowledge than they did on direct measures. No difference was found on this 
dimension in the non-impaired group and reports of the phenomenon in dementia 
indicate that these patients can provide intermediate level "generalities" in 
response to direct questions (e.g., Funnell, 1995; Hodges et al., 1994; Martin, 
1987). Although there were other issues arising from results of the present 
research, this difference in performance on direct and indirect tests is critical in 
differentiating the memory disturbance in amnesia from other manifestations of 
poor memory.
Explanations of preserved memory for generalities in dementia have 
some bearing on its occurrence in amnesia. There are two main theories
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proposed to explain the phenomenon in dementia7. According to the 
familiarity/frequency account (Funnell, 1995), exemplar knowledge is more 
vulnerable to damage due to its reduced representational strength. It is proposed 
that this arises from its low frequency of occurrence in language. No 
assumptions of selective vulnerability are made in the alternative theory, referred 
to as the fragmentary knowledge account. In this case it is argued that the 
residual "fragmentary" representation that results from damage is sufficient to 
support more general-level, but not specific-level, knowledge (e.g., Hodges et al., 
1995). The two theories differ in that the fragmentary knowledge account 
assumes that the loss of information is random. The superior performance with 
generalities occurs because this level of representation can be accessed from a 
reduced data base.
Either of these theories could be appropriate in consideration of preserved 
remote memory for generalities in RA, as this form of amnesia (like dementia) 
involves damage to pre-existing representations. However, some modification is 
required to explain findings from patients with AA. Assumptions about the 
formation or retrieval of memory traces (e.g., that patients form fragmentary 
representations) must be made for accounts of a "fragmentary knowledge" type 
or a "familiarity/frequency" type to be applied. Theories of amnesia, while not 
particularly relevant to the generalities phenomenon, also have some bearing on 
specific issues arising from results of this investigation. The relevant accounts 
involve the semantic-episodic and the implicit-explicit distinctions as well as the
7 Collins and Quillian's hierarchical model was considered earlier in Chapter 3 
for historical reasons. It is not included in the present discussion because there is 
considerable evidence that suggests it does not provide a plausible account of 
semantic memory structure (e.g., Barsalou, 1987; Rips et al., 1973).
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contextual memory deficit hypothesis. These will be considered in discussion of 
specific issues in the following section.
10.2 General theoretical implications of findings
10.2.1 Which knowledge domain?
Before considering the theoretical implications of the results, it is 
important to consider the knowledge domain or system involved in these 
experiments. This is because confusion may arise when comparing memory for 
generalities in amnesia with that observed in patients suffering from dementia.
As with investigations of the generalities phenomenon in dementia, the tasks 
used in the present studies involved semantic memory because the experiments 
focused on examination of factual knowledge about people. However, the 
present work differs from the work with dementia in terms of the aspect of 
semantic knowledge targeted. In dementia, the reported preservation of memory 
for generalities results from a gradual deterioration of the concepts themselves. 
This is not the case in the present study. It was clear that amnesic patients had no 
conceptual difficulty with the faces, names or occupations used in the 
experiments. They understood occupational relationships (e.g., that a violinist is 
a musician and an entertainer) and had knowledge of the general structure of 
faces and the connotation of names. In these experiments, the generalities 
phenomenon resulted from a difficulty in associating lower-level attributes with 
a person's face or name — not from a deficiency in processing these particular 
concepts. The effects reported here do not concern a deficit in semantic memory 
per se.
At a superficial level it might be argued that the deficit in anterograde 
amnesia lies in the formation of these associations, while that in retrograde 
amnesia results from the loss of these associations. While other sources of 
disruption are possible (e.g., the deficit could be located in retrieval of 
associations), the point of this discussion is to highlight the fact that the nature of
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the memory breakdown in the two patient groups differs. Having said this 
though, it is still possible that the same fundamental mechanism is involved in 
producing differential memory for high- and low-level information in both 
patient groups. It is possible that the same process is operating but that it is 
affecting different aspects of knowledge (i.e., the concepts themselves versus 
associations between concepts) in the different patient groups.
10.2.2 Explaining preservation of memory for generalities in amnesia
The two main theories proposed to explain the differentiation between 
categorical and exemplar knowledge in dementia — the familiarity/frequency 
and fragmentary knowledge accounts — are the most relevant to the present 
investigation of a similar phenomenon in amnesia. As several accounts of 
amnesia are pertinent to particular findings, they will be considered in a 
subsequent section addressing each of these issues. It will be seen that some of 
these theories are consistent with our observations and some are not. A summary 
of this is presented in Table 10.2.
Familiaritv/frequencv
One account of the dissociation of categorical from exemplar knowledge 
in dementia is provided by Funnell (1995) who attributes this to the selective 
vulnerability of items that are lower in familiarity or frequency. It is argued that 
item-specific information is relatively poorly represented in memory and hence is 
more vulnerable to destruction. Accordingly, knowledge about flowers may be 
preserved relative to that concerning a specific type of flower (e.g., daffodil) 
because the former concept has been encountered with greater frequency than the 
latter.
In applying a theory of this type to investigations of AA we must bear in 
mind that the present amnesic patients showed a deficiency in the formation of 
novel associations between occupations and faces. There was no evidence that 
our patients had deficits in visual perception or semantic memory (see Chapter
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5). An account based solely on familiarity or frequency therefore does not 
explain the differentiation found between high- and low-level knowledge. Our 
patients were never presented with the higher-level occupational categories 
during study. Even if other sources of vulnerability (apart from familiarity and 
frequency) can be identified, there remains the fundamental problem of 
explaining preservation of knowledge about concepts that were not explicitly 
learned. Thus, in the present experiments, the effects of familiarity and 
frequency, or any other factor which might make higher-level categories less 
vulnerable, are irrelevant.
A frequency-based account is more successful in explaining the results of 
the experiments examining remote memory for generalities in the patient with 
RA. Knowledge of the general attributes about a famous person (e.g., that they 
are famous and an entertainer) may be preserved because they have been 
encountered with greater frequency. For example, after damage to their memory 
a person may retain the fact that John McEnroe is famous because on every 
occasion he was encountered (i.e., on television, radio, etc.) his status as a 
famous person was highlighted. On the other hand, the fact that he is a tennis 
player may not have been salient on every occasion. As a result, the person's 
ability to recall the latter attribute may be impaired because it has been 
encountered on fewer occasions and hence is more vulnerable to destruction. 
However, this type of argument breaks down when memory for face-name 
associations is considered. It could be argued that names are encountered with 
greater frequency than faces. In the case of famous people, a person's name can 
be encountered on the radio or in a newspaper with no reference to their face. 
Similarly, the name of a family member may come up in conversation without 
exposure to their face. From this, one might predict that knowledge for face- 
name associations should be better than that for associations between faces and 
other higher-level attributes. Yet in both public and autobiographical domains, 
the one patient we studied with RA failed to make face-name associations despite
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having access to knowledge of associations at the more general levels. As was 
the case for new learning then, a frequency-based account fails to provide an 
adequate explanation of the pattern of residual knowledge in RA.
Fragmentary knowledge
An account of the fragmentary knowledge type fares better in explaining 
the present findings in both temporal domains. Such an account could be applied 
to new learning if it is supposed that patients acquire only an arbitrary subset of 
the semantic features of items encountered during study (e.g., target materials or 
context). For example, in learning to pair a face with a "teacher" (as in 
Experiment 1), a normal subject may form associations between the face and a 
range of education-related semantic attributes, including those which specify the 
occupation as teacher rather than lecturer. In the case of amnesia the attributes 
acquired may be limited, perhaps representing a subset of those available to a 
non-impaired subject. If amnesics form only a partial set of associations, then 
their knowledge may be sufficient to support higher-level but not lower-level 
categorical distinctions. Thus, the partial set of attributes may have been 
sufficient to exclude non-educational occupations (i.e., to discriminate educators 
from trades), but not to distinguish subtypes of educator.
The fragmentary knowledge account can also be applied to pre-existing 
knowledge. Assuming that the memory loss in retrograde amnesia is partial, then 
the residual knowledge may be sufficient to support high-level but not low-level 
associations. For example, a patient with impaired remote memory may retain 
knowledge that Mel Gibson is an actor (see Figure 10.1), this would be sufficient 
to support fame judgements. However, this knowledge may not help to 
discriminate him from another actor. Irrespective of the combination of 
attributes retained, partial knowledge is more likely to facilitate accuracy on tests 
of higher-level knowledge.
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Mel Gibson
actor
-fcethal Weapon
Figure 10.1 A hypothetical fragmentary representation of Mel Gibson
[Note: despite loss of particular details, sufficient information 
remains to support performance on tests of higher-level knowledge]
Of these theories, only an account of the fragmentary knowledge type is 
able to explain the preservation of memory for generalities in both retrograde and 
anterograde amnesia. In both temporal domains partial knowledge is sufficient 
to support performance on tests of "generality" without making assumptions 
about the structure or vulnerability of particular memory representations. 
Importantly, a theory developed to explain a phenomenon previously believed to 
characterize particular forms of dementia is successful in accounting for a similar 
phenomenon in amnesia.
10.2.3 Specific issues arising from the results
Preservation of old and new memory for generalities
In dementia, the dissociation of exemplar from categorical knowledge 
seemingly results from a gradual deterioration to pre-existing knowledge. 
However, in amnesia the memory disturbance can affect both remote and newly 
acquired knowledge and thus, the generalities phenomenon was investigated in
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both temporal domains. The experiments reported in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are 
relevant to this issue and their results indicated that both anterograde and 
retrograde amnesics remembered higher-level category membership better than 
lower-level category membership.
The clearest example of preserved memory for generalities in AA was 
provided in Experiment 1. Here patients were asked to remember specific face- 
occupation associations (comprising teachers, lecturers, electricians and 
plumbers) but they were only successful in discriminating studied people on the 
basis of higher-level occupational groupings (i.e., educator, tradesperson). In 
other words, their memory for general-level information about face-occupation 
associations was preserved and person-specific knowledge was impaired. This 
pattern of preserved memory for generalities in new learning was confirmed in 
Experiments 4 and 5 which examined knowledge at a range of levels, from the 
very general to the very specific. Again, the same pattern of differential memory 
performance was found, with higher-level information remembered better than 
lower-level detail. Thus, amnesic patients demonstrated the same pattern of 
preserved memory for generalities previously reported in dementia, but for them 
this pattern was manifested in relation to material acquired after the onset of 
memory disturbance.
To determine whether the generalities phenomenon occurred in retrograde 
amnesia, another series of experiments was conducted with the one patient who 
suffered from this form of the disturbance. In the domain of remote public 
memory (i.e., in Experiment 8), knowledge at the most general levels was 
retained and that at more specific levels was impaired. Although the amount of 
knowledge the patient could access about people from their faces and names 
differed, the same pattern of preserved memory for generalities was found with 
both cue types. A similar pattern of preserved autobiographical memory for 
generalities was found in Experiment 6 in response to face cues. In this 
experiment the patient accurately discriminated people at the most general levels
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examined (i.e., supporting familiarity judgements and discrimination of 
personally known from famous people) but failed to make more specific 
discriminations. Thus, in one patient, evidence of preserved memory for 
generalities was found in relation to material acquired before the onset of 
amnesia.
Given that the generalities phenomenon presents in both anterograde and 
retrograde amnesia, it is appropriate to ask whether this has any implications for 
the relationship between these two forms of memory disturbance. If the 
preservation of memory for generalities is considered to be a characteristic 
feature of amnesia then it might be argued that retrograde and anterograde 
amnesia are different manifestations of the same syndrome because they share a 
common residual memory profile (i.e., preservation of higher-level knowledge 
and impairment of lower-level knowledge). However, the evidence suggests that 
the generalities phenomenon is not unique to particular conditions. It has now 
been demonstrated in dementia, amnesia and in a non-impaired sample. This 
suggests that the phenomenon occurs whenever there is a deficiency in memory, 
irrespective of whether past or newly acquired knowledge is involved. If the 
generalities phenomenon is characteristic of memory in general, it tells us 
nothing about the relationship between retrograde and anterograde amnesia.
An important question is whether acquisition or retention of partial 
knowledge can be accommodated within existing accounts of amnesia. One 
account which might be invoked to explain acquisition of partial knowledge in 
amnesia is based on a distinction between semantic and episodic memory. 
Superficially, the partial learning observed in our patients is consistent with the 
argument that semantic memory is preserved in these patients. Patients learned 
to associate novel faces with existing knowledge concerning occupations. To 
that extent the new learning was supported by semantic memory (given that the 
novel information acquired was factual) and by pre-existing knowledge (given 
that the occupations were known to patients prior to the onset of their amnesia).
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However, the semantic-episodic distinction does not address the observed 
differentiation between higher- and lower-level knowledge. Accordingly, this 
account provides no basis on which to expect that associations with specific 
occupations would be more difficult to acquire, given both higher- and lower- 
level occupations were known to the patients.
In addition, the semantic-episodic distinction has little to offer as an 
explanation of partial knowledge in retrograde amnesia. All tests of remote 
memory required participants to access semantic knowledge, irrespective of 
whether high- or low-level information was involved. Preservation of high-level 
semantic knowledge together with impairment of low-level semantic knowledge 
cannot be explained by an intact semantic memory system.
Performance on direct and indirect tests of higher-level knowledge
In Chapter 6 it was shown that amnesic memory performance was 
influenced by the type of response, direct or indirect, engaged at test. While 
patients could not discriminate between people on the basis of studied 
occupations (e.g., involving teachers, lecturers, electricians and plumbers in 
Experiment 1), their response confusions indicated that they had acquired 
sufficient knowledge to discriminate between them in terms of their higher-level 
occupational groupings (i.e., as educators or tradespeople). In this case 
examination of knowledge at the higher-level was indirect because no reference 
was made to these occupations. However, patients failed to make the same 
discrimination when questioned directly about higher-level occupational 
membership in Experiment 3. Similarly, indirect tests facilitated access to 
remote autobiographical information that was not available under direct testing 
(i.e., in Experiment 7).
These findings suggested that the generalities phenomenon itself, as 
demonstrated in Experiment 1, might be a consequence of testing procedure. 
However, this explanation was discounted on the basis of results from the 
experiments reported in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. In Chapters 7 and 8, it was shown
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that amnesic patients were capable of accessing higher-level knowledge in 
response to direct questions when the information elicited was sufficiently 
general (i.e., at intermediate levels of "generality"). In Experiments 4 and 5, two 
patients accessed higher-level information about novel people directly. Results 
from the third patient (i.e., TG) were not conclusive as she was only accurate 
when making familiarity judgements that could have been supported by either 
implicit or explicit knowledge. In Experiments 6 and 8, there was evidence of 
direct access to higher-level autobiographical and public knowledge in the one 
patient who suffered from retrograde amnesia. Together these findings indicate 
that the generalities phenomenon cannot be attributed to testing conditions alone.
The results of Experiment 9 provide additional support for the notion that 
preservation of memory for generalities is not simply a consequence of testing 
procedure. This study was essentially a replication of the first three experiments 
with non-clinical participants. As was the case with amnesic patients, non- 
clinical participants remembered general information better than specific detail. 
However, in this case there was no difference in performance on direct and 
indirect tests of higher-level knowledge. If the generalities effect were solely a 
function of indirect testing then a difference should have been observed between 
the two methods of testing.
One theory from the amnesia literature, based on the distinction between 
implicit and explicit memory, was considered in Chapter 6 as a possible 
explanation of amnesic performance on direct and indirect tests. The possibility 
was considered that enhanced memory performance on indirect tests might have 
been due to the implicit nature of the task — the latter being a well-established 
means of demonstrating knowledge in these patients. Amnesic performance on 
the indirect tests could be seen as an example of implicit memory in that 
knowledge was implied indirectly in the patients' response confusions. Although 
patients could not remember studied occupations, their errors indicated they had 
knowledge of their higher-level category membership. For example, patients
196
tended to confuse the occupations "teacher" and "lecturer" when presented with 
the face of an educator, but rarely responded with "plumber" or "electrician". 
However, our indirect tests differ from other demonstrations of implicit memory 
in amnesia as they required patients to remember studied occupations explicitly 
(In fact, given patients were consciously engaged in the task at the time of test, 
the present indirect tests are more like those used to demonstrate covert 
recognition in patients with prosopagnosia (e.g., de Haan, Young and 
Newcombe, 1987; Tranel & Damasio, 1985)). The "implicit" evidence of 
memory here is provided by the nature of errors in explicit recall. A catch-all 
appeal to an "implicit" memory is not a satisfactory explanation of this effect. As 
indicated earlier in a review of the amnesia literature (i.e., in Chapter 2), implicit 
memory phenomena are disparate. The present findings, together with those 
reviewed earlier, underline the point that every form of implicit memory requires 
its own explanation.
Irrespective of the type of test, amnesic patients showed better memory 
for general category membership than they did for lower-level category 
membership. The difficulty lies in explaining why they could access knowledge 
at the highest levels on direct tests (e.g., familiarity in the case of one patient in 
Experiment 4) and at intermediate levels on indirect tests (e.g., involving 
discrimination of educators from tradespeople in Experiment 1). In one sense the 
direct and indirect tests are similar — they both examined knowledge about 
occupations explicitly. However, the cues provided in the two types of test 
differed and these might tap different aspects of the stored information (cf. study- 
test mismatch, see Bransford, Franks, Morris & Stein, 1979). In the indirect tests 
the occupations presented at study and test were the same, but in the direct tests 
the recognition cues provided at test differed from those encountered at study.
As a result of studying four specific occupations (e.g., teachers, lecturers, 
electricians and plumbers), higher-level category membership (i.e., educators, 
tradespeople) might be highlighted in an effort to distinguish the professions. By
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presenting the same four occupations at test (i.e., indirect tests) the associative 
pathway between specific and general occupations created at the time of 
encoding could be retraced, leading to a facilitation in memory performance. 
Such a mechanism cannot support performance on direct tests as no associative 
pathway can be formed with occupations that were not encountered at study.
Preservation of memory for generalities and the role of context
In Experiment 1 patients acquired sufficient knowledge to discriminate 
educators from tradespeople but not between subtypes of educator and subtypes 
of tradesperson. One interpretation of this result is that learning of novel 
associations is restricted to a particular level of knowledge — in this case, that 
involving educators and tradespeople. What determined the level of 
categorization which could and could not be acquired? The studied occupations 
in this experiment (i.e., teachers, lecturers, electricians and plumbers) are 
arguably "basic" Roschian categories (e.g., Rosch et al., 1976), and it is possible 
that new learning in amnesia is confined to the superordinate categories of 
educator and tradesperson.
It is also possible that the "higher" and "lower" level status of particular 
categories was defined by the study context — that is, by the specific stimulus 
sets used in the experiment. The presentation of teachers and lecturers in the 
context of plumbers and electricians, may have served to highlight a distinction 
between educators and tradespeople. Yet a different distinction would be 
required if differences between subtypes of teacher and subtypes of lecturer are 
to be remembered. According to this analysis, knowledge at any level in a 
taxonomic hierarchy can be high or low depending on the learning conditions.
These alternatives were investigated in Experiment 2 and results 
indicated that for at least one patient the ability to discriminate teachers from 
lecturers changed with a modification in study context. When the 
teacher/lecturer distinction represented the lower-level detail (i.e., in Experiment 
1) both patients failed to differentiate people on this basis. However, when it
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represented the higher-level categorization (i.e., in the context of subtypes of 
teacher and subtypes of lecturer) one patient was capable of making the 
discrimination. For this patient knowledge of the association between people and 
the teacher/lecturer distinction was available in one study context and not 
another. This suggests that there is nothing special about any one level of 
knowledge.
The one theory from the amnesia literature which is central to this issue 
of context-sensitivity is the contextual memory deficit hypothesis. According to 
this theory, the memory deficit in amnesia arises from a failure to process the 
contextual aspects of information. However, our findings are inconsistent with 
this view. In Experiment 1 one patient (i.e., TG) did not discriminate between 
teachers and lecturers when these were embedded in a broad learning set. Yet in 
Experiment 2 there was evidence that she could discriminate at this level within a 
narrow learning set confined to educators and comprising subclasses of teacher 
and lecturer. It was suggested that the change in memory performance might be 
explained in terms of a shift in encoding strategy employed (cf. Baddeley's 
notion of intrinsic context discussed in Chapter 2). Contrary to the contextual 
memory deficit hypothesis, the mere fact that there was evidence of improvement 
indicates that the patient could process contextual information.
Context sensitivity is, however, compatible with a fragmentary 
knowledge type account. As alluded to earlier, we might suppose that one effect 
of shifting to a narrow learning set in the second experiment was that it induced 
the patient to encode the associations in terms of more specific semantic 
attributes than those used in Experiment 1 (i.e., attributes which would 
distinguish primary school teachers from secondary school teachers). In 
Experiment 2, as in Experiment 1, a fragmentary representation of this form 
would allow confusions between members of the most similar occupational 
categories (primary/secondary teachers) while preventing confusions between 
members of less similar occupations (primary school teachers/lecturers). In other
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words, the same mechanism could be operating in both experiments but on 
semantic representations at different levels of specificity.
Superior memory for generalities in the non-impaired
Experiments 1 to 8 provided evidence of preserved memory for 
generalities in amnesic patients. Experiment 9 indicated, using the same 
techniques, that the effect can also occur in a non-clinical population when it is 
subjected to suboptimal learning conditions. As noted earlier, this supports a 
range of evidence which suggests that under conditions of poor memory, normal 
individuals tend to remember general information better than specific details 
(e.g., Bransford & Franks, 1971; Yarmey, 1973).
Given that preserved memory for generalities occurs in non-clinical 
populations, it could be argued that it is simply a property of poor memory 
representation, irrespective of their cause. In this case, why is it of interest that 
the effect occurred in amnesic patients? It is of interest in that it shows that 
material which superficially appears lost, is available to the patients at an abstract 
level. This finding clearly bears on any explanation of amnesia and it carries 
implications for the assessment of amnesic memory. The effect in amnesic 
patients is also of interest for two other reasons. First, the type of test (i.e., direct 
and indirect) influenced the performance of amnesic patients but not controls. 
Second, amnesic patients showed a pattern of residual knowledge which was not 
found in the non-impaired group. In amnesia, impairment of specific knowledge 
was found in the context of preserved general-level knowledge. Although the 
non-impaired group remembered general information better than specific details, 
their performance at the two levels of categorization was intact. Thus, while the 
phenomenon can be described as preserved memory for generalities in amnesia, 
it is best classified as superior memory for generalities in the non-impaired.
A parsimonious assumption is that the superior acquired memory for 
generalities observed in the non-impaired group is supported by the same
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mechanisms as that seen in AA. On this basis, the presence of the effect in the 
non-impaired enables us to exclude one suggested explanation for the effect seen 
in clinical patients. The possibility that the generalities phenomenon is simply a 
product of testing procedure can be discounted as in the non-clinical group 
indirect measures were no more effective than direct ones in accessing 
knowledge. This finding suggests that the preservation of memory for 
generalities observed in amnesia is not simply a consequence of poor memory. It 
is likely that another feature of amnesic memory is responsible for producing the 
difference observed on direct and indirect tests, though it is not really clear from 
results of the present investigation what this feature may be.
Modality differences in access to information about people
One patient, TG, showed consistent evidence of differential access to 
person-related information via cues presented in different modalities. She 
accessed more information from a person's name than she did from their face. 
This was found in Experiment 6, which investigated autobiographical memory 
for generalities. It was confirmed in Experiment 8, which investigated remote 
knowledge in the public domain. This is particularly striking since the 
information requested at the point of memory failure with faces was identical to 
that with names and yet the details provided in response to the latter cue were 
accurate.
The differential performance with faces and names was unexpected. This 
modality-based differentiation, while not central to theories of amnesia, is 
relevant to theories of person recognition. In particular, differences in the 
amount of information accessible via faces and names challenge current theories 
which propose a unitary semantic information store. A current model of the 
different stages involved in face and name recognition is outlined below. Its 
capacity to explain TG's performance will then be considered.
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A lunctional model of the stages involved in person recognition
There have been a several important developments in modelling the 
processes involved in recognizing and recalling information about people. Early 
models of person recognition focused primarily on the processes involved in 
recognizing people from their faces (Bruce & Young, 1986; Hay & Young,
1982). Subsequent models have addressed additional features of person 
recognition, and in particular, the involvement of names in the recognition 
process (Bredart, Valentine, Caldor & Gassi, 1995; Burton & Bruce, 1992, 1993; 
Burton, Bruce & Johnston, 1990; Valentine Bredart, Lawson & Ward, 1991). In 
general, there seems to be agreement over the main components involved in 
person recognition, though the internal organisation of these components remains 
a point of contention.
Several stages are believed to be involved in the process of recognizing a 
person and the main components are shown in the model illustrated in Figure 
10.2. The first stage of processing involves the formation of a representation that 
contains a visual description of a seen face. This is compared with all known 
faces which are believed to be contained in the face recognition units. Name 
recognition units serve a similar function to face recognition units, but are stored 
separately. From the next stage, which involves accessing semantic information 
specific to individuals (i.e., identity-specific semantics/person identity nodes), 
both sets of recognition units access common knowledge. It was initially 
suggested that the recognition units were involved in perceiving a person as 
familiar (Hay & Young, 1982). However, this recognition process has since been 
attributed to the person identity nodes (Burton et al., 1990). This is because 
information from a variety of sources (e.g., faces, names, voices) can support 
familiarity judgements and placing this function in a set of units common to all 
modalities eliminates redundant processing. Name retrieval occurs subsequent to 
recognition via this biographical route.
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Figure 10.2 The central features of the functional model of person 
recognition adapted from Valentine et al. (1991) and 
illustrated in Green and Hodges (1996).
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Explaining modality differences in access to knowledge
TG's results in two experiments (i.e., Experiments 6 and 8) can be 
considered in light of the current functional model of person recognition (refer to 
Figure 10.2). In Experiment 6, TG accessed sufficient autobiographical 
information from names to respond accurately to all the questions asked. Thus, 
her results with name cues suggested that the pathway from name recognition 
units to those containing semantic information was preserved. However, this was 
not the case with her responses to face cues where she failed to provide any 
accurate information beyond Level II. While performance at Level I only 
required a familiarity judgement, that at Level II required additional knowledge 
that would allow discrimination between famous people and those known 
personally to TG. In this case, both groups of people were familiar to the patient. 
TG indicated that she was familiar with the famous faces in her responses to 
questions at Level II, noting that while she would have liked them to be either 
family or friends, they were neither. To respond accurately at this level TG 
would have needed to access details from the semantic information units. If 
she could access some of this information in response to face cues, it is not clear 
why she could not access additional semantic details from this store. Moreover, 
as specific semantic details were accessible with names, it is difficult to explain 
why these details were not available with faces as well. In the model illustrated 
in Figure 10.2, this information is common to both modalities.
Similar difficulties are encountered in explaining TG's performance in 
Experiment 8, which examined knowledge in the public domain. In that 
experiment TG could only access sufficient information in response to faces to 
support fame judgements. Yet when presented with famous names, she accessed 
enough additional information to allow her to discriminate between people 
according to their basic occupational category (i.e., to discriminate actors from 
sportspeople). If familiarity is extracted from the person-identity nodes, then 
TG's deficit in the case of faces must occur after this point in the recognition
204
process. However, as this route is common to both modalities, her ability to 
access additional semantic information in response to name cues cannot be 
explained.
Bruce and Young's (1986) original proposal, in which it was suggested 
that familiarity occurs at the recognition units (Bruce and Young, 1986), fares 
better in explaining TG's performance with famous people. If the face 
recognition units are involved in recognizing a person as familiar then TG's 
performance can be explained by damage to the connection between these units 
and the person identity nodes. Familiarity is supported by the face recognition 
units and additional information cannot be accessed from faces because these 
units have been disconnected from the rest of the system. The disconnection 
does not affect the name route and hence information can be accessed using this 
cue type.
The problem with the current model of face recognition is that it does not 
account for deficits in access to semantic information in one modality and not 
another. If semantic information is available in response to name cues then it is 
not clear why the same knowledge cannot be accessed in a different modality. It 
is possible that the knowledge contained in each unit is modality-specific. But, 
perhaps a more plausible explanation is that the association between faces and 
semantic attributes is weaker than that between names and semantic attributes. 
We know that TG retained knowledge about faces (because familiar faces were 
recognized) and, at the very least, higher-level semantic information (otherwise 
differential access to knowledge would not have been found). The problem lies 
in explaining why the association between attributes and faces is weaker than 
that with names — a point seemingly problematic for the current model and one 
that needs to be addressed in future research.
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10.3 Final comment
The present investigation into preservation of memory for generalities 
began with the notion that the phenomenon might occur in clinical conditions 
other than dementia. Evidence to support this was found in both anterograde and 
retrograde amnesia. However, it was also found that memory for generalities 
was not restricted to clinical conditions. A non-clinical population remembered 
general information better than specific details when partial learning was 
induced. The preservation of memory for generalities phenomenon is therefore 
not confined to pathological conditions. It appears to occur in any situation 
where memory is imperfect.
The fact that existing theories of amnesia cannot account for preservation 
of memory for generalities is problematic and troubling. The aim of much of the 
greater body of research conducted with amnesics is to develop theories about 
normal memory function based on the pattern of preserved and impaired abilities 
observed in these patients. Because the generalities phenomenon occurs in 
amnesia and is fundamental to our understanding of memory, then it is 
reasonable to expect it to be addressed within theories of amnesia. This does not 
mean that there are no adequate theories of the phenomenon (as the fragmentary 
knowledge account attests), but it highlights the importance of integrating 
theories of memory from various sources.
More important though, is what we have learned about amnesia in the 
process of investigating the generalities phenomenon. It is clear from the present 
findings that amnesic patients can acquire novel memory traces and retain pre­
existing knowledge, but this appears to be confined to fragments of the original 
information. While the actual content of memory traces is unclear, they are 
sufficient to support performance on tests of more general-level knowledge. As 
the fragmentary knowledge account suggests, there is no need to make 
assumptions about the actual content of these traces and indeed, it is most likely 
that they are highly individualized. Furthermore, the partial knowledge
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demonstrated in the present investigation does not appear to be confined to 
particular knowledge domains. It was demonstrated, for example, in the context 
of learning novel semantic associations and under explicit instruction. Thus, 
despite the emphasis in the amnesia literature on identification of intact and 
damaged knowledge domains, results of the present investigation suggest that 
knowledge in any domain might be accessible provided the information 
requested is sufficiently general. Finally, the facilitation in memory performance 
observed in amnesic patients under indirect testing conditions may be 
independent of the generalities phenomenon. The fact it was not evident in a 
non-clinical group suggests it may be a specific feature of amnesic memory and 
not other manifestations of poor memory.
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Appendix 1: Appendices for Experiments reported in Chapter 6
(a) Examples of studied faces used in Experiment 1
226
Plumber Plumber
Electrician Electrician
Teacher Teacher
Lecturer Lecturer
227
(b) Examples of studied faces used in Experiment 2
228
High School 
Teacher
High School 
Teacher
Primary School 
Teacher
Primary School 
Teacher
University
Lecturer
University
Lecturer
TAPE
Lecturer
TAFE
Lecturer
229
Appendix 2: Appendices for Experiments reported in Chapter 7
(a) Examples of studied faces used in Experiment 4
230
Mary Logan 
Primary School 
Teacher
Peter Ritchie 
High School 
Teacher
Patricia Innes 
Violinist
Stephen Carter 
Pianist
Alex Mattick 
Primary School 
Teacher
Barbara Hutchings 
High School 
Teacher
Richard Lacey 
Violinist
Victoria Adams 
Pianist
231
(b) Studied names, studied professions and modified names used
in Experiment 4
Studied Name Studied Profession Modified Name (if used)
Mary Logan primary school teacher Mary Lomas
Wendy Ogden primary school teacher —
Elise Farrell primary school teacher Elise Farrow
Michael Kershaw primary school teacher Michael Kersten
Alex Mattick primary school teacher —
Michelle Luton high school teacher Michelle Lutter
Barbara Hutchings high school teacher —
Gary Harris high school teacher —
Jack Ellwood high school teacher Jack Elkins
Peter Ritchie high school teacher —
Patricia Innes violinist Patricia Inglis
Kathy Driscoll violinist —
Cindy Edwards violinist Cindy Edmund
Richard Lacey violinist Richard Lalor
Phillip Gardner violinist —
Jacqui Palmer pianist —
Victoria Adams pianist Victoria Adler
Stephen Carter pianist Stephen Carson
George Norris pianist —
Matthew Bradfield pianist
232
(c) Examples of non-studied faces used in Experiment 4
233
234
(d) Non-studied names used in Experiment 5
Donna Roland 
Belinda Hyland 
Gail Jory 
Miranda Prosser 
Melinda Urquhart 
Kylie Walton 
Jean Tanner 
Anna Nesbitt 
Janice Foley 
Elinor Felton
Brett Sanders 
Jeremy Cowan 
Greg Molina 
Tod Hansell 
Harry Coleman 
Craig Lucas 
Wayne Leighton 
Darren Horder 
Frank Arden 
Eric Bradley
235
Appendix 3: Appendices for Experiments reported in Chapter 8
236
(a) Famous people used in Experiment 6
Flo Bjelke-Peterson 
Jean Kitson 
Queen Elizabeth 
Barbara Stanwyck 
Alicia Silverstone 
Tony Pearen 
Kylie Minogue 
Susan Olsen 
Anna Paquin 
Denise Roberts 
Rowena Wallace 
Andrew Lloyd-Webber 
Rob de Castella 
Grant Kenny 
Gene Hackman 
Clint Eastwood 
James Richter 
Derryn Hinch 
Lloyd Bridges 
Macau ley Culkin
(b) Examples of famous faces used in Experiment 6
238
Queen Elizabeth II
Denise Roberts
Grant Kenny
Clint Eastwood
Barbara Stanwyck
Kylie Minogue
Andrew
Lloyd-Webber
Lloyd Bridges
239
(c) Novel names used in Experiment 6
Leonie Evans 
Melanie Dell 
Leslie Barker 
Mary Barker 
Elsie Newman 
Kylie Fraser 
Elizabeth Cantrill 
Jenny Napier 
Kerry Sweeney 
Warren Sweeney 
Julie Slater 
Susan Turnbull 
Laurie Smith 
Greg Morris 
Jim Doherty 
Warren Patterson 
Kevin Prescott 
Paul Bennet 
Patrick Kane 
Jason Stapleton
240
(d) Famous people used in Experiment 8
A ctors S p ortspeop le
K im  B asinger A ndre  A gassi
Jod ie  F oster K ieren  P erk ins
N ico le  K idm an Pete Sam pras
M ichelle  P feiffer L aurie  D aley
M eg R yan G reg  N orm an
B ruce W illis K athy  F reem an
M el G ibson S teffi G ra f
T o m  H anks C o n ch ita  M artin ez
H ugh  G rant M elin d a  G ain sfo rd
K evin  C ostner M o n ica  Seles
241
(e) Examples of famous faces used in Experiment 8
242
Andre Agassi Steffi Graf
Monica Seles Greg Norman
Mel Gibson Jodie Foster
Nicole Kidman Kevin Costner
243
(f) Examples of non-famous faces used in Experiment 8
244
245
(g) Novel (non-famous) names used in Experiment 8
Henry Nagle 
Patrick Thornton 
Russell Brown 
Adam Gilbert 
Ian Draper 
Ken Joyce 
Edward Kirk 
David Hall 
Frank Newton 
Malcolm Sands 
Helen Palmer 
Sara Bilski 
Kerrie Walsh 
Rachael Fallon 
Carol Reed 
Fiona Cowley 
Leeanne Ashford 
Amanda Lawton 
Elizabeth Evans
Dianne Mackie
(h) Correct and modified names of famous people used
in Experiment 8
246
C orrec t nam e M odified  nam e (if  used)
K im  B asinger 
Jod ie  F oster 
N ico le  K idm an 
M ichelle  P feiffer
K im  B asin fo rd
M eg R yan 
K athy F reem an
M eg R y d er
S teffi G ra f 
C o n ch ita  M artinez
S teffi G ran t
M elin d a  G ainsfo rd  
M o n ica  Seles
M elin d a  G ainey
B ruce W illis B ruce W illiam s
M el G ibson  
T o m  H anks 
H ugh  G ran t
M el G ibbons
K evin  C ostner K evin  C o stin
A ndre  A gassi 
K ieren  Perk ins K ieren  P erley
Pete S am pras 
L aurie  D aley
Pete S am pson
G reg  N orm an G reg  N o rd en
